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ABSTRACT 
This work examines the public interest in relation to concentration in 
the media sector and addresses the question of how to measure 
concentration with a view to safeguarding and promoting media L- 
pluralism. It is based on extensive literature research, official 
publications and interviews. 
Although the pertinent US situation is reviewed, the thesis focuses 
primarily on the European media field. It presents an historical 
background of the European media pluralism and concentration 
regulatory environment, its earlier and current shaping, its past and 
present developments. It uncovers the technological, economic, 
political, socio-cultural and legal forces influencing media 
concentration regulatory policies and action. The work attempts to find 
out both what counts as being in the public interest in the light of new 
developments in the media and whether regulatory intervention in a 
free market can be justified on public interest grounds. 
By doing so, it pinpoints the different methods of regulating and 
measuring media concentration for the purposes of safeguarding 
pluralism in the market. The findings highlight a number of problems: 
none of the proposed methodologies can effectively establish 'impact'; 
different indicators of assessing concentration are likely to lead to 
disparate conclusions as to its level in a given market; a system that is 
applicable to all information services with different characteristics is 
hardly conceivable. 
The contribution of this study rests on the development of better 
strategies that will protect the public interest. Its originality reposes on 
the fact that while accepting the urgent need for new standards to 
measure media concentration and pluralism in the media market , it 
concludes that the proposed units are not sufficient on their own due to 
capture 'influence'. In the absence of a direct measure of influence, it is 
necessary to develop an approach combining the various sets of 
methods and use it as an alternative technique to establish impact 
indirectly. Alternative proposals are thus put forward in an attempt to 
develop a better measure which takes into account a large number of 
public interest issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction I. 
Recent technological advances such as cable, satellite and dicrital 
compression together with liberalised regulation are reshaping the 
European media landscape. During the course of history, most 
European states have created a politically and culturally sensitised 
media (particularly broadcasting) regulatory environment, by referring 
to media's opinion-forming power, and by emphasising the scarcity of 
available frequencies as well as the requisite investment of enormous 
funds. This is all changing at the moment. On the one hand, we are 
witnessing a determination by governments to encourage new 
competitive enterprises to operate in a media environment transformed 
by deregulation. On the other hand, we are seeing the politics of 
deregulation (or light touch regulation), commercialisation and 
globalisation being pursued further by technological developments. 
Digital technology, in particular, can change the number, type and the 
relationship of the players in the media sector and is expected to bring 
about a proliferation of new networks and channels. Satellite 
improvements stimulate firms to expand beyond their national 
boundaries while cable, an important form of television distribution, 
provides the potential of local programming. Advertiser- supported 
radio and newspaper publishing are also burgeoning in most countries. 
The expanded media market-place not only has attracted the entry of 
new companies in the media industry but also stimulated established 
broadcasting station and newspaper firms to expand their businesses. In 
addition, it allowed and, sometimes, forced companies to link up with 
each other, thereby raising levels of media market concentration. The 
progressive economic integration across Europe is encouraged by the 
European Union (EU) which perceives it as a significant objective. In 
the light of the large foreseen increase in the modes and means of 
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delivery, the EU tries to create favourable conditions for trans-national 
investments. In order to establish such a favourable institutional 
framework, the Commission seeks the harmonisation of media 
ownership rules by eliminating national differences concerning 
restrictions on media ownership. 
However, the Commission and the European Parliament, in particular, 
while encouraging the restructuring of the European media industry, 
are also concerned with the implications this restructuring might have 
on the public interest. Concerns have been expressed that some media 
firms may become too powerful in their ability to 'influence' public 
opinion. Therefore the growth of the new media environment raises the 
issue of how to ensure that cultural and political pluralism and diversity 
will be preserved. The concern is threefold: a) ensure that there is 
sufficient programme diversity (variety of programme content); b) 
ensure that there is sufficient access to information; and c) ensure that 
there is reasonable balance in the reporting and presentation of 
information programmes. Economic integration and technological 
development, to the extent that they increase concentration in the media 
sector, are perceived as threats to the above objectives. 
The current thinking at national as well as at European levels is to 
construct a workable and feasible model for regulating media 
concentration that will be capable of both measuring accurately levels 
of media concentration in a given market and capturing an operator's 
ability to influence public opinion in that market. This task is extremely 
difficult as we are moving into an era in which the distinction between 
the corporations and institutions that own and manage different media 
entities is becoming almost impossible to draw. Mergers, acquisitions, 
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alliances and other tendencies towards amalgamation among preN, Iously 
competing firms jeopardise the task of measuring the exact level of 
local, regional, national or even international concentration. Further, 
the convergence of technologies makes it difficult to apply a single 
standard capable of evaluating correctly multi-media concentration and 
assessing its impact on the public interest. 
Changes in the ownership and control of the media, media integration 
and the deregulatory process raise a large number of questions about 
the notion of the public interest. Thus Chapter one, after an initial 
attempt to define that vague term, tries to find out what counts as being 
in the public interest in the light of the new developments in the media 
field. The issue that is tackled there is both whether a state-owned or a 
free market media environment can best deliver the public interest, and 
whether regulatory intervention in a free market can be justified on 
public interest grounds. The main focus though is on the diversity 
principle which is discussed in relation to media market concentration. 
The second Chapter looks at the process of media concentration in 
detail and provides an economic analysis of this phenomenon. The 
analysis of market structure includes the determination of the number 
of players and the degree of competition in a given market, the 
identification of barriers to entry for potential new competitors, the 
isolation of horizontal and vertical ownership patterns, and a study of 
the processes and consequences of conglomerate control. The chapter 
also attempts to make a connection between economic analysis and 
policy implications by giving concrete examples of different types of 
policy intervention. 
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Chapter three explores the media competition, concentration and 
merger control policies at European level. It firstly tries to evaluate the 
relevance of competition law and merger control provisions for the 
purposes of safeguarding diversity in the media industry. An historical 
background of the European media concentration policy is then 
presented, followed by an outline of the main points of the 1992 
Commission's Green Paper on 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in 
the Internal Market' (the paper that initiated the discussion of forming 
media-specific ownership rules). The interested parties' reaction in the 
context of the two consultation rounds that followed the publication of 
the Green Paper is then described. Finally, an attempt is made to point 
out the factors that prevent the enforcement of effective European 
regulation in the field of media concentration. 
No doubt, one of these factors has to do with the content of a possible 
initiative on media concentration, particularly the selection of the 
appropriate standard for measuring concentration. Thus Chapter four 
outlines the problems of the different methodologies of measuring 
media concentration for the purposes of guaranteeing diversity in the 
mass media. Traditional criteria such as the number of channels or 
franchises that one single company or individual can hold are critically 
analysed, followed by an examination of the proposed audience and 
revenue-based criteria. At the end of this chapter alternative proposals 
are put forward in an attempt to develop a better measure which takes 
into account a large number of public interest issues. 
The fifth Chapter consists of a summary and conclusion of this work 
and includes its contribution to the body of knowledge. 
CHAPTER I 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE MEDIA 
Public Interest and Diversity in the Media 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past, in both Europe and the United States, there was a general 
consensus surrounding the concepts of telecommunications and 
broadcasting. The technologies were regarded as 'public good good 
held in common, accessed by all, and benefiting everyone. The social 
organisation of both technologies has been along the lines of national 
boundaries. Telecommunications has been regarded as a natural 
monopoly, 1 while broadcasting has been regulated and protected by the 
perception of spectrum scarcity. 2 Because of the limited entry in the 
latter sector, governments have directly or indirectly controlled it. 
Broadcasting has also been linked to the concept of cultural defence - 
defining and proclaiming a view of what holds one nation of people 
together as against others. Hills and Papathanassopoulos (1991: 4) state 
that 'so fierce has been the view of broadcasting as a forum for the 
expression of national solidarity and as the national information source 
for citizens, that for the last 70 years or so, governments have retained 
public service broadcasting organisations to fulfil these roles'. In 
contrast, the press, the only supplier of information and entertainment 
I Natural monopoly is a product or service market in which one supplier can always supply the home 
market more cheaply than two or more suppliers. This notion mainly applies to infrastructures such 
as telecommunications, electricity, etc. 
2 Until the late 1970s there was the practical matter of the initial limitation of spectrum availability 
that primarily made state regulation in broadcasting acceptable. However, the development of new 
media technology has undermined the notion of spectrum scarcity as a rationale for regulation. New 
areas of spectrum are now open to use (notably the centimetric band by satellites) and in some markets 
broadband cable distribution of television is pervasive, whereas in others video-cassette recorders have 
displaced or re-ordered consumption of broadcast TV (see Collins et al., 1988: 124). The expected 
digital compression technology, with its capacity to pack information into a fraction of the original 
volume for storage and transmission, will further broaden the radio spectrum. However, so long as 
allocative scarcity exists, that is, that demand for broadcasting frequencies exceeds supply, then 
, government regulation still applies. 
States must continue to license broadcasters, oversee the 
spectrum, decide who should lead the new stations and consider how these should be financed. 
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to the public until the end of the last century, has almost always been 
free from state control in providing such material. 3 
Significant changes that took place in the audio-visual media during the 
past two decades established a new media reality. The once non- 
competitive businesses of broadcasting and telecommunications have 
become dynamic and highly competitive. New players have been 
allowed to enter these markets in both Europe and the United States. 
These changes are due most directly to technological advances in the 
means of electronic distribution and handling of information. The 'new 
media' of cable, video and satellites have changed the number, type and 
the relationship of the players in the media sector. The latest digital 
transformation and compression advances (or information 
superhighway)4 are expected to lead to an unprecedented proliferation 
of the means by which the general public are informed and entertained. 
An abundance of new channels and networks and a further 
intemationalisation of the media, stimulated by the intrusive nature of 
the new distribution technologies, is about to lead to the creation of a 
global media system characterised by international activity at the 
production, distribution and consumption levels. The trend towards the 
globalisation and commercialisation of the electronic and print media is 
thus bringing together distinct technologies, different media 
enterprises, and divergent economies and cultures. 'International 
3 Although in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the state, church and the professional class 
enjoyed a monopoly over public information, the press soon won the battle against that monopoly 
and became independent from potential restrictions. 
4 'Digital technology' is about to change media production, to the point where audio and video 
production, editing and storage equipment increasingly become similar, and sometimes are 
indistinguishable from computers. 'Digital compression' is expected to lower dramatically the storage 
and transmission costs in CD-ROM, cable and satellite TV, and terrestrial broadcasting. The notion 
'information superhighway' relates specifically to telecommunications infrastructures which can deliver 
all kinds of electronic information and communication services. (for more information, see European 
Publishers Council, 1993: 1-8; US Department of Commerce, 1993, esp. chp. 3; PICT PolicN 
Research Forum, 1994: 2-3). 
Public Interest and Diversity in the Media 3 
transactions are constantly eroding national barriers and enlarge our 
vision to embrace a wider horizon of economic, political and 
regulatory issues than previously prompted by the 'old media' of press, 
radio and television (Ferguson, 1986: viii)'. The term most often used 
to describe the emerging social order of the developed states is that of 
an 'information economy' or 'information society'. As most briefly put 
by Melody (1990: 26-7) this refers to a form of society which 'has 
become dependent upon complex electronic information and 
communication networks, and which allocates a major portion of its 
resources to information and communication activities'. 
The on-going technological innovation in the media field and its 
application to information and entertainment services has far-reaching 
consequences for the media environment and raises a broad spectrum 
of policy and research issues. New media technology has firstly 
removed the notion of spectrum scarcity as a rationale for broadcasting 
regulation. The increasing internationalisation of the media, driven by 
the satellite and cable technologies in particular, has also undermined 
the regulatory powers of individual nation states. 5 Governments face 
increasing difficulties in regulating cross-border flows and often cannot 
5 This can be shown by the following example. In its original form the satellite transmission of 
television (and later radio) was thought to happen by way of DBS (Direct Broadcast Satellites), which 
in the WARC 77 Plan were meant for national areas of coverage, and where the satellite position had 
been carefully selected, so that neighbour states would bother each other as little as possible. The 
thought was that it was the single national state which had sovereign power over its five frequencies, 
and the state's public authorities were thus meant to have controlling influence on the access to and 
use of these frequencies. As is well known, the entire European DBS project failed, partly because of 
technical difficulties in developing the transmission technology, partly because of the linking of the 
DBS and the MAC standard, and partly because of transmission problems with the first German TV- 
Sat. But especially because of the parallel development of the FSS (Fixed Satellite Services). These 
were originally intended as communication satellites which were to transmit telephony and data, but 
by way of a decision in the Interim Eutelsat Council in Paris in June 1982, they were put to use as 
television satellites, that is, as satellites which have as their principal task the transmission of TV 
channels to cable systems and later to individual dishes (Direct to Home dishes). The control of access 
to the frequencies which these satellites used and still use, was not given to national governments but 
to Eutelsat. In reality thus the national authorities lost the control over access to their national TV 
markets. This was further intensified by the European acceptance of the privately owned and run SES's 
Astra Project, which acquired access to satellite positions and frequencies able to reach largely all the 
member states of the Council of Europe. 
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prevent capital flowing from one country into another. Moreover, 
market expansion has undermined the notion that dominant public 
monopolies serve best the 'public interest'. The view that has emerged 
is that free market competition among a plethora of new services 
delivers more efficiently public interest goals such as pluralism, 
diversity in content and accessibility. While the public policy model is 
based on the assumption that government intervention is a necessary 
condition for people in order to have equal chances of media access and 
fair representation, the market system assumes that the free operation 
of supply and demand provides better access for all 'voices' (provided 
that they can afford to pay for it) and content that satisfies all interests. 
Indeed, since the market model encourages the proliferation of 
channels and new audience markets, it can lead to increased numerical 
diversity, that is, more channels and theoretically more consumer 
choice. Cable television, in particular, with its capacity to carry 
enormous amounts of information and its potential for two-way 
communication and local programming, is regarded as a revolutionary 
technology that could create a'wired democracy. However, this model 
has been criticised on several grounds. Some have put forth the 
argument that quantitative diversity of variety of channels does not 
necessarily provide qualitative diversity of the media content (LeDuc, 
1982; Hoffmann-Riem, 1987; Melody, 1990). The pure market model, 
the argument runs. ) does not really produce representative social, 
political and cultural diversity including critical and controversial 
views; rather, the predominant trend will be either in favour of the 
production of bland programmes with a universal appeal to an 
undifferentiated, mass audience (Curran, 1991a, 1991b), or in favour 
of the superficially variety of the same politically safe content 
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('corporate speech') (Keane, 1991). Hotelling, who originally discussed 
the potential danger to welfare in terms of the variety of products 
offered by the market, talked of 'an undue tendency for competitors to 
imitate each other... ' (Hotelling, 1929: 41). Apart from the critics that 
the free market approach promotes cultural uniformity and excludes 
social interests from expressing their views, this model is said to lead to 
private media monopolies and concentration of media ownership. 
Garnham. (1990) mentioned that in recent years a small number of 
groups have dominated the film and music production industries, while 
Murdock (1982,1990a, 1990b) and Bagdikian (1992) pointed out that 
media privatisation policies have enabled firms to merge and therefore 
produce multi-media conglomerates which, according to Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos (1990) and Sepstrup (1990), have expanded on a 
global scale. 
The greater linkage between media companies brings forward serious 
questions on positive freedoms, such as the citizens' right to have equal 
access to the new technologies and receive a wide range of opinions and 
information at affordable prices. Potential conflicts between private 
profit motivations and social goals like diversity of views and political 
pluralism - that have been present since the opening of media markets 
to private capital - now more than ever need to be considered and 
resolved. The problem remains one of designing media regulation in 
the public interest. We will add that one of the crucial issues nowadays 
is whether the public and its interest is best served within this new 
concentrated high-tech era, or whether the beneficiaries are only those 
who stimulate these changes. In other words, are the developments 
'public-interest friendly"? 
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In the media politics of Western societies during the past two decades, 
debates about the public interest in mass media have focused on the 
central issue of whether they should be based on the functioning of the 
free market. Many analysts have looked at the performance, policy and 
change of the mass media system from a variety of perspectives. 
McLuhan (1967), Enzensberger (1970) and Forester (1985) advanced 
the technological determinist argument, while Owen et. al (1974), 
Noam (1985), Hendon et. al (1986), Collins et. al (1988) and Gamham 
and Locksley (1991) examined media market economics. Ideology as a 
decisive influence on mass media performance was studied by Negrine 
(1988). Dyson and Humphreys (1990) looked at the politics of neo- 
pluralism, whereas Murdock (1990a, 1990b) examined the influence of 
private ownership patterns from the point of view of neo-Marxism. 
The political and cultural influence of the media was tackled by 
Seymour-Ure (1991) and the sociology of media industry organisation 
by Tunstall (1970,1972,1991). Blumler (1992) identified the social 
values at stake as far as the organisation of broadcasting is concerned. 
Finally, an assessment of mass media performance in economic, social, 
aesthetic and moral aspects was carried out by McQuail (1992a). Most 
of these works dealt with the main challenges that modem media policy 
faces, namely the problem of regulating the private media sector, the 
issue of whether to offer a comprehensive or more shrunk public 
service broadcasting service, and the problem of how to make the 
media accountable to the populace in the high technology era. 
The crucial issue has been (and still is) whether regulatory intervention 
in a free market can be justified on public interest grounds. This 
chapter tries to find out what counts as being in the public interest in 
the light of new developments in the media field. A definition of the 
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term 'public interest' is firstly provided, followed by a debate on media 
regulation on 'public interest' grounds. The main focus though is on the 
'diversity' principle which is discussed in relation to media market 
concentration. 
1.2 DEFINITION OF 'PUBLIC INTEREST' 
The term 'public interest' is a maddeningly vague and loosely 
constructed one and therefore difficult to define. Sills (1968), in the 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, states that the term 
is 'elastic and relative ... [and] ... has no a priori content waiting to be 
revealed ... [It] serves to remind parties immediately concerned that 
there are considerations extending beyond their goals... ' (cited in 
McQuail, 1992a: 20). Moreover, 'it assumes the existence of a common 
interest, although specific manifestations cannot be agreed upon'. Even 
if it presupposes the existence of a common interest, there is no 
consensus on what is in the common good and on the particular policies 
that are required to achieve it. The precise content and meaning given 
to the 'public interest' notion and the means proposed for achieving it 
vary widely within different contexts (countries) and time segments. 
Since it assumes the development of common interests, we may 
provisionally use the idea of public interest to refer to the collective 
cultural, political, social and informational benefits to the society which 
serve both the democratic processes of political participation and the 
cultural, social and economic well-being. Individual claims then are not 
included in the concept. 
There are contradictory versions of what 'public interest I is. Downs 
(1962) mentioned three main schools of thought about how the public 
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interest can be identified and argued that each of them has some 
validity. The first originates from 'the will of the people': the public 
interest is what the majority wants. Such a definition of the public 
interest has been adapted in the USA by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) which, through its Chairman Fowler, argued in 
1982 that the public interest is the collection of private choices. 
According to this point of view, 'the public's interest defines the public 
interest' (Fowler, 1982). The weakness of this theory, according to 
Held (1970), is that there is a conflict between a particular means of 
identifying the public interest (for example, a majority vote or mass 
consumer demand) and the broader notion that public interest means 
something more than the sum of individual preferences. As Dewey 
(1983 [1927]) argued on this point, the public and its interest is not 
necessarily synonymous with the consumers and their interests, nor is it 
the sum total of individual opinions on the events of the day. The public 
is that field of activity that shares in common the consequences of 
private and state action and performs effectively in its own defence. 
For instance, when citizens of a municipality suffer the consequences of 
polluted water and act to cope with the problem (perhaps through an 
environmental or parents coalition) they function as the public. On the 
contrary, when they cannot group together to solve their common 
problem, then they constitute a weak public (Aufderheide, 1993: 53). 
The second school of thought described by Downs states that the public 
interest is decided according to some absolute standard of value 
regardless of what citizens want. McQuail (1992a) pointed out that the 
defect of this theory is twofold: firstly, it may have a weakness of 
insensitivity to popular wants; secondly, its frequently authoritarian, 
paternalistic or ideologically contestable character makes it 
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problematic. The third 'realist' or 'pragmatic' class of theory states that 
the public interest is what political institutions arrive at by their 
decision-making. 
A similar classification scheme was suggested by Held (1970) who also 
identified three main variants of public interest theory: 'preponderance' 
theories, 'unitary' theories and 'common interest' theories. These 
correspond with Downs' versions of the public interest described 
above. McQuail (1992a), in an attempt to define a public interest in 
public communication, advocated Held's 'common interest' variant 
(similar to Downs' 'realist' theory). He ruled out those versions which 
depend heavily on the voice of the people expressed in opinion polls or 
market research because, in his view, one cannot rely on majority votes 
to settle complex issues when public communication has to serve many 
and divergent purposes. He also challenged those versions which rely 
on some absolute value commitment on the grounds that there is no 
longer a unitary value system to which one can appeal in order to settle 
broad issues. He thus focused on the third type of theory (the 'middle 
way' as he called it) because in that context specific objectives and 
mechanisms of achievement can be named and deployed in argument. 
The principle of freedom of speech and publication, for example, may 
itself have to be supported on grounds of long-term benefits to society 
which are not immediately apparent or clear to many individuals. 
Various theories of public interest have thus been advanced. Their very 
presence justify the elasticity and abstract notion of the term. In 
relation to the mass media though we might initially argue that 
something counts as being in the public interest only if it serves the 
aims of all those who participate in public communication and not just 
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those of a minority. Public communication is central in the democratic 
process. As Garnham (1990: 104) argued, 'citizens require ... equal 
access to sources of information and equal opportunities to participate 
in the debates from which political decisions rightly flow'. A definition 
of the term 'public communication', with reference to the mass media, 
has been suggested by Ferguson (1990: ix) as 'those processes of 
information and cultural exchange between media institutions, products 
and publics which are socially shared, widely available and communal 
in character'. The context in which these transactions take place is the 
so-called 'public sphere'- that is, as articulated in particular by the 
political theorist Habermas (1979. ) 1989), a space for rational and 
universalistic politics distinct from both the state and the economy, a 
scene of activity in which people are addressed as citizens, as rational 
political beings, and not merely as consumers. 
Habermas stated that in the late eighteenth century a new political class 
(the bourgeoisie) came to the fore in Britain in particular and formed a 
public body which, in sharp contrast to the old authorities (namely the 
state and the church), provided the conditions for reason-based, public 
opinion. The creation of a network of institutions by the bourgeoisie 
within the civil society, and the launch of a number of newspapers in 
particular, provided the means through which private thoughts could 
become public. Libraries and universities became the places for public 
debate, while publishing enterprises formed the means by which 
government was criticised. That new public sphere was in principle 
open to all and protected from the power of both the church and the 
state. However, Habermas also pointed out that the above described 
space for rational and universalistic politics created by the capitalist 
market was historically damaged by both the extension of the state and 
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the evolution of monopoly capitalism. The formation of large private 
institutions (i. e. advertising agencies, public relations) and the deals 
they made with each other and with the state while excluding the 
public, led to the replacement of rational public discourse by power 
politics. The role of the media was central to the replacement of the 
ideal speech situation by conditions of 'distorted communication'. 
Whereas the independent press at the turn of the nineteenth century had 
led to the formation of rational public debate and public decision- 
making on political and judicial matters, it later functioned as a 
manipulative agency controlling public opinion. 
Habermas's theory merits consideration because he carefully 
conceptualised the nature of the 'public sphere', viewing it as an 
achievement of the new bourgeois (or capitalist) class in Europe, and 
an outcome of its successful struggle against feudalism and church or 
state oppression. However, his theory has been questioned on historical 
grounds. Many argued that he idealised the early period of history he 
referred to and particularly the notion of the 'independent' eighteenth 
century press (Mortensen, 1977; Hohendahl, 1979; Curran, 1991a, 
1991b). Koss (1981,1984), in his analysis of the British political press, 
pointed out that political control by proprietary interests was exercised 
in a large part of the press as early as the eighteenth century. Thus 
Koss's careful analysis showed that the early British press was not so 
independent as Habermas described and therefore, we would argue, did 
not contribute to rational discourse to the degree Habermas wanted. He 
has also been criticised for his rationality argument. Curran (1991a) 
mentioned that 'the newspapers celebrated by Habermas were engines 
of propaganda for the bourgeoisie rather than the embodiment of 
disinterested rationalityl. 
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Although the historical status of Habermas's theory may be 
questionable, he nevertheless offered a starting point for understanding L_ 
the media's role in public communication. 6 The media should facilitate 
the process of rational argumentation by providing a context of public 
discourse which is essential for the formation of free and reason-based 
public opinion. The media should tend to maximise debates over 
political ideas and contribute to public information and argumentation 
which are essential to the maintenance of democracy. Public 
information is essential both for expressing the common interest and 
for taking part in the debate about that common interest. The public 
interest arguments are not just political arguments though. Habermas's 
theory is limited to the political question. However, there are countless 
versions of meanings for 'public interest' in the context of a society. 
There are arguments about cultural heritage, environmental 
preservation, public health and universal education, to mention but a 
few. Over the course of time, these desirable objectives have been 
interpreted and characterised as 'public good'. One version of the 
public interest argument has found its fulfilment in the provision of 
universal education in most Western European countries since the 
nineteenth century (Smith, 1989). Another has valued the right to 
authentic cultural expression and the right to participate in defining the 
historical development of a given culture (White, 1994). Provision for 
the arts, in particular, has often been rested on states' hands both 
because cultural heritage was regarded as a service that needs to be 
preserved for future generations and to ensure that all social classes had 
access to them. The notion of public interest has thus been spread to 
6 Garnharn (1986), for example, although questioning Habermas's historical assumptions, adopted his 
central analysis and used it as a Justification of public service broadcasting. 
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include important public services at zero or low cost for the interests 
concerned. 
Nevertheless, one definition of the public interest these days is free 
market competition - i. e. regulation to ensure free market competition. 
The discussions of economic control of competition are also public 
interest arguments. As we shall see below, the argument is that the 
market produces the best outcome for the largest number of people (see 
for example the 1986 Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC, 
henceforth The Peacock Report). One of the questions is how in the 
capitalist era of mass politics, mass communications and the dominance 
of deregulatory philosophy collective goods can be best safeguarded. 
Another is whether they will survive at all. Therefore, the divestiture 
of telecommunications monopolies, the multiplication of channels of 
communication, and the relaxation of regulatory controls over 
broadcasting in particular, pose important questions about the nature of 
the modern public sphere. Are the attempts to move the emphasis from 
public to private sector in the 'public interest? The free market 
competition philosophy declares that it can deliver diversity and a free 
market place of ideas, essential as these goals are for the creation and 
maintenance of a public sphere of communication. But are public 
argumentation, freedom of speech and other desirable objectives 
guaranteed in an age of information abundance? 
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1.3 MEDIA REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The growth of a complex system of regulation of various industries, 
including the mass media, on grounds of a supposed public interest, has 
been evident. As already indicated, historically societies have extended 
the concept of public interest to cover free or inexpensive public 
services such as universal education, preservation of public amenities, 
environmental policy, state or municipally-run transportation, to name 
but a few. Melody's (1990) account of the public interest in the 
emerging information society refers to the historical notion of certain 
industries being recognised in law and custom as 'business affected with 
a public interest. These were often connected with transport and other 
public utilities, in which monopoly conditions were likely to arise and 
where needs for service were likely to be pressing. In these 
circumstances, public regulation was often applied in order to ensure 
equity, efficiency, fair and adequate provision to all at reasonable 
prices. In certain countries and regions, for example, there has long 
been a public interest argument in favour of municipally-run buses in 
order to ensure that people at all levels of income enjoy cheap and 
reliable transport (Smith, 1989). Certain types of industries thus appear 
historically to have been inspired with a public function or 'affected 
with a public interest' and have been regulated to serve that purpose. 
Horwitz (1989) pointed out that the industries considered to be imbued 
with a public function are transportation, telecommunications, energy 
utilities and the system of currency exchange. He labelled them 
infrastructures for they are the channels for trade and discourse which 
bind together a community, society, or nation. They are central to the 
circulation of capital and literally constitute both the foundation and the 
limit for the overall economic functioning of a society. 
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In the media domain, universal telephone service was adopted as a 
policy objective in both the United States and Europe to encourage 
economic and social interaction within the country as a way of 
promoting national unity (Melody, 1990). State support, together with 
the imposition of regulatory controls, helped the establishment and 
successful operation of the American telecommunications system. The 
telegraph industry received in its infancy federal and state subsidies, 
while telephony was established as a 'natural monopoly' and regulated 
in order to facilitate the expansion of the nation-wide telephone 
network (Horwitz, 1989; Smith, 1989; Melody, 1990). The telephone 
system was united by the giant American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
set up in 1934, was given the role to supervise telecommunications and 
to protect the existing structures and corporate interests involved. But 
it was not only a commerce-based public interest which underlay the 
US traditional system of telecommunications regulation. At the same 
time, the FCC had the mandate to secure broader public interest goals 
such as universality, fairness and equity. Telephone and telegraph 
enterprises were legally obliged to provide service to all citizens at air 
and reasonable rates. In part due to such obligations, according to 
Horwitz (1989), the US telephone network was universal and efficient 
and the service was comparatively inexpensive for the customer. 
Telecommunications networks in Europe were run by nationally based, 
mainly publicly owned, telecommunications authorities (the so-called 
PTTs). Each national PTT held a monopoly over the whole network - 
transmission, switching and equipment - and was itself in charge of the 
introduction of new services, acting both as supplier and regulator 
(Hills and Papathanassopoulos, 1991). The technology, as in the USA, 
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was regarded as natural monopoly and as a public good. Governments 
emphasised the importance of the penetration of the technology in 
assuring access to all citizens at low costs. The difference from the 
United States was that the domestic PTTs were state-run, whereas at the 
other side of the Atlantic AT&T was a privately owned network 
operator controlled through an independent agency (the FCC). 
Despite the fact that it was based on different structural models, the 
technology of broadcasting in both the United States and Europe was 
regulated by the state in terms of access and content. The broadcasting 
model thus involved content regulation, as opposed to the 'common 
carrier' model for telecommunications which called for regulation of 
infrastructure but not of content. 7 But as was the case in 
telecommunications, broadcasting was also regarded as 'public good' in 
both continents. Private broadcasters in the USA were given licenses to 
monopolise a given radio frequency but those licenses were not 
regarded as a property right. Broadcast regulation was founded upon 
the public domain argument that the airwaves were a natural resource 
held in common and consequently the state acted to protect that 
resource. The public domain rationale or, put it another way, the 
rationale for regulation, was based on the concept of spectrum scarcity 
- the limited nature of the electromagnetic resource. The FCC allocated 
access to limited airwaves and obliged successful operators to fulfil 
certain aims. In return for the grant of a license to operate, 
broadcasters were placed in a position of public trustees, that is, they 
had the duty to serve the public interest by fulfilling the tastes, needs 
7 The main principle of common carrier law was that a carrier must allow non-discrinunatory (i. e. fair 
and equitable) access to its service at reasonable prices (Horwitz, 1989: 13). For the three different 
types of regulatory regimes that have appeared in the USA throughout the years, namely the press 
freedom model, the common carrier model and the broadcasting model, see Kalven, 1967: 15-30 and 
Geller, 1985: 283-310. 
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and desires of all people within the service area (Rutkus, 1982). The 
1934 Communications Act, clearly mandated that 'broadcasting be 
treated as public good that serves goals of benefit to the public and 
therefore be subject to government regulation' (Kellner, 1990: 185)'. 
The FCC's 1946 statement on 'Public Service Responsibility of 
Broadcast Licensees', commonly known as the 'Blue Book, emphasised 
the public nature of broadcasting and attempted to give a concrete 
meaning to the term 'public interest'. It identified four public interest 
issues in terms of programme policy: the carrying of sustaining 
programmes, the carrying of local live programmes, the carrying of 
programmes devoted to public discussion, and the elimination of 
commercial advertising excesses (Hoynes, 1994). Krugman and Reid 
(1980), in their own assessment of the public interest criteria used by 
the FCC when considering broadcast license applications, identified the 
criteria of balance, heterogeneity, dynamism, localism and diversity. 
These were supplemented by other principles such as the 'Fairness 
Doctrine'. At the heart of the 'public trusteeship' model of 
broadcasting, the Fairness Doctrine (deriving from the 1934 
Communications Act) obliged broadcasters to cover issues of public 
importance or controversy and to provide a reasonable opportunity for 
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues (Brennan, 
1989; Horwitz, 199 1). The FCC may have not always acted in 
accordance with its own rhetoric on the importance of the public 
interest. Many argued that it simply served the interests of those it was 
supposed to regulate (Kahn, 1978) and others emphasised the inherent 
weakness of the FCC as a regulatory body (Baughman, 1985). No 
matter how effective the FCC has been throughout the years, it 
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nevertheless contributed positively to an understanding of broadcasting 
as a kind of public utility. 
Most European countries have imposed similar public service 
obligations on their broadcast media. In contrast to the US broadcasting 
model though, the Western European model developed outside the 
market. The European broadcasting model, the so-called public service 
broadcasting model, in its ideal typical form consisted of a nation-wide 
public monopoly which could best serve the public interest by its 
commitment to quality in return for a basic, initial payment, usually in 
the form of an annual license fee. There is indeed overlap between the 
idea of the public interest in communication and public service 
broadcasting, since the latter is defined by Garnham (1983: 13-14) as 'a 
means of providing all citizens, whatever their wealth or geographical 
location, equal access to a wide range of high quality entertainment, 
information and education, and as a means of ensuring that the aim of 
the programme producer is the satisfaction of a range of audience tastes 
rather than only those tastes that show the largest profit'. Therefore, 
public service broadcasting is often defined in terms of benefits which 
it is supposed to deliver to society: universal provision and wide- 
ranging appeal; services to regions and minorities; attention to national 
interest, identity and culture; the provision of informational and 
educational services beyond what the market would require, etc. 
The first national monopoly broadcaster, the BBC, was established in 
the United Kingdom in 1922 and a similar model was adopted by other 
European countries shortly afterwards. 8 The historic justifications for 
8 National broadcasting monopolies were set up in Italy in 1924, in Sweden in 1925 and in Ireland, 
Denmark and Finland in 1926. This model was not applicable only in countries with linguistic and 
cultural differences such as Belgium and Switzerland. In those countries, each linguistic, religpous or 
cultural community had its own public broadcasting service (McQuail and Sinue, 1986). 
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establishing public service broadcasting were many and varied. Firstly, 
there was the practical matter of the initial limitation on spectrum 
availability. It was always argued that broadcasting could not be a free 
market due to spectrum scarcity and to a consequent limited access to 
that sector. This scarcity of the radio spectrum provided the basis for 
both government regulation of broadcasting and the imposition of 
special obligations of balance and impartiality upon it. Secondly, 
governments wanted to preserve the public service values of universal 
service and give access to those who had limited or no voice in the 
social proceedings namely the young, weak and poor. Furthermore, the 
establishment of public service broadcasting institutions ensured that 
the service was provided to all citizens irrespective of their location 
(for example, to those living in rural as well as densely populated 
urban areas). 'The pursuit of a programming mission that gives a 
higher priority to national, cultural, political and educational/informal 
aims, rather than to entertainment' (Garnham, 1989: 1), was another 
reason for government involvement in broadcasting. Broadcasting was 
thus heavily linked to the concept of cultural defence. One of the 
arguments that culture, in particular, should not be left simply to the 
market (i. e. needs to be regulated) was that it could benefit future 
generations, and therefore one generation does not have the right to 
deny this to future generations. 
In short, both the broadcasting and telecommunications industries were 
regarded as 'public good' - good held in common, accessed by all, and 
benefiting everyone. The dominant idea in both Europe and the United 
States was that the above industries should be treated like air, water and 
other elements that belong to everyone, or like parks and highways that 
can be used by all people (Hills and Papathanassopoulos, 1991: 3). 
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There was thus a recognition that these sectors should not be treated as 
any other economic business. The prevailing idea was that some aspects 
of public communication were of wide concern to the society and 
should be looked after by government or by other public agencies. For 
instance, as regards broadcasting in the USA, Johnson (1987: 31) 
stated: 'reference to the public interest at least contemplates a public 
purpose, public ownership, public impact of consequence, and a 
declaration of public policy that, whatever else it may be, broadcasting 
is not just any other business'. The Report of the Committee on 
Financing the BBC (The Peacock Report), although attacking the 
broadcasting status quo on the grounds both that it did not enlarge 
consumer choice and it did not enable programme makers to offer 
alternative wares to people, it nevertheless endorsed the importance of 
public service broadcasting in providing for this: 'The fulfilment of 
this goal, so far from being incompatible with public service activities 
positively requires them in a sense of "public service"... (The Peacock 
Report, 1986: para. 547) . 
In contrast to the electronic media, the print media were protected 
from any governmental interference. As soon as the battles of the 
emerging middle class against the church and the state were won, 
freedom of the press became established either in constitutions (in the 
United States) or in special press laws (in Western Europe). In the 
USA, the press freedom model applied to the press and constitutionally 
forbade regulatory intervention - the print model was not subject to 
licensing, a fairness doctrine or access requirements. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1791) states that 
'Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
freedom of speech, or press... ' 
(quoted in McQuail, 1992a: 36). For historical and political reasons the 
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authorities in the Member States of the European Union have been very 
restrained concerning regulation of access and content to the written 
press market. In Europe, ' press laws are usually formulated tersely and 
are limited to an ordering framework which accepts the market as the 
mechanism to control content diversity... [They] are normally limited 
to the creation of a legal framework of unrestricted press 
organisations... (Hoffmann-Riem, 1992b: 148)1. 
Although the state legislatures' attention has focused on the electronic 
media. ) there has not been such a clear 
divergence between the press and 
broadcasting. Because there is a link between public interest in press 
diversity and democracy, there have been various subsidy forms of 
government intervention in the sector. Positive policy instruments and 
support measures such as tax and postal concessions gave some 
economic protection to the press, and therefore some privilege which 
was justified according to 'public interest' principles concerning the 
quality, independence, diversity and volume of information available in 
the society (McQuail, 1992a). Table 1.1 summarises the various 
support measures for the print media in a number of Western 
European countries. As can be seen, support schemes may take the 
form of direct subsidies (according to the circumstances, automatic 
and/or selective), indirect incentives (i. e. fiscal incentives: reduced 
VAT rate, loans on preferential terms, fiscal incentive mechanisms for 
investment in production, etc. ), or even support for training. All these 
press support schemes have been designed both to allow publications to 
weather the crisis which the sector is experiencing from competition 
from the other media (mainly television) and to maintain diversity of 
publications vis- a-vis the strengthening of concentrations. 
Public Interest and Diversity in the Media -12 
Table 1.1 
Support Measures for the Media 
in Selected EU Countries 
COUNTRY The written press 
Belgium The French Community's written press is supported by the fund for 
assisting the development of the press and which is maintained by 
contributions from the public broadcasting body (RTBF) and private 
TV stations. Further, the daily opinion-forming Belgian press receives, 
subject to a number of conditions, direct aid under a royal decree on the 
advice of the Belgian Association of Newspaper Publishers. 
France Press enterprises benefit from support measures of a general nature (aid 
for national, regional, departmental and local dailies devoted to political 
and general news, which have low advertising receipts) as well as from 
specific assistance (training, postal and tax advantages, a 50% 
reduction in rail transport charges and telephone and telefax. charges). 
Germany The basic principle is that direct support measures leading to any State 
influence on the media are prohibited. Preferential postal rates are 
granted to news periodicals on certain conditions. Investment credits 
(investment loans to improve firms' competitiveness) are granted on 
certain conditions to newspapers and magazines mainly devoted to 
political education and the citizens' development. 
Italy Press companies benefit from indirect support measures (tariff and tax 
reductions) as well as direct measures such as special credit rates for 
technical development. Direct grants are made to the non-profit and 
community press, journalists' co-operatives, linguistic rruinorities and 
political parties' press. 
Sweden The press receives support of a general nature (exemption from VAT, 
preferential tax rates for publicity income for newspapers and similar 
publications, preferential postal rates) as well as specific assistance 
(direct assistance for production, for the creation of new publications, 
for development and modernisation of press companies, for the 
creation of joint distribution networks and for co-operation in printing). 
The A Press Fund provides loans and subsidies to press organs in order to 
Netherlands overcome financial difficulties and/or restructure their operations. This 
support is only given on a temporary basis. The Fund may also assist 
in the financing of new daily newspapers. General support is also 
provided by the application of a low VAT rate to paper subscrip 
nited Newspapers benefit from a zero VAT rate. 
Kingdom 
I 
Source: Committee of Experts on Media Concentration and Pluralism (MM-CM (93) 
6); Gustaffson (1993); Media Ownership: The Government's Proposals (Cm 2872, 
1995); The Guardian (16-12-1995); Financial Times (16-12-1995) 
The trend towards concentration in the press sector has been seen over 
a considerable period of time (see Chapter 2). The rapid commercial 
growth and the strong trend to monopoly that the press has experienced 
since the early part of the twentieth century in both Europe and the 
USA have raised questions over the public task and public 
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responsibility of the medium. The 1947 Report by the Commission on 
Freedom of the Press in America (Chafee, 1947) as well as the three 
Royal Commissions on the Press9 in Britain made specific 
recommendations for standards of press performance based on the 
'public interest' criteria of accuracy, fairness, ethics, access, 
truthfulness and diversity. Because concentration in the written press 
has become more marked in the Western World in recent years, there 
has also been regulation of press ownership in most countries. 10 There 
has thus been a certain degree of government intervention concerning 
the structure of the press sector. Nevertheless, the 1990 report of the 
Calcutt Committee" in Britain, which dealt with press behaviour in 
matters of sensational reporting and invasion of privacy, is a sign that 
governments also intend to intervene in the content of the press. 
1.4 DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA 
A complex mosaic of technological, economic, political, cultural and 
even legal forces have undermined the traditional regulation of the 
electronic media and led in the 1980s to the process of deregulation, 
that is, the dismantling of regulatory controls and the introduction of 
competition and of market forces in the media industry. In the United 
States, the structure of regulated telecommunications was massively 
transformed by the break-up of AT&T in 1982. In the United 
Kingdom, British Telecom (BT) was privatised in 1984 when operation 
and regulation were separated. The then French Socialist government 
9 Royal Commission on the Press (1949) Report: Sir W. D. Ross (Chairman), Cmnd 7700, 
HMSO, 
London; Royal Commission on the Press (1962) Report: Lord Shawcross (Chairman), HMSO, 
London; Royal Commission on the Press (1977) Report: O. R. McGregor (Chairman), Cmnd 6810, 
HMSO, London. 
10 Media ownership rules in selected European countries are stated in Appendixes I to VI. 
II Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) Report: D. Calcutt (Chairman), HMSO, 
London. 
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emphasised profit making for public utilities in the mid-1980s, whereas 
in Germany the national PTT Deutsche Bundespost was partly 
privatised in the late 1980s. Due to pressures from the European 
Commission, steps towards restructuring of their telecommunications 
industries are expected within this decade in other European Union 
countries. 12 The safeguarding of free circulation of services across 
internal frontiers and the guaranteeing of a 'level playing field' are 
seen of central importance by the Commission to the development of 
the European information society. Council Resolution of July 1993 laid 
down a timetable for full liberalisation of public voice telephony 
service in most member states by 1998 at the latest. 13 The Bangemann 
group's report recommended that Member States accelerate the on- 
going liberalisation of the telecommunication sector, and the 
Commission responded by an Action Plan which identified the 
importance of infrastructure liberalisation and of interconnection and 
interoperability of networks for the establishment of a European 
information infrastructure. 14 Efforts are currently being put at 
European level firstly to seek agreement on the principle of 
12 In Greece, for example, where for the time being competition is very sparse in the Greek services 
sector and practically non-existent in infrastructure, two partial privatisation schemes of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organisation (OTE) were introduced in 1993 and 1994 respectively. The first, 
known as the 'strategic investor' initiative, was aimed at selling 35% of OTE's shares together with 
management control to an internationally active telecommunications operator, and selling another 
14% through an undefined flotation scheme. The second attempt, known as the 'flotation' initiative, 
had as its goal the sale of 20% of OTE's shares through an initial public offer scheme in the Athens 
stock market after a global book-building procedure (Caloghirou and Constantelou, 1995). Both 
attempts failed because the policy-making process became ensnared with inter-party antagonisms. 
However, another privatisation scheme (the terms of which have not been specified yet) is under way 
now, opting for introduction of infrastructure competition in the country. 
13 The Resolution took into account the different economic conditions of the member states and made 
proper adjustments to the proposed timetables for adoption by the less favoured regions. Thus 
additional transition periods have been granted to Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal in order to allow 
their public telecommunications operators to achieve the necessary restructuring and tariff rebalancing 
measures in the light of competitive market pressures [Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the 
review of the situation in the telecommunications sector and the need for further development in that 
market (93/C213/01; OJ C213/01,06-08-1993)]. 
14 High-level Group on the Information Society (1994) 'Europe and the Global Information Socictý 
Recommendations to the European Council', Brussels, 26-05-1994. The report was followed bý, 
'Europe's way to the information society: an Action Plan', Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(94) 347,19-07-1994. 
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infrastructure liberalisation in telecoms and secondly to keep to the 
timetable for its implementation. 
The previously evident monopoly in the telecommunications sector has 
thus become more competitive and new players have been allowed to 
enter the industry and compete with incumbents. Similar trends have 
occurred in the broadcasting market and they are still in process. 
According to Horwitz (1989), broadcast deregulation in the USA has 
taken two forms: entry liberalisation and structural/content 
deregulation. As mentioned above, the FCC protected in the past 
conventional broadcasters and conventional broadcast technologies. Its 
orientation though has shifted since the mid-1970s when, in the light of 
new technological developments such as direct broadcast satellites, 
multi-point distribution service and low power television, it rejected 
protectionism and pursued an expansion of broadcast technologies and 
services. In 1977, the then FCC Chairman Ferris (a Carter appointee) 
deregulated cable TV and encouraged the entry of new distribution 
services in the industry. Since 1981, the FCC has moved even further 
to relax both indirect controls over programme content and direct 
controls over the structure of broadcasting. Under ex-FCC Chairman 
Fowler (a Reagan appointee), the Commission loosened, among other 
things, guidelines that required non- entertainment programmes, 
'informative' children's programmes and coverage of community issues 
(McKean and Stone, 1992). It also eliminated various structural rules. 
The new multiple ownership rules which became effective on April, 2, 
1985 retained the 1943 'duopoly rule' and the cross-media ownership 
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rule of 1975, but raised the number of TV channels and AM or FM 
radio stations a single firm may hold from seven to twelve. 15 
The development of new communications technologies then has 
revolutionised the broadcasting industry and was central to the 
deregulation of broadcasting in the USA. Historically, consumer access 
to television and radio programming depended on terrestrial broadcast 
stations. The development of new distribution systems has greatly 
expanded the potential sources of supply for all types of media 
products. Media firms nowadays, for example, can deliver TV 
programming to viewers through distribution systems that include 
terrestrial broadcasting, cable systems, multi-channel multi-point 
distribution systems (MMDS) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) 
service. 16 It was primarily that abundance of choice that undermined 
the traditional rationale for regulation and led to demands for 
relaxation of FCC regulatory controls, particularly around cable TV. 
Indeed, cable was seen as the medium through which minorities, non- 
profit organisations and other groups normally left out by conventional 
TV could have access to citizens. FCC's cable rules were fiercely 
criticised and finally relaxed in 1984 but re-regulated17 in 1992 when it 
15 The 'duopoly rule', adopted in 1943, prohibits common ownership of more than one station of each 
type (AM, FM, or TV) in a given market area. The 1975 cross-media ownership rule prohibits the 
formation of new media combinations involving television stations, daily newspapers and radio 
outlets in the same community. The rule allowed for an increase in ownership of stations from 7 to 
12, also provided that a group may acquire up to 14 AM, 14 FM and 14 TV stations provided that at 
least two of the stations in each service are minority-controlled. For purposes of the multiple 
ownership rules, minority ownership is defined as 'more than 50% owned by one or more members of 
a minority group' (for more information and an update of media ownership rules in the USA see 
Howard, 1989; McKean and Stone, 1992; US Department of Commerce, 1993; Hoynes, 1994). 
16 A cable system receives video and audio signals either of-the-air, via microwave, or via satellite. 
These signals are subsequently transmitted via coaxial cable or fibre optic to the home. MMDS 
systems use microwave radio frequencies to deliver audio, voice, data, or video signals to roof-top 
antennas located on homes or apartment buildings. DBS service uses more powerful transponders than 
conventional satellites to transmit signals directly to home receivers without the aid of a community 
or ground transmitter (US Department of Commerce, 1993). 
17 For debates relating to the re-regulation of TV in the USA, see Porter, 1989: 5-27. 
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became clear that unregulated cable monopolies had not produced the 
optimal pricing or viewpoint diversity. 18 
Technology was also the driving force for the dismantling of the 
European broadcasting industry. During the last decade the European 
public service broadcasting model was perceived to be in varying 
degrees of crisis. The pressure of the new media technologies has led 
more governments to change their broadcasting systems and open up 
the market. The development of trans-national distribution media for 
audio-visual programming such as satellites, cable and video cassettes 
have reduced the potential of regulation by the nation state upon which 
public service broadcasting has rested. In addition, the development of 
new media technology has undermined the notion of spectrum scarcity 
as a rationale for regulation. 'New areas of spectrum are open to use 
(notably the centimentric band by satellites) and in some markets 
broadband cable distribution of television is pervasive, while in others 
video-cassette recorders (VCRs) have displaced or reordered 
consumption of broadcast television' (Collins at al., 1988: 124). 
However, the tendency towards liberalisation/commercialisation of 
broadcasting could not be solely attributed to the pressure from the 
new sophisticated technology. Pressure also came from commercial 
interests, notably potential proprietors and advertisers who envisaged 
financial gains in the new era. Advertisers, in particular, argued that 
the European advertising market was under- exploited. And, indeed, 
Europe spent less on advertising than the United States. 'Whereas in the 
USA, in 1983,1.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) was 
18 The deregulatory Cable Act of 1984 led to the creation of unresponsive cable monopolies (Streeter, 
1987, LeDuc, 1987; Aufterheide, 1992), and consequently revised by the 1992 Cable Act. The latter 
thus can be seen as a legislative 'correction' to the failed 1984 Act's experiment with 'pure' 
deregulation (for more information see Atkin, 1994). 
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spent on advertising, with the exception of Britain, the rest of Europe 
spent less than I percent' (Hills and Papathanassopoulos, 1991: 83). 
Advertisers and proprietors thus believed that if broadcasting was to be 
commercialised and more channels were available this underspend on 
advertising would be liberated. Politicians have also supported 
broadcasting deregulation and especially the abolition of the license fee 
as a method of funding broadcasting for a number of reasons. 'Since 
television ownership had been a near universal condition during the 
1980s, the license fee was regarded as equivalent to a poll tax and had 
unfortunate regressive elements' (Collins et al., 1988: 102). In addition, 
the revenue generated by the license fee was impossible to increase 
unless annual increases took place. Politicians, however, were reluctant 
to incur further public expenditure fearing that they would lose votes. 
As a consequence, broadcasters have faced financial problems that have 
been exacerbated by inflation (Baumol's cost disease19). 
Pressure for restructuring of the European broadcasting scene has also 
come from transnational political institutions that have become 
increasingly important forces throughout Europe and undermined, to a 
certain extent, the regulatory powers exercised by national 
governments. Undoubtedly, the most important transnational political 
institution is the European Community (EC) which, through its 1984 
Green Paper, Television Without Frontiers, has played a significant 
19 The appearance of the Baumol-Bowen (1966) volume on the economics of the performing arts, the 
central hypothesis of which was the cost disease of live performance, has led most media economists 
to the conclusion that the performing arts (cultural industries) are predestined to be victims of a cost 
disease which condemns their cost (say, per performance) to rise persistently faster than the economy's 
rate of inflation. Baumol's model rested on the basic assumption that live performance is inherently 
labour-intensive due to the need for a constant production of prototypes. There is thus a limitation in 
exploiting the productivity advantages of capital investment in labour-saving technology. Since the 
level of prices is dependent on increases in productivity in the capital- intensive sectors, the production 
costs of perfori-ning arts are bound to rise (for supporting data see Baumol and Bowen, 1966). The cost 
disease analysis was offered by Hendon et al. (1986) and Garnham and Locksley (1991) as an 
explanation of the behaviour of the costs and prices of the broadcasting industries. 
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part in shaping the new broadcasting order. The EC assumed that 'with 
the further development of cable and satellite, the legal barriers to free 
broadcasting will hamper the development of cross-frontier systems, 
discourage investment and distort competition' (EEC's Green Paper, 
1984: 254). Hence, the breakdown of national monopolies and the 
presentation of broadcasting mainly as a commercial commodity are 
the main elements in EC's philosophy. 
Above all however, the demand for greater competition and 
elimination of state involvement in the broadcasting industry emanated 
from neo- conservative regimes which came into power in most 
Western industrialised nations during the 1980s. The neo-liberals 
assumed that the market would provide appropriate institutions and 
processes of public communication. Their philosophy is based on the 
premise that the free operation of supply and demand provides access 
to the media for all 'voices' which can pay for it. In their view, the 
profusion of channels created by the new technologies, and the 
multiplication of thematic, narrow-cast and specialised channels in 
particular, not only ensure a supply of content to all consumers but also 
allow them to select content precisely attuned to their needs, tastes and 
interests. In its strongest form, the market model took the view that 
deregulation could ensure freedom from state control and coercion. 
Just as in the USA claims for deregulation came partly from the belief 
that regulatory agencies (notably the FCC) failed to do their task 
efficiently, so too broadcasting deregulation philosophy in Europe 
partly originated from those who saw in governments vast 
bureaucracies whose arbitrariness caused economic inefficiency. 
Indeed, as has been put by Garnham (1986: 29-30) 'the growth of the 
state's role as a co-ordinator and infrastructural provider for monopoly 
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capitalism has led to the massive development of state power as an 
independent administrative and bureaucratic interest, distinct from the 
rationalist determination of social ends'. 
The status of the traditional state-run broadcast systems has been called 
into question by other social and media analysts who mentioned that 
public service media are not always a bulwark of democratic freedom 
and equality and that they fail to reflect the pluralism of tastes and 
interests of a modern society. Those critics did not put forward 
proposals for abolition of public service broadcasting; rather, they 
wanted a more accountable system that would respond to changing 
social conditions. Kuhn, for instance, argued in 1985 that Public 
broadcasters are unable to respond to the new cultural diversity. Shaw 
(1991: 12), criticising the British broadcasting model, pointed out that 
'public service broadcasting in Britain has been remote from its 
audience, indifferent to whatever opinions the audiences might have 
and uncaring for the most part in its dealing with complaints'. Keane 
(1992: 117) indicated that 'the repertoire of programmes channelled 
through existing public service media cannot exhaust the multitude of 
opinions in a complex ... society 
in motion. Keane's intention, apparent 
from his main 1991 work The Media and Democracy, was to offer a 
revised interpretation of the public service model of communications. 
In his view, 'the market liberal ideology of freedom of individual 
choice in the market place of opinions is in fact a justification of the 
privileging of corporate speech and of giving more choice to investors 
rather than to citizens' (Keane, 1991: 89). So he argued that public 
service broadcasting must maintain and promote the 'public interest' by 
making it possible for people to participate in the socio-cultural process 
and therefore enabling them to form an opinion about the world events. 
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A revised public service model should, as he put it, 'aim to facilitate a 
genuine commonwealth of forms of life, tastes and opinions, to 
empower a plurality of citizens who are governed neither by despotic 
states nor by market systems' (ibid: 126). The achievement of the above 
aims, according to Keane, requires efforts to 'de-concentrate' and 
publicly regulate privately owned media and to restrict the scope and 
intensity of corporate speech. He proposed the creation of politically 
accountable, supra-national regulatory bodies, skilled at supporting 
media 'freedoms', abandonment of political censorship, and public 
support for new enterprises. Freedom and equality of information will 
then be guaranteed (Keane, 1991,1992). 
1.5 THE NOTION OF MEDIA DIVERSITY 
It should be obvious by now that there has been a thorny division in 
positions on media policy. This division reflects differences in faith 
concerning the capability of market against governmental processes for 
achieving crucial communications policy objectives. To simplify, the 
social or public school of thought assumes that government intervention 
is a necessary condition for people's exposure to the widest range of 
views and opinions, whereas the market model asserts that the free 
operation of supply and demand provides for this more efficiently. The 
latter even asserts that conditions of free competition outweigh the 
dangers of government control of information. Perhaps the appropriate 
way for someone to face these policy and regulatory challenges would 
be to identify and clarify the most important values at stake in the 
Western societies and to assess which philosophy best provides for 
them. This task is extremely difficult at a time when media technologies 
and distribution systems are multiplying and when there is less 
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consensus about basic values than in the past, not to mention the 
different levels of significance given to a particular value in different 
societies. 
Blumler (1992), editor of Television and the Public Interest: 
Vulnerable Values in West European Broadcasting, set the scene in the 
opening chapters by describing current confrontations, reviewing 
public service broadcasting before the commercialisation trend, and 
noting values at stake. He identified these 'vulnerable values' as 
programme quality, diversity, cultural identity, independence of 
programme sources from commercial influences, integrity of civic 
communication, welfare of children and juveniles, and maintenance of 
standards. His book was an effort to examine what these values have 
meant to European broadcasting systems and how they can be retained 
in the face of deregulation and American-style commercial TV. The 
author, in collaboration with Hoffman-Riem, concludes the book by 
arguing that a public response, and not a call for a variety of competing 
voices in the market place, seems to be the appropriate European way 
for safeguarding the identified values being risked. 
We will focus on one of the values identified by Blumler, diversity, for 
three reasons. Firstly, media diversity is a broad concept with many 
dimensions: plurality of contents, access to different points of view, 
offering of a wide range of choice, geographical diversity, etc. It thus 
encompasses pluralism of many kinds: regional, linguistic, political, 
cultural and in taste levels. Therefore, by concentrating on this notion, 
we will be able to cover a wide spectrum of social benefits that need to 
be preserved if the media are to support democratic life. Secondly, 
diversity is said to be the most vulnerable value at stake in view of 
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concentration processes that have intensified since the liberalisation of 
the media industry. A large number of studies that have been carried 
out to evaluate whether diversity is threatened or strengthened by 
media concentration justify this assumption. 20 Thirdly, media diversity 
has not only been a long-standing goal of all democratic stateS21 but the 
belief in it has certainly united all schools of thought. Indeed, where the 
social and the market schools of thought come together is in their 
shared assumption that diversity should be a primary goal of 
communications policy. Although they disagree on what diversity 
should be and on the means of achieving that desirable goal, they both 
argue initially that societies must allow citizens to have access to a wide 
range of information, which is seen as a precondition for free 
expression of alternative opinions on any potential problems. By doing 
so, the argument runs, they increase the prospects for individual and 
collective welfare. From this viewpoint, the freedom of media, a 
multiplicity of opinions and the good of society are closely linked. As 
McQuail and Cuilenburg (1983: 146) remind us, 'free press theory is 
essentially a theory of media diversity and one of its fundamental 
principles is that you establish and preserve conditions under which as 
many alternative voices, regardless of intrinsic merit or truth, find a 
20 For studies dealing with media concentration and diversity see Owen (1977), Compaine (1982), 
LeDuc (1982), McQuail and Guilenburg (1983), Wildman and Owen (1985), Bagd1kian (1985,1992), 
Ferguson (1986,1994), Hoffman-Riern (1987), Busterna (1989), Porter (1989), Gamham (1991), 
Entman and Steven (1992), McQuail (1992), COM (92) 480 final. For studies on access diversity 
specifically see Geller (1985), Aufderheide (1992), Negrine (1994). For empirical studies on the 
measuring of programme content diversity, see Levin (1971), Litman (1979), Grant (1994), Studies of 
Broadcasting nos. 28 (1992), 29 (1993), 30 (1994). For works focused on measuring content diversity 
in the press see Chaffee and Wilson (1977), Donohue and Glasser (1978), Busterna (1988), Demers 
(1988). 
21 National courts have asserted in many cases that diversity is an essential criterion that should be 
born in mind when governments legislate in broadcasting. This view was taken in 1969 by the US 
Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. versus FCC, in 1961 and 1986 by the West German 
Federal Constitutional Court in their Deutschlandfernsehen and Lower Saxony Judgements, and in 
1986 by the French Constitutional Council in its decision on the constitutionality of the 1986 law on 
the freedom of communication. Even in the UK, where there is no written constitution, there is a 
rhetoric of diversity (for more infori-nation see Porter, 1989). 
Public Interest and Diversity in the Media 
ýý4 
hearing, provided that they emerge from those whom society is 
supposed to benefit - its individual members and constituent groups'. 
Media diversity is a concept which belongs to the sphere of ideas. 
McQuail, examining the media performance in democratic societies, 
argued that the notion of media diversity extends beyond political 
theory: 'It is a broad principle to which appeal can be made on behalf 
both of neglected minorities and of consumer choice, or against 
monopoly and other restrictions' (McQuail, 1992a: 142). He pointed 
out though that national media systems place different emphasis on 
these policy aims. Indeed, as Brennan's (1989) work revealed, FCC 
policy in the USA attempted to encourage diversity both by increasing 
consumer choice and by ensuring, through the 'Fairness Doctrine', that 
a wide range of views have access to the media. Referring to the 
European public service broadcasting model, Hoffmann-Riem (1987: 
60-61) argued that 'the public service philosophy of broadcasting ... is 
oriented toward the accessibility of pluralistic information for citizens 
and society rather than the freedom of expression of communicators. 
Diversity of programme content, accessible to all segments of the 
audience, must be established and safeguarded'. This definition makes it 
clear that media diversity is not simply a matter of the number of 
information channels, but also of who controls these channels, of media 
content, and of accessibility of the media. 
In recent years in Europe, the notion of diversity has come to refer not 
only to political and socio-cultural differences but it has been extended 
so as to include the market-place concept of diversity of products 
available to viewers/listeners (The Peacock Report, 1986; Ve1janovski, 
1989). The causes of such shift of emphasis is the relative channel 
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abundance together with the trends towards liberalisation and 
commercialisation. As Wildman and Owen (1985) argued there are, 
among others, two distinct definitions of diversity, and label them idea 
diversity andproduct diversity. The former, as already indicated, 
means that the more distinct thoughts, analyses, criticisms etc. that are 
available on issues of social and political importance, the better off 
society is. Diversity of ideas thus is measured on an underlying 
dimension of political and socio-cultural concerns. The latter is defined 
as the 'range of variation in product attributes that are available (or 
potentially available) in a particular product or service' (ibid). Most 
economic analyses of diversity focus on firms' competitive strategies, 
as reflected in the variety of products they offer, and on the 
implications of those offerings for economic efficiency (Entman and 
Steven, 1992). Product diversity is believed by market-oriented 
analysts to accomplish idea diversity and create the climate for 
alternative viewpoints in the media (Compaine, 1982). Analysts who 
press the social value case though argue that effective competition 
(economic efficiency) does not necessarily perform well with respect to 
social objectives and therefore product diversity does not always 
produce sufficient idea diversity (Bagdikian, 1992). 
A broader definition of media diversity has been provided by 
Hoffmann-Riem (1987) who, referring to the broadcasting scene, has 
distinguished four dimensions of diversity. He argued that there must 
be diversity offormats and issues, meaning that all the various fields 
and topics (e. g. entertainment, information, education and culture) 
have 
to be taken into account. Secondly, this should be complemented by a 
diversity or plurality of contents. This means that programmes should 
provide comprehensive and factual coverage of the different opinions 
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expressed in a society. Thirdly, person and group diversit 
- N, must exist. 
Programmes have to cater for the interests of all parts of the 
community. The main point here thus is access, but also representation. 
Finally, Hoffrnann-Riem pointed out that broadcasters should include 
local, regional, national and supranational content. According to 
Hoffmann-Riem therefore, a programme has to ensure that issue, 
content, person and geographical diversity is provided. 
A more or less similar identification of the dimensions of diversity has 
been provided by McQuail (1992a: 144-5) who argued that the media 
can contribute to diversity a) by reflecting differences in society b) by 
giving access to different points of view and c) by offering a wide 
range of choice. Diversity as reflection means that pluralistic mass 
media are expected to represent or reflect the prevailing differences of 
culture, opinion and social conditions of the population. Diversity as 
access refers to the channels through which the separate 'voices', 
groups and interests which make up the society can speak to the wider 
society, and also express and keep alive their own cultural identity. 
McQuail mentioned the most essential conditions for effective access, 
namely freedom to speak out, effective opportunity to speak (a 
prerequisite is the existence of many and different channels) and 
autonomy or adequate self-control over media access opportunities. 
Finally, diversity as more channels and choice for the audience 
represents a great deal of variety or range of products or services 
available to consumers, thereby giving them greater freedom. 
In order to assess diversity in relation to media concentrations one also 
needs to distinguish between external and internal diversity. The 
former, according to McQuail (1992a: 145-7) refers to media structure 
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because it is related to the idea of access. It relates to the degree of 
variation between separate media sources in a given sector, according 
to dimensions such as politics, religion, social class, etc. In a given 
society, there are many separate and autonomous media channels, each 
having a high degree of homogeneity of content, expressing a 
particular point of view, and catering only for its own 'followers'. The 
latter, McQuail adds, refers to the media content and connects with the 
idea of representation or reflection mentioned above. It relates to the 
condition where a wide range of social, political and cultural values, 
opinions, information and interests find expression within one media 
organisation, which usually aims at reaching a large and heterogeneous 
audience. A particular channel might be assessed according to the 
degree of attention given to alternative positions on topics such as 
politics, ethnicity and language and so on. 
Complete external diversity is difficult to be found in today's media 
systems. Only in societies with cultural and linguistic differences (in 
Belgium, for example, the Flemish and French speaking communities 
have their own broadcasting and press media), and also in societies 
where there still exists a strong partisan press system (e. g. Greece) does 
external diversity apply. 22 However, since new delivery systems such as 
cable and satellite proliferate, thereby increasing the number of 
channels available, one might argue that the trend towards external 
media diversity increases rather than decreases. LeDuc (1982) for 
example, argued that in the USA, cable TV, multi-point distribution 
systems, subscription TV, DBS and VCRs all offered the possibility for 
serving the communication needs of communities and minority interest 
22McQuail (1992a) points out that while external political diversity of the press has declined, some 
media sectors do show an increase in external diversity according to dimensions other than politics. 
for 
example, magazine press which has developed along specialised lines. 
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audiences. Therefore, instead of having to turn to some national 
network service for their programming needs, people could have 
specialised content channels at their disposal. Nevertheless, LeDuc 
concluded that technological advances in the field of broadcasting have 
not offered the public a wide enough range of alternative services to 
meet all essential needs and that the US legal system must develop the 
capacity to distinguish between channels and content as the source of 
communications competition. 
Internal diversity, on the other hand, is more likely to be found in 
media systems. It has been encouraged partly by the trends towards 
concentration and monopoly and partly by economic (particularly 
advertising) interests. The underlying logic has been that media have to 
appeal to many interests and needs and to avoid exclusiveness in order 
to maximise their audiences and consequently to attract advertisers. 
Internal diversity, particularly in the field of broadcasting, has also 
been encouraged by government regulation. Because of the initial 
limitation of channels, diversity and balance were usually required as 
conditions for the granting of operating licences, as a matter of equity 
in allocating a scarce public resource (McQuail, 1992a). In the future 
though, instead of a number of general channels, the trend will be 
towards a growing number of thematic channels dedicated to news, 
films, sport and many other genres of programming (COM(92) 480 
final). Interactive channels, where the viewer can communicate directly 
with the broadcaster, will be the norm rather than the exception. And 
audiences will be targeted on the basis of tastes and not on numbers. 
Finally, one has to assess diversity of media content from the point of 
view of consumer choice. Here, a distinction between vertical and 
horizontal diversity must be made. Litman (1979) argued that vertical 
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diversity refers to the diversity within a single network (or across the 
networks) according to the number of different program types. This 
vertical diversity is the standard which the FCC uses in judging 
whether a single network or all the networks together are presenting a 
balanced schedule of programmes. However, Litman pointed out that 
vertical diversity does not really reflect the options available to the 
viewers at any point of time. If, for example, a new documentary 
programme that a network decides to offer coincides with another new 
documentary programme that another network decides to broadcast at 
the same time, then the viewer has no choice at that point of time. 
Therefore, changes in vertical network diversity may not fully translate 
into increased viewer options. To solve this problem, Litman 
mentioned that it is necessary to measure horizontal diversity, that is, 
the number of viewing options available to the viewer at any given 
time. 
In short, there have been made various conceptual distinctions of the 
term 'media diversity', including diversity of access, diversity of 
choice, balance in the presentation of news, linguistic and geographical 
diversity, internal and external diversity, horizontal and vertical 
diversity. However, two sub-concepts of diversity, that of access and 
choice for the audience, are the two notions that have been put high on 
the agenda of regulators and policy makers when considering media 
concentrations. As regards diversity of access (freedom of speech), the 
key question is whether the possibility of establishing new media 
companies leads to the situation where all legitimate interests in a given 
society have an equal (or proportional) share of access to media 
channels. As regards diversity as choice, the key question is whether an 
increase in channels actually leads to more choice for the audience. 
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1.6 MEDIA DIVERSITY, CONCENTRATION AND THE 
FREE MARKET 
Having conceptualised the term 'media diversity', we now turn to the 
question of which kind of media structure mostly encourages this 
desirable goal. As concerns the delivering of media diversity, two 
models claim to promote best the diversity principle, that of public 
policy and that of market. The former views state regulation as an 
essential means of ensuring equality of information access and 
expression, while the proponents of the latter assume that an 
unregulated market in communication goods and services can provide 
for this. As indicated by Negrine (1994a: 54-5), what gave the 
assertions and hopes of the market school a degree of currency and 
relevance was a combination of technological and political change. On 
the political side, there has long been a debate questioning the ways in 
which broadcasting systems are organised and run. On the 
technological side, the development and availability of satellite TV as 
well as local and interactive cable television systems have created 
alternative structures and processes of communication. Together, 
Negrine stated, these forces created a desire and an opportunity for 
change and experimentation. 
Undoubtedly, the new technologies of VCRs (video-cassette recorders), 
cable and satellite TV (now boosted by signal compression) has 
widened viewers choice and enabled them to watch their preferred 
programmes as many times as they want and at any time they want. 
New distribution systems have also encouraged senders to seek 
profitability by identifying market niches and serving audiences 
neglected by other media. The proliferation of thematic, narrow-cast, 
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specialised channels has been said to promote the birth of 'personal 
media', allowing viewers to select content precisely attuned to their 
needs. This market segmentation, with different media seeking to 
appeal to various groups, has been partly encouraged by advertisers, 
who wanted their messages tailor-made for a given audience. 
Advertisers' desire is to promote their messages in order to reach 
diversified target groups in a way that suits their own needs. Thus 
media distribution and content patterns are inclined to follow lines of 
income and locality. Since socio-economic variation often correlates 
with political differentiation, the advertising market variant has some 
potential for meeting the main requirements of political diversity 
(Jakubowicz, 1994). 
Therefore the new advertising-financed media systems are able, in 
theory at least, to increase consumer choice and to target audiences on 
the basis of tastes. However, the growing number of new delivery 
systems and the competition with each other had as a consequence a fall 
in advertising revenue. The search for other source of funding has led 
to the development of pay television, both subscription and pay-per- 
view. Subscription television (that is, TV programmes sold directly to 
viewers for a monthly payment to the broadcaster) is said to create a 
direct contractual link between the viewers and the broadcasters and 
therefore the former can express their preferences for the type of 
programmes they want in a way that will be noticed and acted on by the 
latter (The Peacock Report, 1986; Ve1janovski, 1990). Increasingly, the 
consumer now has a direct link with the supplier of media services 
either through the price system or through the computing power of 
interactive systems. However, since not everyone would be able or 
willing to subscribe to pay-TV services, the increase in the number of 
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pay-TV channels will in no way reduce the need for traditional off-the- 
air commercial or public channels. Public broadcasters, in particular, 
with their internal pluralistic structure and their availability for the 
entire public, are a key factor for ensuring diversity of opinions and 
accessibility to all in return usually for a licence fee. 
On the contrary, the model described above is basically the model of 
external diversity in which diversity of content is provided by separate 
media. For this reason, this model is exceptionally good at providing 
numerical diversity (i. e. a large number of newspapers, radio and TV 
stations, satellite and cable channels, etc. ), provided of course that the 
market can sustain them. The problem is that this situation naturally 
favours concentration of capital and ownership in the media (see 
chapter 2 for a definition and a list of types of such concentrations). 
Concentration of control of media ownership is not necessarily a threat 
to the diversity of information. At a time of free trade and free 
movement of capital (as within the European Community, for example) 
and globalisation of media operations, it is argued that media 
concentration may be needed to ensure the emergence of financially 
strong companies able to take part in international competition and 
prevent the domestic market from being taken over by foreign media. 
The development of European groups operating on an international 
level, for instance, both can be beneficial for the dissemination of ideas 
and can enable European undertakings to face international competition 
from big non-European units which benefit from economies of scale 
due to their market and size. In certain circumstances, concentration 
enables economies of scale to be achieved and production costs to 
be 
amortised through access to a wider audience and the possibility of 
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having access to know-how and expertise, which place undertakings in 
a better position to face competition from other media. 
Big, highly- concentrated units normally have the capital, management 
and R&D (research and development) capabilities allowing them to 
overcome high barriers to market entry and establish new media 
outlets. Big media groups may promote diversity simply as a business 
strategy, for example, by diversifying their media outlets and 
establishing new titles, and radio and TV channels. By doing so, they 
may facilitate the introduction of new technologies and new services. 
They may also support diversity by launching newspapers representing 
quite different orientations in order to achieve greater profits by 
serving diverse publics. There is the possibility here for the publication 
of newspapers or new projects intended for minorities, or even projects 
which are not directly profitable but which contribute to 
political/cultural diversity. Large groups may also encourage diversity 
by cross- subsidising low-profit media. By saving certain newspapers in 
danger of closing down they both maintain a diversified supply and 
safeguard employment. A last positive aspect of media concentration is 
that it can guarantee the autonomy of editorial groups vis-a-vis 
advertisers and political power. 23 
All these are appealing theoretical arguments but the simple fact is that 
so far concentration of media ownership (the reduction in the number 
of companies controlling the media in a given sector) as such has not 
resulted in a more critical media serving the public interest. 
Concentration of media ownership combined with the trends towards 
23 For additional information of positive aspects of media concentration see 3rd European 
Ministenal 
Conference on Mass Media Policy, Nicosia (Cyprus), 9- 10 October 199 1. 
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internationalisation and commercialisation has resulted in proprietors 
putting more emphasis on profitability rather than on the cultural 
quality. This is not surprising nor is it an unnatural response from 
market-driven institutions. However, as a result of greater demands on 
profitability, advertising-financed media are increasingly aimed at mass 
public audience and at generating advertising income. Media receiving 
direct consumer payments are more sensitive to intensities of consumer 
preference. But the practice so far has been that these services are 
delivered in the form of a 'package' (Murdoch's strategy in Britain, for 
example) in order to generate profit and therefore the consumer has to 
purchase the whole package and not just a particular service. In 
addition, with the multiplication of pay-TV channels, the accessibility 
and control over encryption and conditional access systems becomes 
crucial. New channels will not normally be able to introduce a new 
system but they will have to utilise the existing one which has the 
greatest market penetration. Potential monopoly control of conditional 
access systems and other 'gateways' represents one of the newest threats 
to diversity. 
The question that has been long with us however is whether the new 
media structures actually translate into more choice for people, 
disseminate more cultural and political ideas, and therefore strengthen 
democracy. Venturelli (1993) argued that multi-media empires tend to 
minimise debates over political and cultural ideas and neglect the 
creative application of media technology to explore multiple 
representations of social reality. In fact, in a purely market-driven 
system more media outlets does not necessarily mean more public 
argumentation and rational discourse. On the contrary, it means more 
ways to address people as consumers. As Garnham (1986: 31) has put 
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the matter convincingly, 'the economy and the polity have different 
values. Within the economic realm the individual is defined as producer 
and consumer exercising private rights through purchasing power on 
the market in the pursuit of private interests. Within the political realm 
the individual is defined as a citizen exercising public rights of debate 
within a communally agreed structure of rules and toward communally 
defined ends. But political communication that is forced to channel 
itself via commercial media becomes a politics of consumerism'. 
In this respect, there is some reason to believe that media 
commercialisation and more media outlets may not upgrade or 
strengthen the space for political and social discussion. Empirical 
evidence24 from the United States, which was the first country that 
reduced public control over mass media, may justify this assumption. 
Lessons from the USA clearly show that commercial media firms do 
not bring new creative options to the public; instead, they are oriented 
towards 'mass appeal' programming. One cannot of course argue that 
the current plethora of talk shows, initially introduced in the USA and 
now part of almost every European commercial channel's programme 
schedule, actually provide a broad spectrum of critical political debate. 
Media analyst Ben Bagdikian (1992) used the trend to 'infotainment' - 
the presentation of news as bland light entertainment designed to 
sensationalise - as an evidence to show that there is little room for 
artistic expression and risk-taking when cost saving and commercial 
viability are the prime considerations. 
24 An influential joint research project, initiated by NEK, the Japanese public broadcaster, in 1992 to 
study the world-wide diversity of TV programming found that the three networks in the USA have low 
programme diversity as compared with the leading broadcasters of other countries. The analysis 
verified the uniformity of TV programmes in the USA (Studies of Broadcasting, nos. 28,29,30). 
London Economics 1995 study reached the same conclusions (London Economics, Pluralisni and 
Concentration in the Media Sector, April 1995). 
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Market incentives are not adequate to provide the optimal level of 
cultural and political diversity. They do not lead to the provision of a 
wide range of products to satisfy heterogeneous consumer tastes. This 
is partly because of the high cost levels of domestic audio-visual 
production, which has led broadcasters especially in small countries to 
the solution of importing cheap and often of low quality programmes. 25 
The high costs of producing original programming has also led to the 
situation where products are constantly reproduced, in the sense that a 
broadcast programme can be seen as a story or feature in a newspaper, 
magazine or even book. 26This however does not really increase choice 
since the product offered is the same but in a different format. Finally, 
due to the near-absence of price competition throughout the cultural 
industries, 27 companies tend to locate themselves as close as possible to 
one another, they tend to locate 'where demand is', and therefore to 
offer similar products. 28 There is an undue tendency then for 
competitors to imitate each other (Hotelling, 1929) and to converge on 
tried- and-tested formulae. This poses a potential danger to welfare in 
terms of the variety of products offered by a given market, because 
25 The two small highly-cabled countries Holland and Belgium cannot support a wide range of 
domestically-produced choice and found a solution in importing cheap programmes from nelghbOuring 
states. In Greece, where liberalisation of the broadcasting sector took place in December 1989, the 
programming schedule of the two leading commercial channels Mega Channel and Antenna TV 
consists mostly of imports from the USA (mostly soap operas and game shows) due to the high costs 
of producing domestic drama. 
26 Garnharn and Locksley (1991), in The Economics of Broadcasting, explained that cultural 
industries are very much dependent on product innovation and therefore spend huge amounts of money 
for R&D. But because the launching on the market of a new product for which demand is uncertain 
involves high risks, a strategy that has been adopted to realise value is economies of scope, that is, 
the controlling of a range of products for a range of market segments or audiences. 
27 Garnham and Locksley (1991: 15) remind us that non-price competition is especially strong in 
broadcasting for two reasons. Firstly, there is no direct price relationship between the cost of 
production and either the size or intensity of audience demand. Secondly, unit costs of consumption 
are very low and therefore it is difficult to create effective price discrimination between programmes. 
28 If, say, there are only two firms competing on price in a given market, they will have an incentive 
to locate themselves as far as possible from each other on the product line, and thus to offer as diverse 
a product as possible, both in terms of product variety and quality. Proximity of location would mean 
that prices are gradually eroded as the firms compete for each other's business. But in situations of 
non-price competition, where there is no interdependence of the two firms'pricing decisions, the 
firms 
are bound to locate 'in the centre of the market', because there is no incentive 
for product 
differentiation. 
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some segments of tastes and preferences will not be catered for. One 
could argue that as barriers to entry in broadcasting gradually decline 
due to digitalisation/ compression of the signal, new players enter the 
market, and price competition in broadcasting intensifies due to the 
expansion of pay-TV, there will be less of an incentive for firms to 
locate themselves in the 'centre of the market. There will be instead an 
incentive to locate further away from each other as such location 
becomes 'saturated', and satisfy 'niche' markets., which means that a 
range of differentiated products will be supplied. Nevertheless, with the 
technology of pay-TV is difficult, if not impossible, to create effective 
price discrimination between programmes (Garnham and Locksley, 
1991). As for digitalisation, which greatly expands the bandwidth, it 
remains to be seen whether it will lead to the situation where a wider 
range of individual preferences are satisfied. 
But even in cable, once described as the 'technology of abundance', one 
cannot find a certain level of programme diversity. As mentioned 
above, cable's capacity to carry huge amounts of information and 
potential of two-way broadcast communication were cited as 
'revolutionary' because both neglected voices could find expression 
through that new medium and interactive communication could alter 
the nature of broadcast communication itself. However, there are 
severe limitations on the current cable industry's ability to provide 
diversity of sources and viewpoints on issues of public concern. Those 
limitations lie in the conditions of commercial TV programming and in 
the current structure of the cable industry. The logic of commercial 
production has shaped most cable operators and ownership 
has 
increasingly centralised in fewer hands (LeDuc, 1982,1987; 
Horwitz, 
1989; Aufterheide, 1992). It could not be otherwise since, for local 
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cable channels to survive in an extremely competitive environment, 
they had to make alliances. But cable's current industry structure 
discourages diversity of sources and perspectives and leaves almost no 
opening for use of the system as a public space (Aufterheide, 1992). A 
few multiple system operators (MSOs) control the US market and 
acceptance of new services (particularly narrowcasting) depends on 
them. Power is heavily concentrated to the extent that the two leading 
MSOs, TeleCommunications Inc (TCI) and Time Warner, account 
between them for over 30 per cent of all basic cable subscribers. The 
top 20 MSOs control 75 per cent of the market and only 14 can boast a 
roster of more than one million basic cable subscribers (see Table 1-2). 
Yet Negrine (1994a: 57) argued that only on the local communication 
system, be it cable or radio, can participatory forms of communication 
exist. The more national, international and concentrated the technology 
of communication, the less the potential for local, participatory or 
access communication; similarly, the more commercial and 
concentrated the organisation of the medium, the less the likelihood that 
forms of local, participatory or access TV will play an important part 
in increasing diversity of opinions. Today, Negrine adds, local and 
even national cable systems are part of international systems of 
communication in an increasingly international setting. 
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Table 1.2 
US TOP 20 MSo.. q (pnd looA) 
CABLE MULTIPLE 
SYSTEM OPERATORS 
BASIC SUBSSHARE 
000S 
BASIC SUBSSHARE 
% 
TeleCommunications Inc 10,400 18.7 
Time Warner Cable 6,900 12.4 
Continental Cablevision 2,940 5.3 
Comcast 2,895 5.2 
Cablevision Systems 2,120 3.8 
Cox Cable 1,770 3.2 
Jones Intercable/Spacelink 1,585 2.9 
Newhouse Broadcasting 1,437 2.6 
Cablevision Industries 1,310 2.4 
Adelphia Communications 1,240 2.2 
Times Mirror Cable TV 1,215 2.2 
Viacom Cable 1,095 2.0 
Falcon Cable 1,095 2.0 
Sammons Conununication 1,045 1.9 
Century Communications 939 1.7 
Paragon Communications 849 1.5 
Crown Media 832 1.5 
Colony Conu-nunications 770 1.4 
TeleCable 690 1.2 
s Howard 688 1.2 
Total 41,815 75.3 
Source: Screen Digest, February 1994 
In Britain, for instance, North American companies have poured huge 
resources into cabling the country and now own four of the most 
promising cable channels. 29However, cable's growth has been a painful 
affair. 'Beset by squabbling between rival companies, inept marketing 
and vast tranches of resistible programming, it has found it difficult to 
get a hold in Britain (The Guardian, Monday November 6 1995: 18)1. 
In France the 'Plan Cable', launched in 1982 by the then socialist 
government as a first step to expand high technology and provide new 
services, proved to be a utopian dream (Serge, 1992). Alternative 
29 'Landmark Communications' owns Travel Channel, 'Video Jukebox and Ticket-master' owns The 
Box, 'Black Entertainment Television' owns Bet International and 'TV Company Graff owns The 
Adult Channel. Other promising channels such as Live TV, and Channel One and Performance 
Channel are owned by 'Mirror Group', 'Daily Mail and General Trust' respectively. 
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forms of communication thus seem not to have been expanded in such a 
scale so as to contribute to the access to a choice of programmes. 
Finally, it should be noted that the availability of a wide range of 
opinions and access to information, as important they are, will not by 
themselves be enough for serving the public interest. As Negrine 
(1994a: 62) reminds us, it is also important 'when and how that 
information is made available and the contextualisation of that 
information'. Impartial and accurate information as well as balance in 
the news reporting are at stake here. Editorial independence and 
investigative journalism are preconditions for the safeguarding of these 
standards. Concerns are often expressed that where journalists work in 
an environment of 'sell the paper, please the advertiser', or when they 
work in a highly concentrated media market with less options of 
changing employers, they become more cautious in their approach to 
the concern for which they work, to the detriment of professional 
integrity. The 'corporate journalist', self-censoring what he/she writes, 
might be the result. The fact that freelance journalism is the fastest 
growing sector in European journalism has already made the 
employment conditions of journalists increasingly insecure and 
uncertain. 30 Unless editorial statutes safeguarding editorial 
independence vis-a-vis interests of the company and the advertising 
industry established in all countries, the public interest in the reception 
of accurate and impartial news is not completely satisfied. 
30 See the response of the European Group of the International Federation of Journalists to the 
Commission Green Paper Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market:. An Assessment 
of the Needfor Community Action, Consultation Vol. 1, April 1993, item 9: 1-14. 
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1.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter started by offering a definition of the loosely-constructed 
term 'public interest' in communication and by providing a discussion 
over media - particularly broadcasting - regulation on public interest 
grounds. The central question that was attempted to tackle is whether 
regulatory intervention in a 'free market' can be justified on 'public 
interest' grounds. The arguments pointing out that the public interest 
can be achieved either under state interference or free-market 
conditions were explored. Government intervention was seen as a 
necessary condition for people in order to have equal chances of media 
access and fair representation. Such intervention was said to guarantee 
a representative media supply and benefit most weak political and social 
groups whose voice would otherwise not be heard. But this model has 
been criticised on the grounds that it limits audience choice, that it 
manipulates public opinion, and that it does not respond to changing 
social conditions. 
However, the market system, which is based on the free operation of 
supply and demand, has not provided either better access for all 
'voices' or content that satisfies all interests. Since the market model 
encourages the proliferation of channels and new audience markets, it 
can lead to increased numerical diversity, that is, more channels and 
theoretically more consumer choice. The quantitative diversity of 
variety of channels though does not necessarily provides qualitative 
diversity of the media content (Hoffmann-Riem, 1987). Or, as Donohue 
and Glasser (1978: 596) mentioned., 'there is a big difference between 
media pluralism and message pluralism and we must be careful not to 
confuse media abundance with media diversity'. McQuail (1992a: 153) 
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stated that 'adequate "reflection" of consumer interests is not always 
met under conditions of market freedom'. Advertisers for example, 
who usually finance the private broadcasting sector, aim at reaching r-- 
many but of high income groups and thus do not cater for all 
consumers. 
But the most significant disadvantage of the market system is that it 
encourages concentration of ownership, partly due to high basic costs 
of access to the media. In the United States, where a small number of 
companies control the national broadcasting market and where press 
monopolies are the norm rather than the exception, we find the fiercest 
critics over media concentration (see Bagdikian, 1985,1992, for 
example). These critics stress that the oligopoly control and 
'depoliticisation' of content we witness within private broadcasting 
institutions, are far from the liberal ideal of a free market-place for 
ideas. And according to Hills and Papathanassopoulos (1991: 84) such 
results simply show that'the liberalisers are concerned with liberalising 
ownership, and not in increasing the plurality of content or with 
broadcasting's social role'. Clearly, the traditional conception of public 
service broadcasting has been superseded by events. But the public 
interest responsibilities remain and must be met by establishing 
workable institutional arrangements. 
The current trends in media structure and organisation though are said 
to lead to the loss of diversity. Concentration of media industries is 
increasing at the same time as the scope for public service broadcasting 
is being reduced. A process of global vertical integration leads to large 
software media industries being taken over by large electronic 
hardware companies or sometimes by trading companies which have no 
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prior media history at all (Murdock, 1990a; see also Murdock, 1990b). 
These media software firms have already grown by horizontal 
integration, absorbing other firms as they grow, crossing the 
boundaries of existing media. Often the most vulnerable to takeover are 
successful local or specialised media which are the most innovative and 
responsive to their publics (McQuail, 1992a; see also McQuail, 1992b). 
These trends may have a negative effect on diversity and on political 
depth. As the different media are converging on each other, as they 
compete for much the same market, it becomes harder for them to give 
attention to world affairs or domestic politics. The economic logic of 
the media has been linked with a potential 'decline of democracy' as 
defined by Curran (1991b) and Keane (1991) and especially with low 
levels of popular knowledge and understanding. There is also the 
problem of access on equal terms to the main channels of 
communication for minority and opposition voices. In theory, the 
equality problem, that of access to media channels as senders, should be 
solved via the multiplication of channels and the proliferation of new 
kinds of media. But these trends have led to a higher commercial price 
and value being placed on media access, especially where these reach 
larger audiences. Finally, both media integration and the competition 
between many channels for the same more or less constant audience 
raise the question of diversity in cultural output. It seems thus that so 
far the so-called 'information society' has not proved to be a more 
culturally diverse one. 
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The next chapter looks at the process of media concentration in more 
detail. It provides an economic analysis of media concentration and 
identifies its level in both Europe and the USA. It also attempts to link 
the problem in defining different types of concentration with the 
problem in defining different types of policy intervention. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
At a time when the media are becoming major actors in world 
businesses, and cable, satellite and the digital revolution are 
increasingly providing the conditions for a global media market, 
questions are raised about the possible effects of media concentration 
on the traditional role of broadcasting and the press in democratic 
societies. The media concentration phenomenon is not a new one. 
Tunstall and Palmer (1991) remind us that Charles Havas' press agency 
founded in Paris in 1835, and Reuters news agency founded by Paul 
Julius Reuter in London in 1851 dominated the international flow of 
information from the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
phonographic and cinematographic industries have experienced the 
phenomenon of oligopolistic competitionI from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, while concentration in the field of broadcasting may 
be observed in the United States from the inter-war years. However, 
concentration of control over mass media has intensified recently in 
both the United States and Europe. According to Bagdikian (1992), for 
instance, ownership of most of the major American media has been 
consolidated in fewer and fewer corporate hands, from fifty national 
and multinational corporations in 1983 to twenty in 1992, owning most 
of the output of daily newspapers and most of the sales and audience in 
I Gomery (1993) mentioned that market structure and conduct in the media world fall into three 
categories: al Monopoly, that is, when a single firm dominates. The basic cable TV franchise and the 
single community daily newspaper provide two examples of media monopoly; b) 011gopol - y, a situation where a handful of firms dominate. A typical example is the dominance of the four TV 
networks (NBC, ABC, CBS and Fox) in the US television industry; and c) Competition, where there 
are many companies in a particular product market. The notion of competition can be split into two 
parts: 'perfect competition' and 'workable' or 'effective' competition. The former is said to exist where 
firms are too small to influence price through changes in output; where there is no product 
differentiation; where resources are perfectly mobile; and where there is a perfect flow of information 
between market participants. Such a model is useful in order to demonstrate price policy, but is 
unrelated to real markets where intractable imperfections are all but universal (Frazer, 1992: 5). The 
latter, according to Stocking (1961), 'is a term economists give to that rather ill-defined market 
situation that is socially acceptable (cited in Frazer, 1992: 6). 
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magazines, broadcasting, books and movies. The emergence of 
multimedia conglomerates with international ambitions is putting the 
subject high on the agenda of legislators, governments and regulatory 
bodies at both national and European levels. The European 
Commission, for example, has issued in 1992 a Green Paper on 
Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market, proposing 
measures aiming to safeguard diversity in view of mergers and 
acquisitions taking place within the media sectors (COM (92) 480 
final). All these are signs of a concern about media concentration and 
its potential impact on diversity and pluralism of the media to which 
the citizens have access. Some media companies, it is thought, may be 
growing so powerful that they can influence public opinion. Focusing 
on issues of concentration, media critics such as Schiller (1981) and 
Bagdikian (1985,1992) have argued that market structures in 
information industries have become less competitive in recent years 
granting both economic and political power to those in the industries 
through their control of the means of modem communications. 
When one tries to deal with the problem of media concentration, he/she 
faces a dual problem: on the one hand, there is pressure to restructure 
the sector. There is the widespread argument saying that big media 
entities are better able than small ones to survive and generate profit in 
highly competitive world markets. In Europe, in particular, there is 
also a tendency to create a mega-industry able to compete in the global 
village dominated by US and Japanese companies; on the other hand, 
there is concern about the effects of concentration on diversity and 
pluralism. The question of cultural, political and of taste levels 
diversity in the context of the deregulation, internationalisation and 
concentration of the media is high on the agenda of legislators and 
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policy makers. Here the argument is that free market competition could 
lead to the creation of monopolies, so that some form of anti-trust law 
is required. This has led to a constant activity to control this process, 
particularly at a national level. In most Western European states the 
media are subject to competition law and/or merger control provisions 
(see Appendix VIII). However, there is also activity to control media 
concentrations at Europe-wide level. There has been an on-going 
debate initiated by the European Commission through its 1992 Green 
Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market on 
whether a specific regulatory framework concerning media 
concentrations is needed. These policy issues will be the subject of the 
next chapter. 
The focus here is on the definition of the media concentration 
phenomenon and the identification of the different forms it may take. It 
seems to us that a clear understanding of the term 'concentration' is 
necessary before proceeding to explore the regulatory framework. This 
is because concentration in the media field can take various forms 
which may need different types of policy intervention. There might be 
concentration in individual sectors or concentration in cross-media 
sectors pursued by economic and technological innovations. There 
might also be concentration of producers or concentration of reception. 
Concentration at the distribution stage and concentration at the 
production level are two additional forms of this phenomenon. None of 
these concerns are new, but they have been reinforced by recent 
technological and economic developments. All these different forms of 
media concentration usually need different policy interventions. Thus 
the purpose of this chapter will be to look at the various forms of 
concentration, to provide an economic analysis of market structure, and 
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to make a connection between economic analysis and policy 
implications. 
The reason why we are focusing on economic issues is that 
concentration is a concept that belongs to the sphere of economics and 
it is not unique to the media industry. Standard tools of economic 
analysis can clarify the functioning of media markets and the behaviour 
of media companies. Concentration (including media concentration), 
together with conglomeration and internationalisation, are elements of 
the market, that is, a grouping of buyers and sellers exchanging a single 
product that is distinct from all others. 2 Therefore the media economist 
should first establish and define the basic conditions of an industry and 
then seek to establish its major players (structure). He/she then should 
define the behaviour dictated by this structure (conduct) and finally 
evaluate the core questions of industry performance. 3 The analysis of 
market structure, in particular, should seek to establish: a) the number 
of players and sellers and the degree of concentration in a market; b) to 
identify barriers to entry for potential new competitors. This is an 
important element of market structure since at the edge of the market, 
that is, at the end of the array of firms there may be barriers to entry 
which keep out whatever potential competitors there might be thereby 
raising the degree of concentration; c) to isolate effects of horizontal 
and vertical ownership patterns; and d) to study the processes and 
consequences of conglomerate control. Conglomerates, which grew 
enormously through diversification into allied businesses also affect 
market behaviour and performance. 
2 For a thorough definition of the market see Shepherd (1979). 
3 According to Busterna's (1988a) Industrial Organisation Model, market structure determines market 
conduct thereby affecting market performance. This model is derived from microeconomic theory and it 
is useful in evaluating how the market forces affect firms and entire markets function. 
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2.2 DEFINITION OF MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
Let us first try to arrive at a definition of the term concentration. Put 
simply, concentration in the media field means the reduction of the 
number of companies controlling the media in a given sector or across 
sectors. The European Institute for the Media (EIM, 1993: 6) defined 
concentration in the media market as 'an increase in the presence of one 
or a handful of firms as a result of various possible processes: mergers, 
acquisitions and deals with other companies'. Thus concentration (or 
oligopolistic competition) is interpreted as integration - horizontal and 
vertical, across media types and national boundaries. However, 
concentration can be caused by phenomena other than media integration 
such as the disappearance of TV stations or newspapers which leaves 
those that remain in the market with less competition or even in 
monopolistic situations. On the other hand, the launch of new media 
products (i. e. a TV company which widens its activities into new 
geographical areas) results in industry integration but not in market 
concentration - the market often becomes more pluralistic and 
consequently less concentrated. It is necessary thus to draw a distinction 
between industry integration and market concentration. In practice 
though, the buying up and/or taking over of existing media firms is the 
commonest procedure leading to media market concentration. 
Media concentration is linked with technological, political and 
economic issues. Research on media concentration, ownership and 
control in the past tended to be conducted within nation states. The 
reasons were threefold: a) broadcasting and newspaper organisations 
were primarily national or state-owned; b) media systems were heavily 
regulated thereby preventing capital flowing from one country to 
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another; and c) media entrepreneurs were primarily involved in 
specific fields of interest (television, newspaper publishing, and so on). 
Therefore, in those days we had a clear picture of who owned the 
electronic media (in most cases, the state) and how the industry was 
operating (under state- guaranteed monopoly) (Papathanassopoulos, 
1990). However, these arenas became meaningless once technological 
(mainly satellite, cable and digital advances) and political forces (the 
trends towards deregulation and liberalisation) brought television into 
the international market-place. As Dyson and Humphreys (1988) 
pointed out, the need to stimulate new international media investment 
has led to powerful pressures on governments to introduce 'light touch' 
regulation and also to encourage a process of 'international 
gamesmanship'. Nowadays, one can notice a greater linkage between 
media enterprises. Deregulation in Europe, for instance, has allowed 
companies to move into new arenas - the Italian Fininvest (owned by 
magnate Berlusconi) into France and Spain, News International (owned 
by Australian Murdoch) into the UK, the USA, Spain and China... to 
name but a few. The result of this procedure is the creation of larger 
and fewer dominant media groups controlled by fewer hands (Negrine 
and Papathanassopoulos, 1990). 
2.3 DEFINITION OF MARKETS4 
Therefore the level of concentration in the media industry is quite high 
(see below). Regarding Europe, for example, the 1992 Commission 
Green Paper stated: 'The media sector is characterised by a fairly high 
level of concentration compared with other sectors and by a complex 
4A thorough market share definition is provided in Chapter 4, where the measurement of media 
concentration is tackled. However, because market definition is a central aspect of concentration, a 
preliminary argument laying out why the question of market definition is difficult is necessary at this 
point. 
Competition, Concentration and Efficiency in the Media 61 
web of shareholders and media ownership networks centred around a 
few large national operators (GP, 1992: 27)'. The argument is whether 
the level of concentration is acceptable, how much more media 
concentration we can afford, and what effects this phenomenon actually 
has firstly on company performance and secondly on diversity of 
opinion and democracy. When focusing on levels of concentration, one 
has to define the relevant market for which market shares would be 
calculated. A concept of the market is necessary to make use of 
measures of concentration. According to Frazer (1992: 13-16), in 
order to assess whether monopolistic situations exist, one must define 
both the geographical scope of the market and the product market. 
Defining relevant geographical and product markets should be the first 
step in order to consider whether media enterprises can exercise 
market power, that is, whether they have the ability to control price 
and output. 
The geographical dimension of market definition determines the scope 
of the market. In other words. ) it determines whether markets are 
defined as being local, regional, national, or even international. The 
issue of the relevant geographic market being examined is particularly 
important, as the adaptation of either narrow or wide market 
definitions may lead to totally different results in measuring levels of 
concentration. Some suppliers may operate nationally offering 
programming of national interest, so that a broad market definition is 
needed to cover the whole country in question. The growing 
intemationalisation of broadcasting, in particular, may mean that some 
relevant markets are larger than individual countries. Competitive 
suppliers of services may thus operate in multiple geographical 
markets, so that levels of concentration and the potential of exercising 
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market power should be considered in the context of an even broader 
market definition. Sometimes, however, the same services may not be 
available to consumers throughout a country because they are 
distributed regionally or locally. In such cases, narrower geographic 
market definitions are needed. 
Measures of concentration are meaningless unless they are calculated 
for markets whose definition is grounded in the extent of the 
geographical area being covered. For example, local cable systems 
often carry programming of local interest in a defined geographical 
area. This programming is not readily available to people living in 
other parts of the country in question. Measures on national 
concentration of ownership of cable systems must thus be drawn 
carefully, taking into account that cable systems in different localities 
are not available to all consumers. The question on whether they 
exercise market power and the related issue on whether they can 
influence public opinion should be discussed in the context of the 
particular market in where they operate. In some cases though, local 
cable may well compete in the national market (i. e. as buyers of 
services) with other delivered broadcast services. As Brenner (1993: 
108) puts the matter convincingly, 'data on the national concentration 
of ownership of cable systems often are cited without discriminating 
among the issues for which it is or is not relevant. National 
concentration may be relevant for evaluating whether cable systems 
exercise market power as buyers of programme services, since this is 
likely to be a national market, although only if there are not other 
competing buyers in the same market. On the other hand, national 
concentration data are unlikely to be relevant for evaluating the ability 
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of cable systems to exercise market power as sellers of services. 
Geographically the implicit market is too wide. 
Regarding the print industry, there have been various economic studies 
concerning media concentrations that have adopted either narrow or 
wide definitions of markets. US mass communication researchers have 
investigated newspaper concentration for decades assuming that the citY 
was the appropriate territory. Nixon (1968) talked about competition as 
a city phenomenon while Busterna (1988b, 1988c) analysed levels of 
concentration in cities. Picard (1988) moved away from the traditional 
way of describing markets and examined daily competition in 
metropolitan areas. After considering the national newspaper market 
and thirty markets from the largest 100 metropolitan areas, he reached 
the conclusion that newspaper concentration increased as the 
geographical size of the market decreased. Lacy and Davenport (1994) 
examined the degree of concentration and competition in the US 
newspaper industry based on the county. They argued that although 
daily newspaper markets showed higher concentration and lower 
competition than other US industries, these markets were less 
concentrated and had a greater potential for competition in 1983 to 
1988 than suggested by other studies using cities as the geographic 
market. 
It is obvious then that using the city as the geographic market yields 
different descriptions of market structure than using the county as the 
geographic market. The same could be said about national and regional 
markets. The Arthur Andersen study (1994), for instance, adopted a 
national perspective in examining UK media concentration. As we shall 
see in greater detail in Chapter 4, the study attempted to assess the level 
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of national concentration by using the time that people spent watching 
television, listening to the radio, or reading newspapers. It is easily 
understood that, under such interpretation, regional channel Carlton's 
share will be smaller in relation to media with national coverage (i. e. 
BBC). In fact, the above analysis found that BBC's share in the national 
market is 44.1% while Carlton's share in the same market is just 6.9%. 
However, it is meaningless to calculate Carlton's national market share 
since people living outside the London area do not have access to that 
channel. 
Product markets also have to be defined. In the past, the definition of 
media product markets was relatively easy, as consumers were exposed 
to a small range of homogeneous media services that were clearly 
distinguished from one another. The difference, for example, between 
a TV service and a cinema film release was obvious. However, new 
broadcast delivery methods such as cable and satellite as well as the 
development of new programme services have increased the substitutes 
available for any particular service and have thus complicated the 
definition of product markets. The convergence of technologies has 
added to the confusion. As the distinction between both electronic and 
non-electronic media and terrestrial broadcast TV and 
telecommunications services becomes more and more blurred, so does 
the definition of the relevant product market. It is now extremely 
difficult to determine which products or services are sufficiently close 
substitutes to be in the same product market. The fact that different 
media are seen as substitutes is shown if someone looks at local news 
which could be found on television, radio and local papers, and at 
national news which could be found in all these and also in cable TV, 
regional radio outlets, and so on. The same or similar information can 
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be delivered via print, on-line, teletext or audiotext and there are 
products and services which combine different communication modes: 
images, text and audio. What is the definition of the broadcasting 
market then? If we take as an example the release of a film which can 
be viewed firstly in a cinema, then as a TV programme and lastly in a 
home video, then the market for this product should include all these 
sub-markets. A soap opera, on the other hand, may only be used as a 
TV programme and therefore the market for this product is television. 
Thus the market for soap operas and films is defined differently. 
Depending on how substitutable consumers consider different services, 
the proper product market definition could be either narrow or wide. 
Consumers may (or may not) consider watching a regional TV station 
and reading newspapers close substitutes. But the media are also 
supplying advertising messages. There is thus a need to determine the 
substitutability of the different media advertising vehicles and define 
advertising markets. The advertising airtime or space sold by broadcast 
and print media may be sufficiently good substitutes to be in the same 
product market. Consumers, for instance, may not consider reading 
newspapers and listening to the radio good substitutes, but advertisers 
nonetheless may consider advertising in the two media good substitutes. 
Advertising airtime or space in broadcast and non-broadcast media will 
be differentiated, but the degree of substitutability and whether they 
should be considered in the same product market depends to a great 
extent on institutional arrangements in particular countries. For 
example, advertising space in newspaper distributed regionally or 
locally might be in the same product market as some broadcast 
advertising where the broadcast industry is organised to allow radio or 
TV broadcasts to sell airtime for local distribution of advertising. 
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Broadcast and newspaper advertising would be less substitutable if all 
broadcast advertising must be distributed nationally and newspapers 
have primarily regional or local distribution (Brenner, 1993: 105-7). 
These distinctions suggest that considerations of the print and broadcast 
market structure need to be based on multiple definitions of markets, 
with separate considerations of local, regional and national markets, of 
audience and advertising markets and of potential substitutes. Using 
principles of market definition helps to see whether concentration 
increases or decreases in any relevant market. However, defining 
relevant geographic and product markets is only a first step in 
analysing the issue of media concentration. An economic analysis of 
concentration should also consider whether a particular pattern of 
common ownership or control of media interests reduces the 
substitutable alternatives available and increases horizontal 
concentration such that it allows an increased exercise of market 
power. Vertical ties between programme production and programme 
networking, between programme networks and video distributors, 
linkages between print media and programme producers... to name but 
a few, also have to be discussed. Before discussing the routes towards 
horizontal, vertical, multisectoral and other types of integration in 
detail though, it is necessary to look at the barriers that prevent 
companies from entering the market. Market structure involves 
barriers to entry and it is necessary to explore them in full before 
examining the forms of concentration. The possibility of entry depends 
both on economic factors [usually on the activities of the dominant firm 
and the potential entrant(s)], and on the influence of public policy (law 
or regulation), which frequently affects the prospects for entry by new 
competitors. In cases where firms are able to enter markets easily, 
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there is little probability that incumbent operators will be able to 
exercise substantial market power. 
2.4 BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
The barriers against entrants include mainly economies of scale, capital 
and advertising requirements, distribution networks, key resource 
inputs, and any other factor which an outsider must have in order to 
enter a market (Bain, 1956). Shepherd (1970) defined 'entry' as a 
substantial move into the market, not the mere gaining of a toehold or 
market niche, which is usually possible in any industry. He also argued 
that some utilities have high or absolute barriers based on publicly 
granted franchises. This is the case in television broadcasting. In fact, 
the TV broadcasting industry is similar to other oligopolistic industries 
in that, in the absence of high barriers to entry, high profits among 
existing firms should stimulate new companies to enter the industry. 
Nevertheless, it is different from oligopolistic manufacturing industries 
in that, under current regulation by the Federal Communications 
Commission (in the USA) or by most Member States (in the European 
Union) new firms cannot enter the market without a license from 
government bodies. The lack of such a license is an absolute (legal) 
barrier to entry in any television market. 
The policies of the authorities concerning access to the media have 
principally concerned themselves with the electronic mass media. 
Governments in the Western world have not regulated access to the 
newspaper market. 5Because there are no state limitations anyone can, 
5 Government policies may act either as barriers to entry or as a means to decrease some of the other 
main sources of barriers to entry. The latter has been the case in the press industry. As argued in the 
previous chapter, there have been various subsidy forms of government intervention in the sector. 
Most European countries have support measures for the press, with Sweden being the most quotable 
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in theory at least, start his/her own title. In practice though it is 
difficult to do so partly due to the resistance they face from established 
newspaper firms. Old participants in a given media market have used 
many ways to make it difficult or even prevent new ones from entering 
it. The lowering of the price of the product for the consumers, possibly 
until the danger of competition has blown over is one of them. The 
price cut war in the UK initiated by Rupert Murdoch is an obvious 
example. Discounts depending on quantity in terms of distribution, 
which put old large players in a favourable position compared to 
(often) small new participants, is another one. Increased marketing 
efforts used by established newspaper companies at times when new 
entrants are suspected to willing to launch their businesses, is an 
additional way of making entry of the latter rather troublesome. 
Finally, the expansion of old firms into a new segment of the market 
constitutes an indirect but not of less importance barrier to entry. In 
respect of the newspaper industry Gustaffson (1993) mentions four 
types of such segments: a) time segments (morning, noon, afternoon, 
weekends, or Sunday newspapers); b) frequency segments (low and 
high- peri ocidy); c) demographic segments (general versus special 
papers); and d) geographic segments (local-regional-national- 
international). 
The phenomenon of established media companies providing obstacles 
for market entry is not unique to the newspaper industry. Regarding 
the television market, there have been cases of an enterprise buying 
programme packages or entire libraries or even buying production 
companies, thereby making it difficult for new channels to acquire 
example. Gustaffson (1993) mentioned that the Swedish press policy was developed in the 1970s to 
design a selective, automatically allocating subsidy system which provided yearly, operational 
subsidies to newspapers in a weak market position. It also stimulated the establishment of newspapers 
through an establishment aid. Finally, it promoted co-operation besides joint distribution. 
Competition, Concentration and Efficiency in the Media 69 
programmes (News Corporation's purchase of 20th Century Fox and 
Viacom's acquisition of the Hollywood major Paramount Pictures are 
two examples). Murdoch's satellite channel BSkyB constantly launches 
new services in addition to acquiring exclusive use of the entire supply 
of high-quality inputs (mainly sporting events), leaving potential rivals 
to rely on substitute inputs that are less popular. Thus although public 
policy (i. e. deregulation) in most parts of the globe helped encourage 
the growth of private TV, broadcast companies have used their existing 
'capacity' of distribution facilities or programme expertise to deliver a 
different type of programming that would be a good substitute for a 
new service trying to enter the market (Brenner, 1993). Increased 
salaries for central employees is an additional technique used. In 
Greece, for example, the two dominant commercial channels Mega 
Channel and Antenna TV increased three-fold the salaries of key 
personnel in mid-1992, at the time that new channels were suspected to 
start broadcasting. Regarding the pay-TV sector, with the proliferation 
of pay-TV channels the accessibility and control of a widespread coding 
system becomes crucial. New channels will not normally be able to 
introduce a new encryption system but will have to utilise the existing 
system which has the greatest market penetration and therefore will be 
placed in a disadvantageous position. Regarding all media, the buying 
up of potential competitors and the high establishment costs (which are 
often kept high by existing participants) are two additional barriers to 
entry. 
In fact, the most significant barriers to entry in the media industry are 
the cost barriers. Capital requirements that are needed to cover start-up 
losses are obviously difficult to overcome. Ve1janovski (1990) regarded 
the launches of two newspapers (The Independent and Today ) in 
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Britain in the 1980s as a proof of the fact that there were no longer any 
barriers to entry in the press industry. At the time his book was 
published in 1990, it was believed that the introduction of the new 
technology could change the entry prospects for the press industry due 
to lower production CoStS. 6 In fact, the launches of the two titles could 
be attributed to the advertising boom of the 1980s which led to the 
prosperity of the newspaper industry (Curran and Seaton, 1991; 
Negrine, 1994b; Sparks, 1995). The prediction that the technical 
revolution would remove barriers to enter the mass publishing did not 
come true. The change of the production technology has led to an 
increase in the number of pages, to bigger newspapers, to multi- 
sectoral papers and to the colour supplements added. Therefore, the 
new computerised production has not led to a significant increase in the 
number of titles but to the expansion of existing ones. It has also led to 
the increase of concentration of newspaper ownership. Today, owned 
initially by Eddie Shah, faced financial problems and sold to Murdoch's 
News International. It finally ceased publication in November 1995. 
The other new entrant, The Independent, set up by a group of 
prominent journalists with the backing of merchant banks, has only 
survived as part of the much larger and long-established Mirror Group 
(Sparks, 1995). As stated by Murdock (1990a), as paper production 
became more sophisticated both technologically and operationally, 
rising costs increasingly restricted entry to major markets and drove 
smaller titles out of business. Kopper (1983), after reviewing twenty 
attempts and nineteen failures to start up new regional or local 
6 The argument ran that entry costs into the market had been artificially inflated by the organised 
strength of the manual printing unions, who had insisted on high manning levels and high pay. Eddy 
Shah thus embarked upon a new project of launching a completely computerised national daily, 
Today, in Docklands, and Rupert Murdoch built a new printing plant in Wapping, East London. The 
shift to new technology was accompanied by an assault on the unions, mounted by management and 
assisted by journalists. This assault succeeded in breaking the unions and replacing large numbers of 
well-paid workers by smaller numbers of much more poorly paid workers (Curran and Seaton, 1991. 
Garnham, 1991; Negrine, 1994b; Sparks, 1995). 
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newspapers in Germany in the early-1980s, concluded that market 
entry is generally impossible. Rather, the practical circumstances of the 
press industry- particularly the newspapers' dependence on advertising 
income7- lead to the situation that, in the long run, only one newspaper 
can survive in a given market. 
In addition to cost barriers Porter (1980) cited five major sources of 
barriers to entry in the newspaper industry: a) economies of scale. 
These economies mean that there are declines in unit costs as the 
absolute volume per period increases. Baden Fuller (1979) stated that 
economies of scale create barriers to entry when the minimum efficient 
plant size pertaining to the industry is large compared with the 
industry's output. Scale economies could be present in purchasing of 
newsprint, printing, distribution of print copies, selling of subscriptions 
and utilisation of home delivery systems; b) product differentiation. 
These differences are seen in established papers which have brand 
identification (e. g. with political parties) and customer loyalties, which 
must be overcome by an entrant; c) switching costs. This barrier 
involves costs of changing from one product to another. Readers (and 
advertisers, to a lesser extent) are used to existing papers and are not 
very interested in new ones. Gustaffson (1993) calls this situation 
'inertia of the market'. However, advertising here would be a process 
of investing in consumer loyalty; d) access to distribution channels. In 
newspaper business, this involves the ease of access to news-stands and 
7 The fact that advertising raises entry barriers was illustrated by Shepherd (1979). He argued that to 
enter a market of advertised goods, a new entrant must meet 'penetration costs' - gaining a larger 
market share requires sharply rising advertising efforts. Shepherd argued that 'advertising intensity' is 
shown by advertising expenses as a percentage of total revenue. Within an industry, advertising 
intensity declines as market share rises (the dominant firm spreads the cost over a large volume) 
whereas among industries, advertising intensity is related positively with concentration (higher 
concentration causes grater sales effort and vice-versa). However, Shepherd also pointed out that 
advertising may not increase market power since it can be a powerful device by which new or small 
firms succeed. Tbus advertising may offset barriers effect as well. 
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to home delivery systems; and e) advantages independent of scale. 
Porter includes in this source of barriers a number of advantages of 
already established firms. An example in Britain was the Financial 
Times' effort (unsuccessful though) to prevent the Evening Standard 
from introducing a pink column, a central characteristic of its own. 
2.5 TYPES OF OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 
In order to understand the processes of media concentration (and its 
relation to the free flow of information) we have to look at the 
processes that are used by media companies to create and strengthen 
their position in the market. A discussion of the procedures that firms 
use to concentrate or diversify their media activity is essential. These 
procedures can be identified as mergers, acquisitions, launching of 
other media and dealings with other media companies. Media 
concentration thus may appear in different forms which need to be 
defined. The exploration of the different growth strategies used by 
companies will help us understand how they influence the market. 
Horizontal and vertical elements of market share together with the 
trend towards conglomeration can have an impact on market structure 
because they affect the performance of corporations and the 
functioning of the market-place. Close analysis should be carried out to 
assess whether a particular pattern of common ownership reduces the 
substitutes available and increases concentration that may lead to a 
dominant position. 
According to the Council of Europe, a company is considered to be in a 
dominant position 'at the moment when it has the possibility to behave 
independentlY on the relevant market in a way that gives it an 
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opportunity to avoid rendering itself accountable to competitors, 
buyers or suppliers. This possibility could result from either the 
market shares of one undertaking, orfrom the market share of this 
undertaking linked closely to the possibility of controlling technical 
know-how, raw materials, or capital. This dominant position enables 
this undertaking either to fix prices, or to control a significant part of 
the production or the distribution of the relevant products' (Council of 
Europe [CoE], 3rd European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media 
Policy, 1991: 10). Dominant position thus exists where one firm is in a 
position to use its dominant market power to minimise competition. 
Nevertheless, dominant position is not the same as concentration. 
Concentration may measure the general amount of competition in a 
particular market, but that does not necessarily mean that there is a 
dominant position in that market. There might be a highly concentrated 
market according to some concentration ratio (where, for example, 
only three firms are in a market, this market is normally considered as 
concentrated), without any firm enjoying a dominant position. This 
distinction is of paramount importance, since the various types of 
ownership patterns that will be examined below may result in an 
undesirably concentrated market, but they may not result in a dominant 
position. 
2.5.1 Horizontal Concentration Issues 
Horizontal integration is a situation in which an undertaking or group 
of undertakings control, at executive level, several production units of 
one only activity (a group controlling several TV channels, or several 
titles, or advertising sales). Horizontal integration has often been 
observed in the press industry. It enables a press group, by controlling 
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different titles, to achieve economies of scale by combining previously 
separate operations: operations concerning advertising sales; publishing 
editorial segments common to different titles such as TV supplements, 
games pages, fashion pages; operations concerning printing, 
distribution, promotion (Compaine, 1982; CoE, 3rd European 
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, 1991). Horizontal 
integration takes place either as a result of a merger (the combination 
of two firms into one with the one firm absorbing the other), or 
through 'natural' expansion of firm activity. Horizontally integrated 
companies may own properties either in geographically discrete areas 
or directed to different audiences. The second case would be a company 
that publishes magazines for sports, for decoration and for mothers. 
In the United States, mergers of newspapers located in the same city 
provide an example of horizontal integration. The US press industry is 
indeed highly concentrated. The number of chain-owned daily 
newspapers has risen dramatically over the twentieth century, 
accounting in 1992 for four-fifths of the daily newspaper circulation 
(Presstime, 1992). Press concentration causes considerations of 
economic efficiency and performance of production economies 
associated with large firms and of the degree of competition in the 
relevant market. But are there production economies associated with 
chain ownership? Are chains able to disseminate features, national news 
items, or advertising copy to individual firms at lower cost? The 
literature suggests various reasons for the trend towards newspaper 
chains. Many argued that there exist significant scale economies in the 
production of circulation and space. Ross (1970) stated that the absence 
of face-to-face competition in all but a few cities is most likely the 
consequence of scale economies in the production of circulation, news 
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and advertising. Blankenburg (1983) found that newspaper chains 
possess greater managerial ability which makes them more profitable. 
Compaine (1982) argued that chains are more capable of extracting 
greater profits from newspapers. Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) 
found that the tax system stimulates chain growth. 8 
Chains are considered to be better able than independents to exploit 
their market power in order to charge higher advertising prices. The 
Antitrust Division of the US Justice Department has charged that chains 
have used predatory pricing financed by cross-subsidisation to drive 
competing newspapers out of business in some markets. Newspaper 
chains are thus a subject of concern for economic reasons. The loss of 
competition that may be brought about by increases in chain newspaper 
ownership may be avoidable by enforcing anti-trust laws. Busterna 
(1989) pointed out that economic analysis and the reliance on some of 
the anti-trust case law9 suggest several options available to policy- 
makers that could make the newspaper industry more competitive and 
reduce the abuse of market power that chains may practice. Busterna 
argued that a possible solution to the problem would be the 
disintegration of the daily newspaper industry. He also noted that, even 
without this action taking place, policy makers can prevent monopoly 
pricing and profits by rate regulation of advertising and subscription 
prices. 
8 Dertouzos and Trautman's paper specified a five equation model of newspaper operations and 
estimated the model with data drawn from a sample of 129 newspaper firms. On the cost side, they 
confirmed that there are significant scale economics in the production of circulation and news. 
However, they did not find any evidence that chain newspapers can produce output more efficiently 
than independents, all things equal. According to them, economies associated with chain ownership 
fail to explain the growth of newspaper chains. What does explain this trend are the tax advantages 
associated with investing earnings in other paper properties. On the demand side, they found that 
newspapers located in contiguous geographic markets appear to have an important competitive effect 
on the demand for circulation (see also Dertouzos and Thorpe, 1982). 
9 For a thorough description of how anti-trust laws have been utilised to deal with certain newspaper 
chain activities in the past three decades see Busterna, 1989: 6- 10). 
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However, a close inspection of the nature of market structure and 
market power is a prerequisite in order to find the appropriate way to 
deal with horizontal media concentration issues. It should not be 
forgotten that newspaper firms compete in distinct but interrelated 
markets for advertising and circulation with other media (i. e. local 
radio, television stations, etc. ). Once again it is clear that in examining 
company market power careful consideration should be taken as to 
whether the medium in question supplies the same relevant geographic 
and product market as others. The existence of close substitutes in a 
defined geographical market usually prevents concentration and 
constrains the formation of dominant positions. 
A case recently considered by the European Commission provides an 
example of a competitive assessment and reveals the role of regulation 
in tackling horizontal concentration patterns. In 1994, News 
International p1c, a UK based firm controlled by News Corporation 
Limited, acquired a 49.9% stake in Vox, a German general interest TV 
channel, in which the German based Bertelsmann Group already owned 
24.9%. The Commission decided to allow the concentration on the 
grounds that it would not create or strengthen a dominant position as a 
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in 
the common market or a substantial part of it (Commission Decision of 
6 September 1994, Case No IV/M. 489). Regarding the relevant product 
market, the operation concerned the market for advertising in TV 
broadcasting, and more specifically, the segment of that for free access 
TV and for film rights. Bertelsmann had already been in the market 
for free-access TV through its stake in RTL (37.1% held by UFA in 
which Bertelsmann had 50% stake), RTL2 (7.8% held by UFA) and by 
the 24.9% stake in Vox. News International was only entering the 
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German free access TV market through its purchase of the stake in 
Vox. So the Commission decided that the position of Bertelsmann in the 
joint venture with regard to its interests in Vox and other TV channels 
does not change as a result of the proposed concentration. But News 
International had already been present in the German pay-TV market 
through Selco (a joint venture with Pro 7). However, the Commission 
decided that free access TV and pay-TV represent separate markets. 10 
Although some substitutability exists between free access TV and pay- 
TV, since the value of the latter depends directly on the alternative 
viewing possibilities, nevertheless, the case did not, in the 
Commission's view, raise competition concerns even in the narrowest 
possible market. 
Concerning the market for film rights, both Bertelsmann and News 
Corporation (through Twentieth Century Fox) had operations in film 
production and the trading of film rights in Germany. Bertelsmann was 
active primarily in the field of TV sports rights and its total market 
share for all rights was less than 10% at that time. News Corporation 
also had a market share for foreign language film and TV 
programming on the German market of less than 10%. Given that 
Vox's licence required it to be an information and entertainment 
channel and could not purchase significant amounts of sports 
programming, its low market share on the German free access TV 
market and the existence of other considerably more powerful players 
on the German market for film rights including the Kirch Group, the 
Commission concluded that it is unlikely that there is a risk of co- 
10 In the Commission's view, free access TV should be regarded as distinct from pay-TV for two main 
reasons. First, free access television is financed by advertising revenue and/or by other means (i. e. TV 
licence fee), depending mostly on whether the channel in question is state-owned or a private 
commercial one. Pay-TV is primarily financed by subscription fees. Secondly, free access TV offers a 
different programme mix in order to meet the requirements of a target audience. This can include live 
coverage of sport events or first television screenings of recent films. 
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ordination between News International and Bertelsmann through Vox. 
Regarding the relevant geographic market, the Commission noted that 
the TV broadcasting market is undergoing a strong process of 
development and geographical expansion due mainly to the growing 
importance of satellite TV. It also noted that the geographic reference 
market for TV broadcasting is influenced and determined primarily by 
the existence of language and cultural barriers, and therefore TV 
broadcasting markets remain mainly national or regional. Since the 
operation in question did not raise serious doubts as to the compatibility 
with the common market, the question of the precise relevant 
geographic market was left open by the Commission. 
Regarding the measurement of the magnitudes, the Commission decided 
to measure market share both by advertising revenue and by audience 
figures. At the time of the scheme, Vox had a market share of 2.5% of 
the advertising turnover of all general interest TV channels. This 
compared with market shares of 35% for RTL, 27% for SATI, 9% for 
ARD and 7% for ZDF. RTL2, in which Bertelsmann also had a stake, 
had a share of 1%. These figures were similar whether or not agency 
commissions were included. Regarding audience market shares, Vox 
had a market share of 1.8% in 1993. Further market share figures for 
the first half of 1994 suggested that Vox's viewing figures had 
remained under 2%. According to the 1993 figures, Vox was the ninth 
largest free access TV station in Germany. ZDF had 17.8%, RTL and 
RTL2 (in which Bertelsmann had a stake) 17.5% and 3.3% 
respectively, ARD 16.8% and SATI 14.7%. News International had no 
presence on the German free access TV market. As a consequence, the 
acquisition of Vox would not create a dominant position exercised by 
this firm. Bertelsmann already had a stake in Vox, so there was no 
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change to its market position. The Commission concluded that even 
given the financial strength of News International and the possibility 
for Vox to improve its market position following the completion of the 
operation, the market figures and the number of other channels in the 
free access TV market prevent the proposed concentration from 
creating or strengthening a dominant position on the German market 
for advertising in television broadcasting. 
2.5.2 Vertical Concentration Issues 
Vertical integration is the extension of the functional boundaries of a 
company. Vertically integrated entities are mainly large firms which 
have united several stages of the production and distribution processes 
under common ownership. II Vertical integration may intervene 
'upstream', either to reduce costs (control of the paper-making and 
printing industry by publishers) or to ensure priority in access to 
programmes (trend towards the control of audio-visual production by 
TV broadcasters), or 'downstream' (integration of advertising sales 
agencies by press groups or broadcasters). Many broadcasting 
corporations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
produce a large amount of their programming and form vertical 
relationships with independent producers, whereas others such as the 
Greek public broadcaster ERT or the Italian RAI also own local 
transmitting stations. Ownership links between the four big networks, 
programme producers and cable operators (multiple system operators) 
have been observed in the United States by Bagdikian (1992). The 
established relationship between networks and producers of new 
II Blois (1972) and Auerbach (1988) used the term 'quasi- i nte gration' to descfibe the situation where 
there is integration between firms which are not under common ownership. 
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programming in particular, often lasts from an early stage of 
programme production to final delivery and often harms rivals. When 
a company acquires exclusive use of the entire supply of high quality 
inputs, it forces competitors to rely on substitutes that may not be 
considered popular by consumers. Examples might include exclusive 
rights to tested popular programming, such as motion pictures and 
sporting events. 12 
Vertical integration can thus enable a firm to gain monopolistic 
advantages through the creation of a barrier to entry. However, the 
vertically integrated organisation can also increase or promote 
economic efficiency (Chandler, 1977; Auerbach, 1988; Brenner, 1993). 
Vertical integration of programme production (and/or distribution) and 
programme networking often enable the firm to exercise direct control 
of upstream and downstream subsidiaries. Patterns of vertical 
integration can also lead to increased market power. The broadcasting 
entity with a certain degree of market power can more completely 
exploit that power by using vertical integration to control production 
or distribution. For instance, a programme network might exploit its 
market power more effectively by controlling the ability of the video 
12 Rupert Murdoch's empire has cornered the television coverage of many major sporting events and 
has thus restricted the amount of similar programming shown by others. BSkyB, 40% of which is 
owned by Murdoch, has established the following major contracts. Football: E304m for five years of 
FA Premiership (with BBQ; Rugby League: E87m for five years of Super League; Boxing: two-year 
with Frank Warren stable (Bruno, Benn, Hamed), possibly worth E50m if Tyson included; Golf: Ryder 
Cup and ten European PGA events; and Rugby Union: f7m for three-year share of domestic and Five 
Nations' highlights. The American Fox TV, 100% owned by Murdoch, has made two major contracts. 
American Football: flbn over four years coverage of the National Conference of the NFL; Ice 
Hockey: f 96m for five years of NHL. The German Vox, 49.9% of which is owned by Murdoch, has 
acquired the Americal Football for World League for L45,000. The Australian Channel Seven, in 
which Murdoch holds 15%, has made the following three main contracts. Olympics: E46.1m for 
Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000; Australian Rules Football: f39.2m for seven years for ARFL; and 
Rugby Union: f 7.5m for five years of Super Ten, domestic rugby and home tests. Finally, Star TV 
(63.6% owned by Murdoch) has established two major sport contracts. Chinese Soccer: f-18.75m for 
ten years, not exclusive in China; and Badminton: f12.5m for ten years of all international 
competitions (The Guardian, 13-06-1995: 22). So by acquiring exclusive use of major sporting events 
by vertical contracts, Murdoch's empire has excluded rivals from a sufficient quantity of high quality 
input. 
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distributor to substitute other networks as inputs, or might price 
discriminate more effectively by gaining control of downstream 
pricing of other video services. According to Brenner (1993: 123-51), 
vertical ties cause a concern that includes the possibility that 
unaffiliated programme networks will be denied access to video 
distribution; that independent producers will be denied the ability to 
sell their programming; that increased barriers to entry will result 
from backward integration into networking (by video distributors) or 
into programme production (by networks); that unintegrated video 
distributors will be foreclosed from purchasing integrated programme 
networks; and that the purchase by networks of exclusive rights to 
blocks of programming may increase entry barriers into networking. 
The underlying reason for such concerns is that the vertical 
relationship will result in exclusion that may harm competition and 
may even increase or exploit market power. Of course, the question of 
whether or not an integrated company is able to enjoy increased market 
power involves the above described competitive analysis of a market. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the number of competitors (networks or 
distributors) in the same market, the ability of new suppliers to enter, 
and the ability of competitors to carry similar (close substitutable) 
programming, all have to be taken into account in analysing vertical 
relationships. 13 However, it is difficult to measure vertical integration 
and therefore the market power that it possibly exercises. Shepherd 
(1979) argued that one method would be to count stages of production; 
13 In the above mentioned Vox case examined by the Commission, both News Corporation and, to a 
limited extent, Bertelsmann had film production and trading activities. As to the purchase of film 
rights by Vox from News International and its affiliates (which would include News Corporation's 
subsidiary Twentieth Century Fox), it is true that the Fox film and programme library is an important 
source of programmes for TV channels. However, many other sources existed both for foreign (in the 
case of Fox mainly English) and German language programmes. Therefore, there was no foreclosure of 
the market for programmes through the proposed operation (Commission Decision of 6 September 
1994 No IV/M. 489). 
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the greater the number of stages embraced, the greater the integration. 
Defining stages though is a matter of judgement and debate simply 
because a 'stage' can include several individual steps. Another method 
proposed by Shepherd (1979) and Auerbach (1988) is to take the ratio 
of a firm's v alue- added/s ales integration. An integrated producer adds 
value by processing at many stages so that the ratio would be high. 
There are occasions though where some one-stage industries have high 
value-added while others have many stages, each adding little value. 
Thus there is no perfect measure of vertical integration and no official 
indexes have been published. 
2.5.3 Diversification Relationships 
Diversification is the move of a business into other areas of businesses. 
It can be product extension (adding a product to an existing product 
line) or geographical extension and normally involves operations 
concerning different product markets. The Marris and Mueller's 
(1980) approach found the root of diversification in the managerialist 
imperative to grow, even if necessary beyond the constraints of 
traditional markets. Diversification was supported by a particular 
management theory, that was called 'portfolio theory' (Smith and 
Schreiner, 1969), which assumed that it was desirable for businesses 
either to diversify across a national market or have investments across 
a range of different national markets both in terms of 'relative 
maturity' and in terms of investing in several markets in case home 
market was adversely affected. The benefits of diversified entities are 
threefold: firstly, allocation of capital (the managers of a diversified 
firm could allocate capital among the various branches); secondly, the 
transfer of technology; and thirdly, the pooling of risks (combined 
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risks are usually lower). Probably the most commonly explanation of 
diversification is that it is a form of risk aversion -a company does not 
'put all its eggs in one basket' (Auerbach, 1988: 229-31). 
In this respect, there is a confusion over the terms of diversification 
and vertical integration. This is due to the fact that diversification, like 
vertical integration, is now a common business practice and thus some 
of the trends related to diversification are inseparable from those of 
vertical integration. It might be difficult in particular cases to say 
whether a business strategy is diversification or vertical integration. In 
principle though the two processes are distinguishable, since they are 
driven by a different management logic. Diversification means the 
entry into new different markets which are not likely to be infected by 
a particular economic trend that affects the market therein (the market 
may have reached saturation, for example). On the contrary, vertical 
integration is about integrating a market. To that extent, vertical 
integration and diversification are quite different concepts and different 
strategies. In addition, unlike vertical integration, the measurement of 
diversification has no conceptual difficulties (for diversification 
measures see Auerbach, 1988: 231-33). 
Diversification can be conglomeration in cases where the trend towards 
diversification does not come about through 'natural' expansion of firm 
activity, but through a merger. Conglomerate mergers are 'second best' 
solutions by acquiring companies mainly because there are no 'market 
power' advantages by new acquisition. Many acquisitions of this kind 
took place either because a leading firm felt that the market was 
'saturated' with its product or because its market was 'mature'. 
Auerbach (1988) pointed out that nowadays companies tend to focus on 
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what they do best. The American ITT, for example, already 
multinational giant in telecommunications in the mid-1960s was taken 
on by Harold Gennen. The plan proved to be unsuccessful so that in 
recent years, ITT tries to de-conglomerate by attempting to re-enter 
telecommunications, an action financed by selling off of the assets not 
related to electronics. 
In the mass media field, diversification can produce industrial 
conglomerates (for instance, an oil company that goes into the media) 
or service conglomerates (where a sector such as financing or retailing 
moves into the media) (Murdock, 1990a). However, multi-media 
integration is the commonest form of diversified relationships in recent 
years. Multi-media integration is a situation where the same company 
invests in different sectors of the media industry. During the 1980s in 
Europe, for example, the phenomenon of the same firm investing in 
different sectors of the communication and cultural industries, led to 
the establishment of multi-media groups active on several markets 
(press, radio, television, cinema, records), along the same lines as 
already existed in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Japan 
(IDATE, The World Television and Film Market, 1994). The trend 
towards multi-media diversification may be explained by different 
factors: developing expertise; preserving positions in the advertising 
market; promoting the same product developed in different media; 
investing in a market segment considered to be profitable; or even 
simply for prestige purposes (see below). 
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2.5.4 Multinational Relationships 
The multinational expansion has been motivated by the same forces 
which permitted, and the same motives which impelled the development 
of giant, integrated and then highly diversified companies. The 
expansion of 'business horizon' have forced them to examine 
possibilities overseas. The search for economies of scale in operations 
such as the sale of advertising slots, the production or purchase of 
programmes, R&D (research and development) and the possibility of 
market segmentation have been some of the driving forces. 
Multinational integration in the member States of the European Union 
may also be explained by referring to the completion of the Single 
Market. Companies have sought to acquire stronger positions so as to 
be able to face up to competition at the level of the European market. 
In many cases, international expansion took the form of exports; 
however, with the increasing flexibility and sophistication of the giant 
firm overseas production came to be seen as a viable alternative to 
exporting. 14 Over time we expect to observe the expansion and 
diffusion of managerial technique and 'culture' to host company 
businesses and others who were formerly limited to production within 
national or even regional boundaries. 
2.5.5 Co-operation Agreements 
Finally, there is a trend towards co-operation agreements. These are 
agreements between distinct enterprises which intend to improve their 
14 Globalisation via horizontal expansion occurs when a company serves at least two different foreign 
markets through either FDI (foreign direct investment) - this refers to the ownership of a company in a 
foreign market and includes the control of assets, or exports (i. e. international trade) and sells the same 
product in each market. Globalisation via vertical expansion occurs when a firm is engaged in 
successive stages of the production chain through either FDI or long-term contracts, when one or more 
of those stages are located in different countries (US Department of Commerce, 1993). 
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market positions. The companies involved in these kind of agreements 
do not lose legal control but they agree to exert their power of decision 
separately for their common benefit. The 1994 global alliance between 
the British Broadcasting Corporation and Pearson to launch satellite 
delivered channels throughout the world is an obvious example. Co- 
operation agreements though, as all the other forms of concentration 
described above, may have anti-competitive implications and even lead 
to dominant positions. This was the case of 'Media Services', a 1994 
technological joint venture, in which the German companies 
Bertelsmann, Kirch Group and Deutsche Telekom were involved. The 
partners intended to develop the infrastructure for digital television in 
Germany, but the deal was found to be anti- competitive by the 
European Commission. Commission Decision of 9 November 1994 
(IV/M. 469, OJ No L 364) declared that the joint venture would have 
created dominant positions on the markets for administrative and 
technical services, pay-TV and cable networks should the venture had 
gone ahead. 15 
2.6 MOTIVES AND EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC 
CONCENTRATION 
It is necessary to have a closer look at the motives and the effects of the 
various forms of economic concentration in order to fully comprehend 
these growth procedures. This will help us to apply them in the media 
sector in the next section of this chapter. The first motive is the gaining 
of straight market power and profits. Indeed, if the resulting company 
has more market power, then it can achieve higher profitability. 
15 See next Chapter for an account of the Commission's Decisions concerning media concentrations 
in the Internal Market. 
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Horizontal mergers raise market power, for by definition they 
eliminate direct competition between two or more firms. Vertical 
mergers tie together firms in the chain of production but it is open to 
question whether they raise market power. Adelman' hypothesis in 
1949 assumed that vertical integration does not affect competition and 
thus does not contribute to market power. Shepherd (1979) however, 
displaced that hypothesis on the grounds that markets are not pure and 
frictionless with perfect certainty and free entry as that hypothesis 
assumed. The answer therefore depends on the degree of competition in 
capital markets, on the role of entry barriers, on the extent of 
uncertainty and market imperfections and on firm behaviours. 
A second motive is the gaining of economies of scale. These can be 
divided into two categories: pecuniary economies and technical 
economies. The former means that a merged firm may be able to 
enforce lower prices for the inputs it buys. Tax laws and accounting 
rules may also raise the profitability of mergers. In the latter case, 
horizontal mergers are mostly associated with the monopolistic 
advantages gained by creating large companies. On the contrary, 
vertical integration is associated with the increases in efficiency 
achieved relative to existing firms. Williamson (1971) argued that the 
advantages of integration are not that technological (flow process) 
economies are unavailable to non-integrated enterprises, but that 
integration harmonises interests (or reconciles differences) and permits 
an efficient (adoptive, sequential) decision process to be utilised. The 
problem is thus one of control and of conflict of interests between 
actors rather than a purely technological one. In fact, there have been a 
number of arguments against vertical integration. Firstly, it is thought 
that in a growing economy one expects progressively greater 
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specialisation and differentiation (vertical disintegration) to take place 
at all levels (Stigler, 1951). Secondly, there is the widespread argument 
that moving into a new sphere of activity brings with it many of the 
managerial and productive difficulties associated with vertical 
integration. 16 Stigler (1951) argued that a 'young' industry might tend 
towards a vertically integrated structure (since it cannot afford 
specialisation) and then, as the industry grows, disintegration is likely 
to take place. 
A third class of economies may arise from conglomerate mergers: a) 
the whole firm may be stabilised by combining disparate activities; b) 
financial guidance and flows may be superior in diversified firms; and 
c) 'synergy' may result from interaction among differing technology 
and management within a conglomerate. These economies however, can 
be achieved not only by mergers but also by internal growth (a firm 
invests to create new capacity instead of buying an existing company) 
and by long-term contracts among firms (vertical economies, in 
particular, can be realised through 20 or 30-year supply contracts 
thereby creating security of supplies). Shepherd (1979) mentioned 
three different techniques for measuring scale economies. The first 
divides cross-section data on company size and average cost (average 
costs though are hard to measure). The second involves managerial 
estimates of the 'optimum' scale of new plants and of possible 
economies of multiplant operations. The third regards estimates for 
16 However, as Auerbach (1988) illustrated, the US computing company IBM is a typical example of 
a vertically integrated enterprise that has been associated with managerial and productive flexibility. 
For IBM, full integration has extended the possibilities for firm development and greatly added to its 
flexibility. From the very beginning, the IB-360 was a vertically integrated conception both in terms 
of production and marketing: the innovatory SLT (Solid Logic Technology) components were devised 
and produced by IBM, as well as other parts of the computer. The final device not only was marketed 
by IBM at all stages but its genesis and production had at all stages taken place in the context of the 
marketing strategy which governed it. Another example of a firm at the highest levels of integration 
and managerial sophistication was the US AT&T before the break-up. 
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hundreds of markets in all sectors. If firms of size Y are surviving (or 
increasing in number) this proves their efficiency in all essential 
activities - production and distribution activity, location, research, and 
so on. 
Other motives for mergers and acquisitions are the desire to build an 
empire for prestige purposes (not a business-led motivation) and the 
'failing firm' argument. The latter means that although troubles within 
a company may be solved by inside changes (stockholder action or 
take-over), when more serious problems are causing 'failure', then the 
firm may be salvaged by merger with a healthy firm. This was the case 
of Vox, a general interest free access TV channel broadcasting in 
Germany, owned by Bertelsmann (24.9%) and a number of other small 
shareholders. It had been experiencing financial difficulties since its 
inception (1991) and thus required a substantial capital injection to 
enable it to continue broadcasting. News International p1c, a UK based 
company controlled by News Corporation Limited, and Canal+, a 
French pay-TV channel, acquired in 1994 a stake of 49.9% and 24.9% 
respectively and enabled the channel to continue operating. 
2.7 LEVEL, MOTIVES AND EFFECTS OF MEDIA 
CONCENTRATION IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
Merger and acquisition activity increased significantly in the mid- 
1980s in both the United States and Europe. In the OECD 1988 Report 
on Mergers and Competition Policy, it was stated that the proportion of 
international mergers (non-US firms acquiring US firms and vice- 
versa) in 1985 was 11.6 per cent by number and 13.9 per cent by value 
of transactions. In the 1985-86 period, the number of all types of 
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operations rose sharply to 561 (compared with 480 in 1984-85) and 
international operations as well as those between the European Union 
countries accounted respectively for 18 and 21 per cent of this total. 
When considering only international and intra-Community mergers and 
acquisitions of majority holdings, they accounted for more than a third 
of all operations of this type. Fairburn and Way (1989), looking at the 
history of merger activity in the United Kingdom observed four 
merger booms. The first one occurred at the turn of the century mostly 
in the textile industries and had only limited effect. The second merger 
boom in the 1920s had a major impact on most sectors of the 
manufacturing industry since it promoted rationalisation of the 
industry. In the late 1960s, aggregate concentration and concentration 
in most industries increased again after the 1930s world depression17. 
The firms' motivations for attaining large scale in that period were 
both the achievement of economies of scale and the reduction of costs. 
Finally, the recent merger wave in 1985-86 was accompanied with a 
concern of securing effective competition. 
In an era of intense change, it can hardly be surprising that the media 
industry has been dominated with questions of concentration, 
ownership and control. The concentration in the communications sector 
is little more than the adaptation of this sector to the general 
concentration dynamic in the economy. Murdock and Golding (1978) 
have observed the basic shifts of the UK media in the mid-1970s: a 
long-term trend towards concentration and a more recent increase in 
diversification which has produced conglomerates with significant 
17 Auerbach (1988) mentioned that the overall effect of mergers on the growth of large companies was 
substantial: in 1960, in both the USA and the UK it accounted for half the rise in aggregate 
concentration. However, he also pointed out that, although mergers had a major impact on the growth 
of post-war aggregate concentration in both the USA and the UK, their relationship is complex. 
'I'lle 
rises in concentration in both countries were not coincident with great merger waves. 
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stakes in several sectors of the communications industry. As stated by 
Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1990) these shifts have taken on an 
international flavour. The new media tycoons have not restricted their 
activities to any single country and they have developed their forces 
across several countries or even continents and also across different 
media sectors. In the late 1980s, there have been a series of major 
mergers and acquisitions in the communications industries around the 
world: the Japanese firm Sony's acquisition of the CBS's record 
division; the General Electric's take-over of the US TV network NBC; 
the German firm Bertlesman's purchase of the Doubleday book 
company and RCA records; Maxwell's take-over of the New York 
publisher Macmillan; Murdoch's acquisition of the Twentieth Century 
Fox film interests and others... to name but a few. 
These trends continued in the 1990s. In August 1995 the other two US 
TV networks ABC and CBS were acquired by Walt Disney Co and the 
industrial group Westinghouse Electric Corporation respectively. In 
September 1995 Time Warner Inc and Turner Broadcasting System Inc 
(owner of CNN) were merged, with the resulting company being the 
largest in the world media sector with revenues of more than 20 billion 
dollars at the end of 1995. Similar practices are observed in the 
telecommunications sector. The American AT&T, in collaboration with 
14 other telecommunications organisations (among them the Japanese 
KDD, the Dutch KPN, the Spanish Telefonica and the Swiss PTT) have 
created a 'telecommunications federation' called 'World Partners'. 
British Telecom has contracted alliances with telecommunications 
organisations operating in Japan, India, Norway, Finland and Denmark. 
Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom have created the joint venture 
'Atlas' and by taking a 30% stake in the third largest US long-distance 
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telephony company Sprint are prepared to complete a world-wide 
association named 'Phoenix'. According to Screen Digest (January 
1994) three kinds of alliances are observed today: alliances primarily 
concerned with software production and ownership of content; alliances 
concerned with the business of distribution networks and delivering 
content; and those concerned with developing or obtaining access to key 
enabling technologies (see Appendix VII). 
Murdock (1990a) pointed out that communications companies have 
been making efforts to expand their core interests which take several 
forms: a) growing integration between hardware and software, which 
has been prompted by a desire to ensure a supply of programming to 
service the new distribution technologies. Sony, for instance, acquired 
the CBS record division in the late-1980s which gave it a major stake in 
the international music industry to add to its already dominant position 
in the world market for compact disc players through its partnership 
with Philips, the Dutch electronics group; 18 b) growing 
interpenetration between the old and the new media market as the 
major players in established sectors have moved into emerging areas 
which offer additional opportunities to exploit their resources. 
Newspaper and journal publishers, for example, have moved into the 
provision of on-line data services and broadcast networks have 
branched out into cable programming. Murdoch stated that the 
rationale behind these moves is the desire for greater 'synergy"9 
18 The trend towards integration between hardware and software undertakings is common in the USA 
(General Electric/NBC, Sony/Columbia, Matshushita/MCA, the role of cable operators in cable 
programming). However, although increasing, it is still relatively rare in Europe (Phili ps/Pol y gram, 
cable groups in France). 
19 Synergy is 'a net gain in value due to real advantages when heterogeneous entities are conjoined' 
(Auerbach, 1988: 154). In media corporations, synergy calls for material from one kind of the firm's 
owned media, such as magazines, to be reused in altered form in its other owned media, like books and 
TV series. Investors favour synergy because a company's newspapers and magazines can be used to 
promote the celebrities featured in its other products such as movies and TV series. For Bagdikian 
(1992) though, this recycling of material trends to increase the already high level of imitativeness in 
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between the companies' various divisions so that activity in one sector 
can facilitate activity in another. When the Italian magnate Berlusconi 
bought the Standa department store chain in July 1988, he immediately 
announced a programme of cross-promotion whereby his TV stations 
would carry daily slots featuring the bargains in offer in the storeS20. 
Gerson (1993) pointed put that the Time-Warner merger has taken the 
philosophy of vertical integration to a whole new level in terms of 
strategic planning at the international level (including books, 
magazines, movies, cable TV and VCRS)21. Murdoch's News 
Corporation Ltd. also used vertical integration strategy as a basis for 
launching new businesses. He entered the US market in 1985 with the 
purchase of seven TV stations from Metromedia, in 1986 he purchased 
the Twentieth Century Fox and therefore he combined a steady source 
of programming with ready-made distribution outlets. 
There have been a large number of other authors and researchers who 
commented on the recent concentration trends within the European 
Union. Locksley (1989) argued that the economic dynamics of 
programming as it puts owners of a single type of medium at a competitive disadvantage. 
Nevertheless, for Garnham and Porter (1994) so-called cross-media synergy is 'largely a myth 
circulated in company reports to justify mergers rather than a demonstrable econormc reality. There are 
no significant economies of scale or scope in operating across television, radio and prmt publishing'. 
Comanor (199 1) also argued that economies of scale are exhausted at a modest level of firm size and 
that hardly any sufficient gains from mergers could be found. 
20 Here it is worth exploring the distinction between conglomerates made earlier on. Murdock (1990) 
identified three varieties of conglomerate: a) industrial conglomerates (companies that own media 
facilities but the major operations are centred on the industrial sector); b) service conglomerates (these 
are centred on service sectors such as financing and retailing). Berlusconi is a typical example of this 
type of conglomerate; and c) communications conglomerates who are centred on the media and 
information industries. Examples of this kind of conglomerate are Murdoch and Bertlesman. 
21 However, in Garnharn and Porter's 1994 paper 'Evidence to the Review of Cross-Media Ownership' 
it is stated that the Time-Warner merger was 'a creation of the junk bond financed mania of 1980s 
America and remains deeply indebted'. The same could be said about Sony and Matsushita's entry into 
films, which have been disastrous. Sony is still struggling to restore Columbia's fortunes, while 
Matsushita is embroiled in an acrimonious row with the MCA management over the latter's desire to 
buy back the business. Nevertheless, the convergence of the entertainment industry with new 
technology has attracted a stream of investors to Hollywood. The misadventures of Sony and 
Matsushita have done little to dampen the enthusiasm of the other electronics, information technology 
and telecommunications companies, such as IBM, that are searching for partners in the entertainment 
business (Financial Times, 15-10-1994: 9). 
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information industries encourage enterprises in the sector to become 
vertically integrated, to expand horizontally, thereby raising levels of 
concentration, and to become involved in adjacent markets. Lohest 
(1983), in a report to the Council of Europe talked about technical 
diversification and economic concentration that have come to 
complement each other through the 'natural laws' of the market. All 
these trends in Europe could be attributed to two factors: a) to the 
widespread belief that the European industry must be restructured in 
order to be able to compete more effectively with the US and Japanese 
firms; b) to the argument that the European industry ought to be 
rationalised. The emergence of large, efficient Euro-firms would help 
to exploit advantages of mass-production strategies. This view is based 
on the belief that the scale economies are large and that a fragmented 
Europe prevents European companies from exploiting them. The 
industry thus becomes increasingly reliant on joint ventures 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1990). 
Gomery (1986) argued that there are two reasons for such processes. 
Firstly, there is a business desire to take full advantage of the power of 
integration in terms of reducing the costs of sales and transactions. The 
vertically integrated corporation sells products to itself so that it does 
not have to go through bidding procedures. It can also publicise itself. 
Murdoch, for example, has promoted the Sky's satellite programmes in 
his own newspapers. Secondly, there is a business desire for attaining 
market control. A vertically integrated corporation need not worry 
about being excluded from key markets. 
Regarding foreign investment in the media field Gerson (1993) offered 
a number of explanations for this trend. He argued that some media 
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transnational corporations (TNCs) invest abroad to obtain specific 
proprietary assets - ownership of talent or specialised expertise. Sony's 
purchase of CBS and Record Divisions in 1988 and Columbia Pictures 
in 1989 was supposed to make the company a formidable player in both 
entertainment and music. Secondly, some TNCs invest abroad in order 
to enter a foreign market and serve it from that location (foreign 
market penetration). In fact, as stated by Behrman and Grosse (1990), 
the decision to invest abroad is dependent upon the profitability of the 
market, the growth potential and the existing competitive situation. The 
easiest way of a foreign market entry is the ability to buy an existing 
media property. This is illustrated by Hachette's strategy to establish a 
presence in many countries by buying an array of magazines since 
1985. 
A third reason for media international consolidation is the purpose of 
creating production and distribution facilities abroad (production and 
distribution efficiencies). The term 'comparative advantage' is used to 
describe situations in which a foreign entry manages to produce or 
service for less cost than that produced locally. The world's leading 
newspapers Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times distribute 
their news via satellite to various international publishing sites where 
the newspaper then is locally published and distributed. By doing that,, 
they lower the distribution costs. A fourth reason for foreign media 
investments is the overcoming of regulatory barriers to entry. Since 
some markets are heavily terrified (i. e. there are regulatory controls 
on foreign imports), one way to overcome these regulatory barriers to 
entry is to promote joint partnerships or create foreign subsidiaries. In 
October 1989, the European Union adopted the 'Television Without 
Frontiers' Directive which required the reservation of space for 
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European works on broadcasters (89/552/EEC). In order to offset the 
potential effects of any proposed European import regulation, many US 
film and television industries have already begun forming joint 
partnerships with European media industries. Two examples of this 
trend are the Capital Cities/ABC's 50 per cent investment in the 
German television production house Telemunchen and the Viacom 
International's joint venture with the British Telecom and Mirror 
Group in order to launch the music channel MTV. 
Another reason explaining the tendency towards media 
internationalisation and diversification is that single media ('mono- 
media') activity is risky as the competition between media for 
advertising revenue has become intense (Dyson and Humphreys, 1988). 
The 1992 EU Green Paper on Pluralism and Media Concentration in 
the Internal Market stated that multimedia developments (which are due 
most to publishers investing in the audio-visual sector rather than the 
opposite) are attributable to the value-added which multimedia 
represents for advertisers and for programme suppliers (COM(92) 480 
final). Indeed, the advertising sector has been the subject of two 
specific phenomena over recent years: a) a trend towards the 
globalisation of commercial strategies and therefore the advertising of 
the firms on an international scale; and b) the multiplication and 
strengthening of the role and influence of intermediaries- the 
advertising agencies and the media buying houseS22. Faced with the 
emergence and subsequent concentration of these intermediaries the 
media have been forced to group together and become more 
concentrated. Booz-Allen and Hamilton 1989 report pointed out that 
22 Agencies have created media buying companies with the aim of managing the purchase of 
advertising space at a national and even international level and demanding reductions in advertising 
prices charged by the media. (The European Institute for the Media, 1993). An example is the 
buying 
house Zenith which belongs to the UK-based advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi. 
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remaining in one sector only leaves entrepreneurs open to the erosion 
of their market share by intruders in this sector. In this respect, 
diversification creates a mass and a degree of strength absent from 
single media organisations. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
The importance of exploring and evaluating media concentration is 
linked, on the one hand, to economic competition across the several 
media markets and, on the other, to pluralism and diversity in content 
with its related impact on the formation of public opinion. In both the 
United States and Western Europe there is a general consensus that free 
market competition (i. e. an absence of dominant monopolies) is a 
prerequisite for democracy. Unbridled competition however, often 
results in the creation of private monopolies and cartels which would 
stifle competition in a substantial proportion. Research has to look at 
the conditions that structure the development of print and broadcasting 
media systems and to point out and analyse factors that can be used to 
influence this development. In any case, it is very difficult to develop a 
coherent policy on mergers and concentration of activity when the 
measurement of market strength is itself difficult to assess (see chapter 
4). The large diversified conglomerate cannot easily be classified under 
any single category. The question of which markets need to be 
identified, the level of market share beyond which concentrations 
become unacceptable (i. e. horizontal concentration) and what types of 
links between companies might affect the market (i. e. vertical or multi- 
media integration) are important and must be considered. In addition, 
we have to consider the measures that the states should take to protect 
against excessive media concentrations. 
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Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1990) suggest that for policy to be 
coherent, one needs a regulatory body which could operate on carefully 
drafted regulations and use clear-cut procedures. Such a body would 
deal with controlling mergers, limiting market shares and prohibiting 
the establishment of alliances which would constitute an abuse of the 
system. But which approach should this regulatory body adopt? The 
economic one which emphasises expansion of markets beyond state 
borders and the advantages of mass production within large enterprises, 
or the cultural one which emphasises the necessity of maintaining free 
access to the media markets for both consumers and new companies and 
also gives priority to the advantages of plurality and diversification 
within a media sector? Unless policy-makers come to terms with this 
dilemma, any proposed concentration policy is doomed to fail. 
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The next chapter explores the media competition, concentration and 
merger control policies at European Union level. It advances the 
argument that the competition and merger control framework does not 
necessarily result in pluralism and diversity of opinions in the market- 
place. A media-specific regulatory framework is needed for this 
purpose. Competition law safeguards (with regard to mergers and 
uncompetitive behaviour) and media law safeguards (with regard to 
media pluralism) have different objectives. As the Commission has 
rightly stated in its 1992 Green Paper, pluralism and competition are 
different criteria, and the protection of pluralism often needs tighter 
control than the protection of competition. This makes it necessary to 
have specific rules on media pluralism even where the general 
competition rules apply. We therefore welcome the European 
Commission's initiative to form media-specific rules for safeguarding 
the above objective. 
CHAPTER 3 
MEDIA COMPETITION/ 
CONCENTRATION POLICY 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Media CompetitionlConcentration Policy in the European Union loo 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In December 1992, the European Commission published its Green 
Paper Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: an 
assessment of the need for Community action. ' This was the outcome of 
several requests on behalf of the European Parliament2 and some of the 
interests concerned. The purpose of the Green Paper was to assess the 
need for action at Community level in the light of the disparities 
between national rules on media ownership and consider potential 
options. By adopting the Green Paper, the Commission sought to 
provide a basis for discussion and receive opinions of all interested 
parties - the European Parliament, competent national authorities, 
European organisations representing television and radio broadcasters, 
publishers, journalists, audio-visual creative artists and producers, 
satellite and cable distributors and advertisers. At the same time, it 
sought to stress the importance which it attaches to preserving 
pluralism in the frontier-free area (i. e. the Internal Market). In the 
Commission's view, the freedoms of the Internal Market cannot be put 
into practice at the expense of pluralism; instead, their implementation 
must help to strengthen that market through the opportunities which it 
gives both to citizens and the media. 
Before the publication of the Green Paper, the instrument available for 
tackling concentrations in the European media field was (and still is 
until the Green Paper becomes Directive or Regulation) European 
competition law. Competition policy in general is concerned firstly 
with preventing agreements between undertakings that reduce the 
I COM (92) 480 final, 23 December 1992. 
2 Resolution of 15 February 1990 on Media Takeovers and Mergers, OJ No C 68,19-03-1990, p 137- 
8; Resolution of 16 September 1992 on Media Concentration and Diversity of Opinions, OJ No 
C 
284,02-11-1992, p44. 
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effectiveness of the competitive process, secondly with controlling 
mergers that increase the probability of exercising undue market 
power, and thirdly with anti- competitive behaviour that enables 
companies either to acquire market power or to increase barriers to 
entry. In most Member States the media are subject to ordinary 
competition law and/or merger control provisions. 3 Competition law is 
a major growth area of European regulation. The EC Treaty has two 
main sections specifically on competition (Articles 85 and 86) and 
several others that may also be used - Merger Control, State Aids 
(Article 92) and Dumping (Article 91). 
Competition policy rules ensure (or should ensure) that the competitive 
process is not threatened by either market structure or the conduct of 
firms. Its application though to the media industry cannot always 
safeguard other values and objectives such as diversity and freedom of 
expression. Media policy has encompassed a much wider range of 
public values and objectives than the efficient functioning of private 
markets. The media play a central role as a disseminator of 
information, opinions and culture, and policies are often founded on 
broad principles governing the circulation of ideas and information that 
are fundamental values for pluralistic democratic societies. Precisely 
because of the nature of the media industry, competition policy 
3 In Europe, the merger control provisions display a great deal of variety from country to country (see 
Appendix VIII). The main differences arise as regards firstly the criteria for defining or examining 
mergers - size and market share thresholds. Secondly, the standards 
by which a merger is considered 
desirable or undesirable (straightforward competition test or wider public interest criteria of which 
competition is but one, though important, element among others such as trade, employment, 
environment and regional policy). Thirdly, as regards procedure Oudicial or administrative or some 
combination of the two, prior or post notification, procedure of advance clearance or approval of 
certain mergers). The 1988 International Mergers and Competition Policy divide the countries 
worldwide into those which rely entirely on a competition test (Canada, Germany, Japan and the 
USA) 
and those which take a broader position requiring a case-by-case assessment of a variety of 
factors 
before determining whether a merger is acceptable or not (France, Sweden, the UK and the 
European 
Union as a whole). In the UK, for instance, Fairbum and Way (1989) pointed out that policy operates 
on a two-tier procedure: merger proposals are first selected by the Secretary of State 
for Trade and 
Industry and then they are considered against a public interest standard by the Monopolies and 
Mergers 
Commission (MCC). 
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objectives are not enough for preserving other policy objectives. This 
is not to say that competition policy does not have a role to play in the 
cultural field. Policies promoting efficient competition may limit 
concentration of media control and at the same time they may also 
promote the presentation of diverse points of view. However, the 
safeguarding of a competitive environment and the promotion of 
pluralism are different (although sometimes overlapping) objectives. 
The latter can only be fostered by specific media rules on either content 
or ownership. The European Commission, through its 1992 Green 
Paper, recognised the difference between the two objectives and 
launched an ambitious initiative to regulate media ownership at 
European Union (EU) level with the aim of preserving pluralism in the 
market. 
Therefore both media ownership rules and competition law (to a lesser 
extent) are applicable for pluralistic purposes. This chapter is thus 
divided into five parts. The first tries to evaluate the competition and 
merger control policies within the EU. An historical background of the 
European media concentration policy is then presented, followed by an 
outline of the main points of the Commission's Green Paper. The 
interested parties' reaction in the context of the first and second 
consultation rounds is then explored. Finally, an attempt is made to 
point out the factors opposing the enforcement of an effective 
European regulation in the field of media concentration. 
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3.2 COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.2.1 Restrictive Practices and Dominant Abuse 
The EU's competition policy framework lies in the Articles 85-94 of 
the Treaty of Rome. These aim to maintain or increase competition in 
the Single European Market and ban restrictive practices which distort 
or prevent competition or lead to a dominant position. Article 85(l) 
especially, prohibits 'all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market, in particular those which: (i) directly or indirectlyfix 
purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (ii) limit or 
control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (iii) 
share markets or sources of supply; (iv) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them 
at a competitive disadvantage; (v) make the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts'. 4By Article 85(2), any 
such agreements will be automatically void and could not be enforced 
in national courts. Nevertheless, Article 85 does not necessarily 
completely prohibit the above described practices because under Article 
85(3), agreements which abridge competition can be exempted if (i) 
they contribute 'to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or promoting technical or economic progress'. Typical improvements 
4 Examples of practices which could contravene Article 85(l) include: joint ventures, price cartels, co- 
production arrangements, discrimination through vertical integration, cross-medla ownership, 
joint 
purchasing, market sharing and block booking (for more information see Howkins and Foster, 1989: 
41-2). 
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are reduced costs, increased efficiency, the quicker penetration of 
markets or increased production. Many joint ventures are justified on 
this basis; (ii) allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits: 
(iii) do not impose conditions not indispensable to (i) and (ii) above-, 
(iv) do not allow undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in a substantial part of the product market. 
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome provides that 'any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market 
or in a substantial part of it should be prohibited as incompatible with 
the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member 
States'. Such abuses may have the following chief features: (i) 'directly 
or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; (ii) limiting production, production or technical 
development to the prejudice of customers; (iii) applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; and (iv) making the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the sub ect of such 
contracts'. In addition, Articles 92-94 forbid subsidies that distort, or 
threaten to distort, competition and therefore the free operation of the 
market. Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome, in particular, prohibits any 
existing state aid that distorts competition by favouring national 
undertakings. 5 
5 The Commission ensures that the support measures do not excessively affect interstate i 
trade and that 
the terms under which a right to State aid is granted, do not discriminate against citizens of other 
Member States. Making the granting of aid dependent on the nationality of the person asking support, 
is deemed to be discriminating, as the Greeks experienced in 1988 because of their system of support 
for their national film industry (Doc. of 21 December 1988 on aid granted by the Greek government to 
the film industry for the production of Greek films, OJ NoL208,20-07-1989, p38-41). Under the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, State aid measures to promote culture and heritage conservation 
are explicitly permitted, provided that such measures do not affect trading conditions and competition 
Media CompetitionlConcentration Policy in the European Union 105 
As defined both by Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome and by the Court 
of Justice, the term 'undertakings I applies to all firms engaged in 
economic activity and includes both private and public organisations. It 
thus covers media institutions. The Community's competence to 
regulate broadcasting, in particular, is in little doubt after the approval 
in 1989 by the Council of Ministers of the European Community of the 
Commission's proposed Directive 'Television Without Frontiers'. 6 
According to the provisions of the Broadcasting Directive, DG IV (the 
Director General responsible for competition policy) is able to move 
against monopolistic situations that restrict competition in the 
broadcasting field. The Directorate's role has indeed become very 
important in view of the trends towards consolidation in the 
broadcasting sector, following the introduction of competition in the 
sector. 7 A report commissioned by DG IV8 pointed out that the trends 
towards vertical and horizontal integration raises levels of 
concentration in the information industry. The Booz-Allen & Hamilton 
1989 report9 stressed that mergers and acquisitions will dominate the 
European broadcast and production industries in the 1990s. Lohest, in a 
report to the Council of Europe, 10 considered technical diversification 
to an extent that is contrary to the common interest. As concerns the press, the Commission permits 
in general terms State aid, because the majority of press publications are published in different 
Member States without being in competition with each other (see Van Loon, 1993: 28-9). 
6 Council Directive, 89/552/EEC, OJ NoL298, Brussels, 03-10-1989. The TWF Directive 
harmonises national legislation regarding the free movement of television services. Harmonisation 
normally means that the Member States can no longer impose further restrictions on the basis of a 
general interest in the fields harmonised by the directive. However, the directive only aims at a 
minimum harmonisation, which means that members keep the right to adopt stricter measures for 
their own nationals as long as these measures are in conformity with primary Community law as laid 
down in the EEC Treaty (Lange and Van Loon, 1991). 
7 Until the last decade, with the exception of Italy and Britain, Member States excluded competition in 
the audio-visual sector, by granting exclusive rights to (normally) one public entity. Under the EEC 
Treaty, the Court of Justice accepted this, as long as this was based on non-economic considerations 
of public interest (Van Loon, 1993). 
8 Locksley, G., 'Satellite Broadcasting in Europe and the New Technologies', Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels, 1989. 
9 Booz-Allen & Hamilton report (by J. Hughes, A. Mierzwa and G. Morgan), 'Strategic Partnerships 
as a Way Forward in European Broadcasting', London, 1989. 
10 Lohest, H., 'The Independence of the Media', Mass Media Files 4, Council of Europe, 1983. 
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and economic concentration as the reasons for an absence of 
diversification of broadcasting content. Media competition policy has 
thus a crucial role to play - to ensure that there are a large number of 
companies supplying TV programmes, printed material and other 
sources of information to the public. 
3.2.2 Merger Control 
Mergers may be a prelude to a restrictive practice or an abuse of a 
dominant position. Therefore, both Article 85 and Article 86 may be 
involved. In the absence of a merger regulation, the applicability of 
these Articles to mergers has arisen in several cases. They were not of 
much help though because they evaluated concentrations in retrospect, ) 
and therefore required the divestiture of a merger that was not in line 
with Article 86 only if it were found anti-competitive. Until 1989, the 
Commission had powers to act against anti- competitive mergers and 
acquisitions only after they have taken effect and a restrictive practice 
or 'dominant position' is established or strengthened. For many years 
the Commission has argued that it should have new, pre-emptive 
powers that would remove the uncertainty of retrospective action for 
the parties involved. The Commission made a proposal to the Council 
of Europe for a Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings in 1973. The proposal, based on Articles 87 and 235 of 
the EEC Treaty, has been amended three times but was not acted upon 
by the Council until 1989. It should be noted that, as new legislation, 
the Regulation required unanimous Council approval. Following 
intensive bilateral discussions with the member states and discussions in 
the Council, a Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings was finally adopted by the Council of the European 
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Economic Community on 21 December 1989 and became effective on 
21 September 1990.11 The Council thus granted power to the 
Commission to require the pre-notification of mergers having a 
'Community dimension' 12with the possibility that such mergers could 
be prohibited. 
The Council Regulation was intended to complement the Commission's 
anti-trust powers conferred by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome. The object of the Regulation was to create a new legal 
instrument 'to permit effective control of all concentrations from the 
point of view of their effect on the structure of competition in the 
Community and to be the only instrument applicable to such 
concentrations'. Article 3(l) declares that a 'concentration' shall be 
deemed to arise where (i) two or more previously independent 
undertakings merge; or (ii) one or more persons already controlling at 
least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire, whether 
by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, 
direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings. The provisions adopted apply only 'to significant 
structural changes the impact of which on the market goes beyond the 
national borders of any one Member State '. Thus the scope of 
application is defined according to the geographical area of activity of 
the undertakings concerned13 and is limited by quantitative thresholds. 
II Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations 
Between Undertakings, OJ No. L 395,30-12-1989. 
12 For the criteria when a merger or acquisition has a 'Community dimension', see Article 42) of 
Council Regulation No. 4064/89. 
13 Council Regulation No. 4064/89 states that 'the geographical reference market shall consist of the 
area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supplýy of products or services, in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
areas. This assessment should take account in particular of the nature and characteristics of the 
products or services concerned, of the existence of entry barriers or of consumer preferences, of 
appreciable differences of the undertakings'market shares between neighbouring areas or of substantial 
price differences'. 
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In particular, Article 1(2) states that concentrations may be presumed 
compatible with the common market if the aggregate world-wide 
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is less than ECU 5,000 
million and the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least 
two of the undertakings concerned is less than ECU 250 million, or 
each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member 
State. 
It is worth noting that, despite these high threshold provisions, multi- 
media and international mergers are likely to surpass them. Indeed, 
they have done so as the examples below will reveal. In any case, 
assessment on the level of concentration on the basis of a one product 
market in the current multi-media era is difficult. It is almost 
impossible to measure the market power of big, vertically integrated 
units operating globally across a range of product markets in which 
they hold different shares (see Chapter 4). Another grey area is that 
Commission and Member states have agreed that national authorities 
should be allowed a second bite after Commission vetting 
(Papathanassopoulos, 1990: 27-30). Although the object of the 
Regulation is purely economic (i. e. effective competition), Article 
21(3) stipulates that members may protect other values than those 
pursued by the Regulation. These are public security interests, plurality 
of the media and prudential rules. Therefore if the Commission decides 
that a concentration is compatible with EEC law, members could still 
prohibit that concentration because of other legitimate interests. The 
Court of Justice would then have to decide on a 'case by case' basis 
whether restrictions following from such a prohibition are admissible 
regarding Community law (Lange and Van Loon, 1991: 33). 
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Thus the Regulation on mergers covers only large mergers which 
affect competition on the market in question. As a consequence, it has 
allowed many mergers to proceed simply because they did not meet the 
high thresholds that the Regulation itself had imposed14. The Sky/BSB 
merger in Britain, for instance, fell outside the scope of the Regulation 
because each of the undertakings concerned achieved more than two 
thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the 
same Member state. That, according to Lange and Van Loon (1991: 40- 
1), might be the reason for the inclusion of the provision that members 
can continue to apply their national legislation on the protection of 
pluralism and freedom of expression in cases where the Commission 
permits a merger in the media field. Likewise, the application of 
Community law, in particular Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome, cannot cover all situations in which there is a threat to 
pluralism, notably in the case of multi-media ownership. As indicated 
above, when investigating cases in the light of Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty, the Commission takes into account the cultural dimension. 
Its aim is not to frame a policy on culture or to make value judgements 
in applying the provisions, but rather to assess business practice with 
due regard to the repercussions they could have on the Community's 
cultural policy. 15 The overriding principles though are those of fair 
competition. 
This will become evident if one takes a closer look at the various cases 
that have been examined by the Commission. There have been many 
cases in which the Merger Task Force (the body which investigates 
merger practices in Europe) had to assess concentrations in which 
14 It has been estimated that half of the Gross Domestic Product of the Community arises from 
industries in which no two firms have an aggregate turnover of ECU 5 billion (Korah, 1990). 
15 See 23rd Report on Competition Policy. 
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media undertakings were involved16. In all those cases but two, the 
Commission concluded that the notified operations fell within the scope 
of application of Council Regulation No. 4064/89. In Case IV/M. 410 - 
KIRCH /RICHEMONT/TELEPIU, 17 for instance, it firstly found that 
the project had a Community dimension - the undertakings had a 
combined aggregate worldwide turnover in excess of 5,000 million 
ECU, a Community-wide turnover of more than 250 million ECU, and 
they did not achieve more than two thirds of their aggregate 
Community-wide turnover in one and the same Member State. That the 
acquisition constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article 
3(l) of the Council Regulation, was justified on the grounds that the 
parties will together have the right at least to veto the principal 
decisions referring to Telepiu's activities, and therefore they will have 
joint control of Telepiu. The compatibility with the common market 
was based on the assumption that the acquisition of joint control of 
Teleplu will not give rise to co-ordination of the competitive behaviour 
between the parties, since the TV activities of Richemont (through 
FilmNet), the Kirch Group and Telepiu are carried out in separate 
geographical markets. Regarding the relevant product market, and 
since the operation concerned the market for pay-TV, the conclusion 
16 Case No. lV/M037 - MATSUSHITA /MCA, 10-01-1991; 
Case No. 1V/M I 10 - ABC / GENERALE DES EA UX / CANAL+ / W. H. 
SMITH TV, 10-09- 
199 1; 
Case No. IV/M 176 -SUNRISE TELEVISION, 13-01-1992; 
Case No. IV/M202 - THORN EMI / VIRGIN MUSIC, 27-04-1992; 
Case No. IV/M4 10 - KIRCH / RICHEMONT / TELEPIU, 02-08-1994; 
Case No. IV/M489 - BERTELSMANN / NEWS INTERNATIONAL / VOX, 
06-09-1994; 
Case No. IV/M469 - MSG MEDIA SERVICE, 09-11-1994; 
Case No. IV/M525 - VOX (11), 21-12-1994; 
Press Release IP/95/535 - SUPER RTL, 30-05-1995; 
Press Release IP/95/526 - HOLLAND MEDIA GROEP S. A. (HMG) (commission to carrýl out 
detailed enquiry in Dutch TVjoint venture), 24-05-1995. 
17 This concerned the proposed acquisition by Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (Richemont), a 
Swiss-based holding company and the Kirch Group, active in film and TV production and broadcasting 
in Germany, of joint control of Teleplu S. r. I. 
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reached was that the case did not raise competition concerns because 
pay-TV represents a separate market. 
However, some substitutability exists between pay-TV and free access 
TV, since the value of the former depends directly on the alternative 
viewing possibilities. Moreover, pay-TV channels are likely to take 
away audiences (and therefore revenue) from channels that are free at 
the point of reception. The decision is also open to criticism because the 
Kirch Group already had a 34.72% shareholding in Telepiu and a 
representative that was President of the Board. Although the parties 
agreed that a member of the Board nominated by Richemont will also 
be managing director, and thus they will have joint control of Telepiu, 
Kirch Group's long-standing experience in television activitieS18 
compared with Richemont which is mainly involved in producing and 
distributing tobacco products can turn the balance in the decision 
making process in favour of the former. Anyway, the approval of this 
particular transaction as well as of all the others allowed was based on 
economic criteria only. There was no mention or evaluation of whether 
the schemes would affect wider objectives such as diversity of 
alternative points of view or choice for the consumers. 
Competition policy though might favour pluralism, to the extent that it 
operates to prevent the erection of greater barriers to entry, or indeed 
to reduce the existing barriers rendering the market contestable. For 
example, DG IV's decision to block a pay-TV joint venture in Germany 
between the Bertelsmann and Kirch groups and the state monopoly 
Deutsche Telecom was made on economic grounds. The joint venture 
18 In addition to the 34.72% shareholding in Telepiu, the Kirch group had at the time of the 
transaction interests in two commercial channels and one pay-TV channel in Germany (SAT- 1 [43%1, 
DSF [24.5%], Premiere [25%]), and owned a 25% shareholding in the Spanish commercial channel 
Gestavision Tele Cinco S. A. 
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under the name of MSG Media Service19 was declared incompatible 
with the common market on the grounds that it would create or 
strengthen dominant positions on the markets for administrative and 
technical services, pay-TV and cable networks. In this case, the 
Commission found that the parties to the joint venture would have 
created or aggravated a dominant position in three markets should the 
venture had gone ahead. However, it is not difficult to see that the 
proposed joint venture would have also created a very large player 
with significant clout and scope for exercising influence in the cultural 
and political market. 20 The dominant position of the proposed scheme 
as a supplier of programmes and services (distribution of decoders, 
administration of consumer base) would have meant that competitors 
had to overcome significant entry barriers in order to obtain these 
services. These would have greatly constrained entry, with the potential 
for an abuse of economic power, but also with damage to pluralism. 
Although the interested parties invoked technical and economic 
progress in having the initiative allowed2l, the Commission stated that 
it is extremely doubtful whether the establishment of a digital 
infrastructure for pay-TV by MSG will actually contribute in a positive 
manner to the development of technical and economic progress. 
Another proposed TV joint venture under the name of Holland Media 
Groep S. A. (HMG) between RTL4 S. A., Vereniging Veronica 
Ornroeperganisatie and Endemol Entertainment Holding BV faced 
Community objection. The Commission decided in May 1995 to 
19 MSG Media Service was a proposed 'oint venture being set up by Bertelsmann AG (the leading 
German media group), Deutsche Bundespost Telekom (the public telecommunications operator in 
Gen-nany) and Taurus Bateiligungs GmbH (a holding company belonging to the German Kirch group). 
20 See Chapter 4 for a definition of the 'political and cultural market'. 
21 On the notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, see Commission Regulation (EQ 
No 3384/94 of 21 December 1994, OJ No L 377. 
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proceed to an in-depth investigation of the above proposed TV joint 
venture, following a request from the Dutch government. 22The fear 
was that the combination of the parties' activities in HMG could lead to 
high market shares in the Dutch TV market, in particular with respect 
to TV advertising. 23 The decision reached in October 1995 took this 
fact into account and did not allow the joint venture to take place. It 
also declared that the position of Endemol, the largest independent 
producer of TV programmes in the Netherlands, could be 
strengthened, with the possibility of forming a dominant position. 
The prohibition of the formation of dominant positions thus might 
achieve plurality because it prevents further concentration of power. 
The Council Regulation though cannot catch all cases in which states 
want to preserve plurality. For either Council Regulation or Article 86 
to apply there has to be a certain creation of dominance and clear 
evidence of an abuse of such dominance. The Merger Task Force is 
looking at a particular transaction and analyses that transaction on 
competition terms. It is a pure competition assessment, in so far as 
culture in policy terms is not very clearly a Community objective. The 
Commission has to be careful in considering pluralism under the 
Treaties. In an era where subsidiarity is accepted and Member States 
are questioning Community's competence in the area, the Commission 
22 In the absence of the Dutch government's request, the Commission would have had no jurisdiction 
to deal with the case since the requisite turnover thresholds set out in the Merger Regulation were not 
attained by the parties concerned. Where the thresholds are not attained jurisdiction rests with the 
Member States. In that situation however, a Member State is entitled under Article 22 of Council 
Regulation 4064/89 to request the Commission to take up the case and to examine it. Nevertheless, it 
should be stressed that in the meantime the parties are entitled in this case to complete their operation. 
23 As to the market for TV advertising, in 1994 the market share of the public broadcasters as a group 
in the Netherlands, and of RTL, was around 50% each. It is not possible to attribute a precise market 
share to each of the nine major public broadcasters, since advertising time for the three public channels 
is sold by STER, a state-owned organisation. The revenues from advertising on the public TV 
channels as well as from the licence fees are first distributed to the Dutch state. NOS, the largest 
public broadcaster, receives a share of the revenues on the basis of its yearly budget approved by the 
Dutch government. The other eight major broadcasting organisations each receive an equal share of the 
revenues from the licence fees and advertising revenue. 
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should be very clear over its scope of intervention. The subsidiarity 
principle is also a hot issue in the current talks of presenting Europe- 
wide media ownership rules as we shall see below. 
3.3 EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN MEDIA 
CONCENTRATION POLICY 
3.3.1 The Council of Europe and Media Concentration 
The Council of Europe has been involved in the field of media 
concentration, especially in the press sector, since 1967 with a view to 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Several debates, 
analyses and reports have been undertaken and led to the adaptation of 
a number of 'Recommendations' and 'Resolutions' during the 1970s. 24 
Most of them discussed the scope and causes of press concentration and 
provided an initial analysis of its effects on freedom of opinion. In the 
light of the potential or actual threat to diversity in the press (resulting 
from the decreasing number of both newspaper titles and newspaper 
groups), the declarations called for measures of assistance to the press 
(direct or indirect subsidies - special taxation and postal rates, etc. ). In 
the 1980s, the Council of Europe urged a pluralistic approach towards 
the electronic media. In its 1981 Recommendation, 25 the Consultative 
24 The most important are: a) Resolution 338 (1967) on press concentration, 26-01-1967; b) 
Resolution 428 (1970) containing a declaration on communication media and human rights, 
Consultative Assembly, Document 2867, DH-MM (85)6; c) Report on press concentration (draft 
resolution), presented by the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteurs: Bjork and Van Der Sanden, 
Consultative Assembly, 03-10-1972, Document 3178; d) Opinion on press concentrations, presented 
by the Legal Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Fanelli, Consultative Assembly, 12-10-1972, Document 
3188; e) Resolution (74) 43 on press concentrations, Committee of Ministers, 16-12-1974, DH-MM 
(85)5; f) Recommendation 747 (1975) on press concentrations, Consultative Assembly, 23-01-1975, 
Document 3536, DH-MM (85)6; g) Recommendation 834 (1978) on threats to the freedom of the 
press and television, Parliamentary Assembly, 28-04-1978, Document 4090, DH-MM (85)6. All 
these are proposals or declarations and not binding legal instruments (for more information, see Lange 
and Van Loon, 199 1, p26-31 and Annex 1). 
25 Recommendation 926 (1981) on questions raised by cable television and by direct satellite 
broadcasters, 02-10-198 1, Document 4756, DH-MM (88)3. 
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Assembly expressed fear that the independence of programme makers 
would be undermined by the technical developments in the field of 
cable and satellite television. It argued that a deterioration of the 
financial resources of existing broadcasting organisations was to be 
expected, leading to a decline of the intellectual and cultural 
pluriformity in Council of Europe Member States. The Assembly took 
the view that measures to guarantee access of all political, social and 
cultural forces to the electronic media on fair terms was highly 
desirable. In its 1987 Recommendation, 26 the Assembly recognised 
potential positive effects related to new developments in cable and 
broadcasting - opening up of new fields for cultural creation and 
expression, broadening of the range of programmes, assisting 
awareness of other European languages and cultures. However, it 
mentioned that such advances also carry cultural risks, such as: 
reduction in programme diversity, undermining of the cultural identity 
of smaller countries, economic and cultural dependence on large 
commercial actors. It proposed harmonisation of legal arrangements 
which would respect national differences. 
A number of Ministerial Conferences on mass media poliCy27 since the 
mid-1980s also tackled media concentration. The 1986 Conference 
stipulated that the Ministers should, among other things, act against 
monopolistic trends of the new TV services. The 2nd Ministerial 
Conference in 1988 called for concrete political measures in the field 
of media concentrations. The ministers recommended the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to pursue consideration of questions 
26 Recommendation 1067 (1987) on the cultural dimension of broadcasting in Europe, 08-10-1987, 
Document 5782, DH-MM (88)3. 
27 a) First European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, Vienna 9-10 December 1986; b) 
Second European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, Stockholm 23-24 November 1988, 
c) Third European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, Nicosia 9- 10 October 199 1; d) Forth 
European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, Prague 7-8 December 1994. 
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raised by media concentrations and develop research and the exchange 
and distribution of information in order to: 'a) evaluate the 
consequences of such concentrations for the freedom and pluralism of 
information, cultural diversity and the circulation of television services 
and audio-visual works; b) identify appropriate means of preventing 
abuses of dominant positions and the hannful consequences which could 
result therefrom' (Resolution Nol). In Spring 1988, the Steering 
Committee on the Mass Media (CDMM) and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to co-operate in order to 
analyse the developments taking place in the member States in the field 
of media concentration. A Working Party on media concentrations 
(CDMM-GT-CM) consisting of national experts was thus set up and it 
was agreed to entrust two specialised institutions (IVIR and IDATE28) 
with the task of reflecting on the methodology and formulation of a 
questionnaire which would make it possible to co-ordinate national 
studies on multi-media and cross-media ownership and gather 
information from the member States. The questionnaire, divided into 
three parts (legal situation, statistical data and qualitative evaluation), 
was sent to the member States of the Council of Europe for completion. 
The answers received, 29 were then analysed and classified by the 
experts of IVIR and MATE Van Loon and Lange respectively and 
resulted in two reports. 30 
28 Institute for Information Law (IVIR), University of Amsterdam; Institute of Audio-visual Media 
and Telecommunications in Europe (IDATE), Montpellier. 
29 Answers to the questionnaire were received by the members of the Working Party Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, by the Commission of the European Communities as an observer, and by Denmark. 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Spain. 
30 Van Loon, A. (1991) 'Pluralism, Concentration and Competition in the Media Sector', report to 
the Council of Europe, 01-12-1991, CDMM (92)8, vol. 1, p281-91. Lange, A. (1992)'Study on Media 
Concentrations in Europe (Economic Analysis)', CDMM (92)8, vol. II, Strasbourg, 16-06-1992, pl- 
78. The first report contained the legal part of the study, while the second was about the economic and 
statistical part. 
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On the basis of these reports, and taking account of its own work in this 
area, the Working Party submitted a synthesis report on media 
concentrations to the 3rd Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy 
(Nicosia [Cyprus], 9-10 October 1991). That Conference reaffirmed 
that the starting point of any discussion on the desirability of media 
legislation in the area of media concentration at national and/or 
European level, should be the freedom of expression3l and the ways of 
protecting the existing cultural diversity in Europe. In view of the 
complex situation and the different national approaches towards media 
concentration and pluralism, it invited participating states to elaborate 
and develop common policies addressing these problems. In addition, 
the Ministers agreed to identify and support policy measures for the 
establishment of various independent and autonomous media reflecting 
a diversity of opinions and ideas and meeting the interests and 
expectations of the public. They reached the conclusion that support 
measures for communication undertakings, such as direct subsidies, 
indirect incentives and support for training, are often more effective in 
safeguarding pluralism than restrictive ones (i. e. competition and media 
law provisions). 
Following the 3rd Ministerial Conference, a Committee of Experts on 
media concentrations and pluralism (MM-CM) was set Up. 32 The 
31 Freedom of expression is laid down in Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is generally accepted, as has been stated many times by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, that the right to freedom of expression is not 
simply a right protecting individuals from state intervention. The freedom also has a social aspect: all 
democratic states have an obligation to secure an adequate protection of this freedom for everyone. 
This means that the state has a duty whenever individuals prevent other individuals from exercising 
their right to freedom of expression. 
32 The terms of reference of the Committee are: Under the authority of the CDMM, and taking into 
account of the work already carried out within the CDMM in this area, the MM-CM will give 
concrete follow-up to the conclusions concerning media concentrations adopted at the 3rd European 
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, including that concerning the possible creation of a 
multilateral consultation mechanism on this subject. In this regard, the MM-CM will endeavour, in 
particular, to define clearly the notions of political and cultural pluralism for the purposes of its 
analysis of all the various implications of media concentrations for the safeguarding and promotion of 
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Committee met on nine occasions between 1991 and 1994 and carried 
out several projects. 33 Over the course of its meetings, it gave priority 
to monitoring the evolution of media concentrations in the European 
continent, so as both to explore the impact of such concentrations on 
political and cultural pluralism and formulate proposals for policy 
measures. The Committee decided first of all to agree on a working 
definition of the notion of pluralism: 'In relation to media 
concentrations, the notion of pluralism is understood to mean the scope 
for a wide range of social, political and cultural values, opinions, 
information and interests to find expression through the media. 
Pluralism may be internal in nature, with a wide range of social, 
political and cultural values, opinions, information and interests finding 
expression within one media organisation, or external in nature, 
through a number of such organisations, each expressing a particular 
point of view'. 34 It also felt that the issue of access to media markets 
should be more closely examined. The Committee thus instructed a 
consultant to analyse the factors which may facilitate or hinder access 
pluralism. The MM-CM will follow closely the evolution of media concentrations, in particular at the 
transnational level, with a view to identifying any possible risks arising for pluralism. It will put 
forward, if necessary, proposals to supplement and co-ordinate the measures which the member States 
might take at the national level for promoting pluralism. The proposals may, if deemed useful, take 
the form of appropriate legal instruments (4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media 
Policy, 1994: Appendix 1). 
33 These are: a) MM-CM (1993) Comparative Table of National Legislation of Relevance in the Area 
of Media Concentrations, (93)6, Strasbourg, 22-02-1993; b) MM-CM (1994) Discussion Document 
on Multi-media Concentrations, (94)6, Strasbourg, 10-01-1994; c) MM-CM (1994) Resolution of the 
European Parliament on the Green Paper 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market', 
(94)9, Strasbourg, 28-01-1994; d) MM-CM (1994) Consultant's Study on the Notion of Access to the 
Market (final version), (94)7, Strasbourg, 29-03-1994; e) MM-CM (1994) Summary of the Evolution 
of Media Concentrations in Sweden, (94)14, vol. 1, Strasbourg, 27-04-1994; f) MM-CM (1994) Study 
on Media Concentrations in Central and East European Countries, (94)17, Strasbourg, 06-05-1994; g) 
MM-CM (1994) Summary of the Evolution of Media Concentrations in Finland, (94)14, vol. II, 
Strasbourg, 17-05-1994; h) MM-CM (1994) Summary of the Evolution of Media Concentrations in 
France, (94)14, vol. 111, Strasbourg, 26-05-1994; 1) MM-CM (1994) Summa[y of the Evolution of 
Media Concentrations in Switzerland, (94)14, vol. IV, Strasbourg, 11-07-1994; j) MM-CM (1994) 
Summary of the Evolution of-Media Concentrations in Austria, (94)14, vol. VI, Strasbourg, 06-09- 
1994; k) MM-CM (1994) Summary of the Evolution of Media Concentrations in the French 
Community of Belgium, (94)14, vol. VII, Strasbourg, 06-09-1994. 
34 Report from the 3rd meeting of the Committee of Experts on Media Concentration and Pluralism, 
MM-CM (92)12, Strasbourg, 1992, p3. 
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to the market. 35 This analysis firstly stated that pluralism should not be 
confused with the issue of 'freedom of speech'. It defined freedom of 
speech as any body Is freedom to establish any kind of media (market 
access). However, this does not ensure pluralism. It concluded, among 
other things, that opportunities for entering the market and for 
remaining competitive in the long-term depended to a great extent on 
the presence of sufficient resources for the creation and development of 
new media without undermining the financial basis of those media 
already on the market. Since this threshold can vary according to the 
type of media and the market in question, the ease of access to the 
market can only be analysed on a case-by-case basis. Therefore no 
general conclusions can be drawn which are valid for all countries and 
all types of media. Moreover, any such threshold cannot be measured at 
the outset, given that this would depend upon how the public invests its 
resources between the media and other consumer needs as well as in 
relation to the choice of media. 
An account of the activities undertaken by the MM-CM since the date 
of its inception (December 1991) was presented to the 4th European 
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague [Czech 
Republic], 7-8 December 1994). Key issues of the Committee's concern 
are media transparency and multi-media concentration. It defined 
multi-media concentration as 'the accumulation of interests by the same 
company or by the same group in different media sectors'. 36 As was 
noted by certain members of the MM-CM at the 6th meeting of the 
Committee, 37 current provisions in the legislation of member States on 
the limitation of multi-media concentrations are intended to regulate 
35 MM-CM (94)7,1994: 1-28. 
36 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, 1994: 11. 
37 MM-CM (93)22,6-8 December 1993, § 19. 
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what may be termed 'traditional forms of multi-media concentration: 
the participation of press undertakings in the capital of broadcasting 
organisations (and vice versa), the exploitation of different types of 
electronic media (radio, TV, cable) by the same undertaking'. The 
MM-CM stressed the potential inadequacy of these rules in the light of 
the new trends appearing due to advances in technology: the increase in 
the number of specialised services including subscription services in the 
broadcasting sector; the trend towards the integration of broadcasting 
organisations and other sectors of activity which are situated either 
downstream or upstream from these bodies; the trend towards the 
integration of mass and individual means of communication which 
facilitates the appearance in the media sector of actors from a new 
background and which are equipped with significant financial resources 
- telecommunications companies, data processing enterprises, etc. The 
evolution of these new forms of concentration, the argument follows, 
has made it very difficult for the public and the responsible authorities 
to identify who in fact owns the media and who are behind the owners 
who may have an influence on the media (for instance, through the 
provision of funding or other services). 
The Committee therefore considered a number of measures to support 
media transparency that took the form of a draft Recommendation. 38 
Specific provisions in national legislation, or the adoption of self- 
regularity measures by media firms themselves constituted possible 
options. The distinction between the press and broadcasting sectors was 
also raised due to the different transparency needs involved and the 
different ways of guaranteeing transparency in the two sectors. In any 
38 It is worth mentioning that, in deciding to prepare a text on media transparency, the Committee 
was of the opinion that media transparency was not per se a means to regulate media concentrations, 
but constituted a preliminary step in this direction. 
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case, account must be taken of the diversity of structures and traditions 
for regulating media transparency in the different member States. 
Regarding the international dimension assumed by the media 
transparency issue, the MM-CM called for the facilitation of 
information exchanges between competent authorities at the European 
level. The draft Resolution was approved by the Steering Committee on 
the Mass Media at its 38th meeting (I 1- 14 October 1994) and adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers in November 1994.39 
It can be seen thus that the Council of Europe has been actively 
involved in the field of media concentration and diversity, particularly 
after the composition of the Working Party on media concentrations 
and the establishment of the Committee of Experts on Media 
Concentrations and Pluralism. A large number of declarations and 
recommendations have been presented which, although not legal 
instruments, have stimulated the discussion and helped several aspects 
to come to light. 
3.3.2 The European Parliament and Media Concentration 
In the last several years, the European Parliament (EP) has been 
leading a campaign to urge the Commission to propose regulatory 
measures in order to limit media mergers so as to safeguard pluralism. 
EP's two resolutions in the mid-1980s called on the Commission to 
formulate a policy framework regarding competition rules for the mass 
media. In 1985, the EP adopted a 'Resolution on the economic aspects 
of the common market for broadcasting in the European 
39 CoE (1994) 'Recommendation No R (94)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on 
measures to promote media transparency', adopted on 22 November 1994, DH-MM (94) 10. 
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Community' 40 based on the De Vries 'Report on the economic aspects 
of the common market for broadcasting'. 41 The resolution requested 
the Commission 'to set up an investigation into the competition policy 
aspects of current developments in the television market and the film 
industry' (EP, 1985: § 15). In its 1986 'Resolution on the Fifteenth 
Report of the CEC on Competition PoliCy', 42 Parliament considered 
that 'there are considerable potential dangers to competition in the jast- 
growing and increasingly complex area of the media, which is 
increasingly supranational in scope, and where interlocking ownership 
of newspapers, magazines, television stations and cable and satellite 
interests is becoming increasingly frequent' (EP, 1986: 62). The 
request was repeated by the EP in its 1987 'Resolution on the Sixteenth 
Report of the CEC on Competition PoliCy', 43 based upon the Sir 
Steward-Clark 'Report on the 16th report of the CEC on competition 
poliCy'. 44 The Commission's reply to those repeated requests was that it 
was carefully considering Parliament's advice, especially in view of 
increases in concentration at that time. 
The EP dealt with the problem of pluralism through its amendments to 
the Television Without Frontiers Directive proposal in 1985. After 
mentioning that the level of concentration has been increased in the 
audio-visual industry due to the creation of private monopolies, it 
called for the safeguarding of cultural diversity in the sector. 45 The 
40 EP, 10 October 1985, PE Texts 7/85, October 1985/1, p57-60. 
41 De Vries, G. (1985) 'Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy on the economic aspects of the common market for broadcasting', COM 
(84) 300 final, 30 September 1985, PE Document A 2-102/85. 
42 EP, 14 November 1986, PE Texts 10/86, p58-65. 
43 EP, 17 December 1987, PE Texts 12/87, p56-61. 
44 Stewart-Clark, J. (1987) 'Report drawn up on behalf of the committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affa-irs and Industrial Policy on the 16th report of the Commission of the European Community on 
competition policy', PE Documents A 2-223/87, plO, 23. 
45 EP, OJ No C 288/113,11-11-1985. 
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Barzanti report, 46 supported by many members of Parliament, called 
Member states to 'monitor developments with a view to preventing 
abuses of dominant positions which might be detrimental to trade 
between Member States or restrict the pluralism and freedom of 
broadcast information and the information sector as a whole' 
(Amendment 21 of Article 2a). The EP Legal Affairs Committee put 
forward several amendments on the TWF Directive tackling the 
development of dominant positions in the mass media. In Amendment 
66 of Article 22a, the Committee stated: ' If the market is to be a 
creative melting pot, the Community must put up a determined struggle 
against the pathological tendencies to destroy fair competition and real 
variety. If the market is to be dominated by a few media companies, we 
risk losing freedom of choice'. 47The TWF Directive was agreed upon 
by the Council on 3 October 1989. As indicated elsewhere though, the 
Directive does not include specific proposals on the media 
concentration question. 
In 1990, the EP adopted a 'Resolution on media take-overs and 
mergers', 48 which states that 'restrictions are essential in the media 
sector, not only for economic reasons but also, and above all, as a 
means of guaranteeing a variety of sources of information andfreedom 
of the press'. The EP thus recognises two reasons for controlling media 
mergers at a European level: traditional economic ones - control the 
potential abuses arising from market dominance - and pluralistic ones - 
safeguarding a variety of information sources. It considers that a 
46 Barzanti, R. (1987) 'Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens 
Rights on the proposal from the CEC to the Council (COM (86) 146 final-Document C2-38/86) for a 
Directive on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities', PE Document A 2-246/87, 
08-12-1987. 
47 EP, OJ No C 110/21,27-04-1988. 
48 OJ No C 68/137-8. 
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process of unlimited and unchecked concentration in the media 
threatens the right to information, editorial independence and 
journalists' freedom. It recalls that Community legislation regardinga 
the completion of the internal market does not include any regulations 
on the protection of the right to information or media mergers. It 
therefore calls on the Commission to 'put forward proposals for 
establishing a special legislative framework on media mergers and 
takeovers together with anti-trust laws to ensure that: a) minimum 
professional standards are guaranteed; b) journalistic ethics are 
protected; c) the risk of subordination of small companies is eliminated; 
and d) freedom of expression for all those working in the media is 
safeguarded. It concludes by asking Member states that do not have 
laws limiting concentration in the media sector to adopt such 
instruments as soon as possible, giving due consideration to written and 
audio-visual communication. 
Following that resolution, the Commission published its 
'Communication to the Council and Parliament on audio-visual policy' 
on 21 February 1990.49 In § 2.2.3. on Pluralism and Mergers, the 
Commission specifies that the Community's audio-visual policy does 
not seek to develop the audio-visual sector at the expense of pluralism; 
on the contrary, it attempts to strengthen it by encouraging the 
diversity of the programmes offered to the public. It also mentions 
that, since media operators' activities assume a European dimension, 
national legislation could be circumvented and would not therefore be 
sufficient to guarantee pluralism in all cases. Significantly, the 
Commission recognises that both the application of Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty of Rome and the Merger Regulation are unable to cover 
49 COM(90) 78 final. 
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threats to pluralism posed by multi-media ownership. One could easily 
detect here a coincidence of the views of the EP and the Commission as 
far as the safeguarding of pluralism is concerned. 
The EP 1992 'Resolution on media concentration and diversity of 
opinion', )50 drafted by socialist MEPs Ben Fayot and Dieter Schinzel, 
called on the Commission to 'submit a proposal for effective measures 
to combat or restrict concentration in the media, if necessary in the 
form of an anti- concentration directive, with a view to: (a) harmonise 
national provisions on the concentration of media ownership; and (b) 
guarantee diversity of opinion and pluralism where the proposed 
concentration is on a European scale'. The above MEPs mentioned that 
competition law cannot be used as a substitute for media law or for a 
specific law on media concentration: '... concentrations in the media 
sector which threaten diversity of opinion do not necessarily also 
involve distortions of competition, just as, conversely, the conditions of 
freedom of competition are no automatic guarantee for diversity of 
opinion'. 51 The resolution also asked the Commission to submit a) a 
proposal for a European framework directive safeguarding journalistic 
and editorial independence in the media and b) a proposal for a 
directive regulating the right to reply in the print media and radio 
sectors. Advertisers' obligation to provide adequate funding for the 
press and vocational furtherance (including professional ethics) of 
journalists were two additional suggestions. The most controversial 
50 EP, OJ No C 284/44,02-11-1992. 
51 Document EN/RR/207 249, PE 152 265 final, Part B: Explanatory Statement, p22-3. In this 
explanatory statement, MEPs Fayot and Schinzel point out that the regulations on competition that 
exist both in Member states and at EC level include the media industry, but are not §pecifically aim at 
the media. Germany, for instance, has stricter controls on mergers for the press sector. In their view, 
competition rules cannot replace rules on concentration in broadcasting legislation. In all members, 
broadcasting is regulated by legislation governing the acquisition and possession of broadcasting 
licences. However, there are great differences between them and often what is forbidden in one country 
is allowed in another. All these national restrictions cannot, according to the above MEPs, counteract 
the dangers to pluralism and diversity posed by multi-media concerns. 
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proposal however, was the EP's call to the Commission to set up a 
European Media Council, a new body charged with observing media 
ownership patterns, ensuring transparency with regard to the inter- 
linking of firms, reporting on proposed mergers and submitting 
proposals on possible concentration measures. An extensive legislative 
scheme is thus put forward by this resolution. 
As pointed out by Brian Sturgess (1992: 7) however, although the 
Fayot/Schinzel report listed several implications of media 
concentration, its concern often exhibits both economic naivety and an 
obsession with cultural questions. As far as the setting up of a European 
Media Council is concerned, the suggestion met with some hostility. 
Many stressed that a creation of a supra-EC body as suggested by the 
EP might well become a bureaucratic superfluity inclined to meddle 
with the due process of Community or national law. Others believed 
that it would be extremely difficult to define the terms of reference of 
such a body which could justify its existence (see below). In addition, 
there were those who questioned the relevance of some proposals that 
were put forward by the EP (training programmes, for instance) to the 
intention of the proposed regulation (i. e. to regulate the media 
concentration process with a view to safeguarding or promoting 
diversity of opinion). Ad Van Loon (1993: 31-6), for example, argued 
that a number of proposed measures do not fit in the fundamental 
rights framework - minimum professional standards, journalistic ethics 
- or are not relevant in the light of the aims of the proposed resolution 
- regulation of advertising influence on programming and contents, 
access to information, training programmes. Van Loon concluded that 
in many cases provisions of general law or forms of self-regulation 
may well be used to reach the aims of some of the proposed measures. 
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3.4 THE 1994 GREEN PAPER ON PLURALISM AND 
MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
Overall, the EPs concerns can be summarised as follows: a) unchecked 
concentrations in media ownership could pose a threat to information, 
editorial independence and journalists' freedom (i. e. objectivity of 
reporting); b) concentration of ownership threatens diversity of 
information and opinion and therefore hinders free information to the 
public; c) control of a large number of media by one individual or 
company jeopardises pluralism by lessening media autonomy and 
independence; and d) differing national laws on media concentration 
could disadvantage the operation of the Single Market, as this creates 
the risk of circumvention of the law and distortion of competition 
between media companies in various Member States as well as different 
start-up conditions for those embarking upon activities in the media. 
The Parliament calls for a legislative framework on media mergers and 
takeovers together with anti-trust laws on the grounds that diversity of 
opinion and pluralism of information cannot be guaranteed by 
competition rules alone. 
As indicated above, the Commission responded to Parliament's 
proposals by publishing its 'Communication to the Council and 
Parliament on audiovisual policy' in 1990. The results of the 
Communication are laid down in the promised Green Paper, Pluralism 
and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: an assessment of the 
need for Community action. It should be noted that this is a 'new style 
Green Paper'52 since it is not accompanied by a proposal for a 
52 Up to then, Green Papers used to present the Commission's point of view in combination with a 
proposal for a Directive. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (OJ C 191,29-07-1992, pI- 113) 
however, has made the Commission more cautious since it restricts actions in areas where the 
_Eedia 
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Directive of the EC Council. Its purpose is to present both an initial 
assessment of the need for Community action concerning concentration 
in the media (television, radio and the press) and the different 
approaches which the Commission might adopt once it has consulted the 
parties concerned. 
The remarkable difference from the 1990 Communication though is 
that the Green Paper (GP) identifies no objective regarding media 
pluralism at EU level: 'Protection of pluralism as such is primarily a 
matterfor the Member States ... there would not appear to be any need 
for action at Community level, since national mechanisms for 
protecting pluralism can be applied to situations with a Community 
dimension' (GP, 1992: 7). The Commission does not provide a 
definition of media pluralism; on the contrary, it mentions a variety of 
expressions used in national legislative statutes containing the 
'pluralism' concept: ýpluralism of the media', ýpluralism in the media, 
'the pluralist nature of the expression of currents of thought and 
opinion', 'pluralism of information'. 'pluralism of the press' and 
ýlurality of the media(GP, 1992: 14). In the Commission's view thus 
the concept is imprecise but is easily used as a reason to justify 
measures in support of freedom of expression or diversity of 
information sources. 
Following its own legal analysis of the European Convention of Human 
Rights as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights and of 
national laws, the Commission states: 'the concept of pluralism serves 
to limit the scope of the principle of freedom of expression; the 
purpose of such limitation is to guarantee diversity of information for 
Commission has not been given absolute competence. Media policies is such an area (Van Loon, 
1993: 5, Kosmopoulos, DGX, personal communication, 01-06-1995). 
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the public' (GP, 1992: 15). The concept of pluralism would only be 
used to detract from the principle of freedom of expression. So the 
Commission considers it acceptable, for the sake of pluralism, for states 
'to refuse a broadcasting licence or permission for the takeover of a 
newspaper ,a monolithic corporate structure, a holding in a media 
company, etc. ' (GP, 1992: 15). Nevertheless, according to Van Loon's 
1993 legal analysis of the Green Paper, this statement is partially 
wrong. 'Pluralism' is not mentioned in Article 10(2) of the European 
Convention on Human RightS53 as a concept on the basis of which the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression could be restricted. 
Pluralism thus cannot be used to derogate from this fundamental right; 
it could only be used to give substantial meaning to it. For this reason, 
Van Loon concludes that it is not right to argue that the concept of 
pluralism might be used to restrict freedom of expression. On the 
contrary, the notion might only be used to promote and safeguard 
freedom of expression. In any case, such negative and legalistic 
interpretation of pluralism being set out in the GP contrasts sharply 
with the Commission's promises in 1990. 
The GP suggested three possible ways for assessing pluralism: a) 
according to the editorial content of the broadcasts or the press. This is 
considered the most logical criterion although the most complex, data- 
demanding and subjective; 54b) according to the number of channels or 
53 The European Convention on Human Rights is an international agreement negotiated in the 
framework of the Council of Europe. The states belonging to the Convention have recognised the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Article 10 protects the 'freedom of expression' 
principle: '... Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities and 
regardless of frontiers (§ 1). But freedom of expression is not an absolute freedom. Article 10 
continues: This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterpnses'(§2). Article 10(2) provides that freedom of expression and freedom to 
receive and impart information can be restricted only in the interests of public order, public safety or 
public health. Pluralism obviously cannot be associated with these (see Van Loon, 1993: 22-6) 
54 The Commission points out that 'it would indeed be necessary to take account of all the editoria 
characteristics of the medium in question (such as type of medium, type of programme or column, 
Media CompetitionlConcentration Policy in the European Union 130 
titles. Despite the fact that it is easily measurable, this alternative is 
rejected as insignificant in terms of diversity of editorial content; and 
c) according to the number of media controllers or owners. This seems 
to be the Commission's preferred criterion since, although it too does 
not reflect editorial content, 'whatever the editorial content or the 
number of information carriers, concentration of control of media 
access in the hands of a few is by definition a threat to the diversity of 
information. (GP, 1992: 20). Without being able to guarantee diversity 
of editorial content, this system constitutes a minimum condition to 
promote diversity of choice for the public. 
However, such emphasis on the number of controllers implies a narrow 
and legalistic interpretation in which the function of the pluralism 
principle is defined, as mentioned above, in a negative sense. On the 
contrary, the emphasis on editorial contents reflects a view of pluralism 
as an objective, that is, the positive concern with ensuring a sufficiently 
wide variety of differing product types (for instance, programming 
schedules which pay attention to minority, political, cultural and social 
interests, or regional issues). In a broader perspective, we are 
sympathetic to a definition of pluralism that incorporates three positive 
elements: a) sufficient programme diversity (variety of programme 
content). The media sector should offer a sufficient diversity in terms 
of breadth, price and quality of the product range, so that it reflects 
consumer preferences including cultural minorities. The existence of 
distinguished programme s/title s in areas where total demand is scarce 
(in arts, minority languages, etc. ), available at affordable prices should 
be of prime importance in order to achieve a pluralistic media sector; 
editorial opinions, frequency and duration of broadcast or circulation, etc. ) and also to see whether the 
consumer given actual media consumption patterns, genuinely benefitsfrom such diversity (Does he 
have access to it? Is the diversity of opinions in society and among consumers re ected? etc. ) (GR 
1992: 19). 
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b) sufficient access to information. Diverse media should be accessible 
to all citizens if a truly democratic and pluralistic society is to be 
accomplished; and c) sufficient balance in the provision of news and 
information. Diverse and accessible to all media that are culturally or 
politically biased when reporting or presenting information 
programmes present the worry that one particular cultural/political 
point of view might become dominant. The above concept of pluralism 
is related to the supply of media content available to the market. 
Although one could argue that 'consumption pluralism' and not'supply 
pluralism' should be the ultimate goal of media policy measures, 55 the 
adoption of such a broad definition of pluralism on the supply side 
could ensure, at least in principle, that cultural and political diversity 
will be preserved. 
Part two of the Commission's Green Paper describes the level of media 
concentration in Europe. This part is based upon a Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton study56 commissioned by the Commission. The study tried 
firstly to analyse the relevant media consumption patterns from the 
point of view of exposure to lack of pluralism, secondly to show the 
level of concentration in the supply and consumption of the media, and 
thirdly to assess whether there should be a need for a Community-level 
intervention in the field of pluralism and concentration of the media. 
Regarding the first issue, it pointed out that while there was a wide 
55 'Consumption pluralism', that is citizens' use of the media in a certain way, although a 
fundamental conceptualisation, cannot be enforced by media policy measures. Politicians in democratic 
societies do not, by any means, wish to force people to use the media in a specific manner. 
Nevertheless, policy makers can ensure that consumers are exposed to a pluralistic set of news, 
information, opinions and cultural experiences through the media ('supply pluralism'). By providing 
such pluralistic output, decision makers can ensure that citizens have at least the opportunity of being 
exposed to a pluralistic set of ideas from the media and thus influence, in a way, 'consumption 
pluralism'. 
56 Booz-Allen & Hamilton (1992) 'Study on Pluralism and Concentration in Media - Economic 
Evaluation', Report to the Commission of the European Communities, DG III/F-5, Brussels, 6 
February 1992. 
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choice of channels available to consumers, a few national channels (TV 
broadcasters or radio stations) or daily newspaper titles tended to enjoy 
a dominant share in consumption. 57 Regarding media concentration 
levels, the study found that the top three TV channel controllers had 
over 80% of the audience share in most of the Member states. In radio 
too, top four station controllers (many of which operated several 
stations) had over 70% of the listeners in seven of the then twelve EU 
countries. The concentration level in daily newspapers was found to be 
low in comparison with TV and radio. Overall, media concentration in 
the Community appeared to be high58 if state-owned channels were to 
be included in the analysis. The study concluded that national rules 
limiting the shareholdings in a channel did not appear to prevent 
dominating influence of a single group. 59 Therefore, a Community- 
level initiative to harmonise the different rules aiming at ensuring 
pluralism and checking on media concentration would be appropriate. 
The GP set out to assess the need for action at Community level in the 
light of the disparities between national rules on media ownership. Part 
three of the GP presents a view of measures taken at national level. 60 
Indeed, since the mid-1980s all Member States have introduced various 
and differing rules on media ownership in order to limit operators' 
57 The study found that pluralism exposure in 1990 was generally transparent as media provision was 
often concentrated in a few nation-wide channels. For example: in TV and radio, government-owned 
broadcasters dominated in the UK, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands; in the 
newspaper sector, nation-wide titles had over 40% share of total circulation in all countries examined 
and an average of 63.5%. 
58 That conclusion was also reached in an earlier analysis of the same consulting firm. In 1989, 
although it did not regard the European broadcasting industry as highly integrated, the consultant 
argued that merger and acquisition activity in broadcasting was increasing and called for further 
deregulation. 
59 According to the study, other broadcasters (typically non-media players) tended to hold stakes as 
long-term investments, letting one majority shareholder control the channel operations and programme 
content. Also, such rules tended to promote partnerships between large media groups which could 
otherwise be competing with each other. 
60 This part is based on the replies which most Member States provided to a request for information 
by the Commission dated 17-04-1990. 
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freedom and consequently preserve pluralism. Four types of provisions 
can be distinguished: a) limits on mono-media concentration. These 
prevent the same person (natural or legal) from controlling or having 
an interest in several media of the same type at once (TV, radio or 
newspapers); b) limits on multi-media concentration. These prevent a 
single person from controlling (or having an interest in) several media 
of different types (for example, a newspaper company cannot control a 
television station, or a TV station is not allowed to control a radio 
station); c) limits on shareholdings in a radio or television company. 
This applies irrespective of how many other media are controlled (for 
instance, in some member states it is impossible for a person who does 
not own any other media to hold more than 25% of a TV station); and 
d) limits concerning 'disqualified persons'. These prohibit certain types 
of operators or bodies from holding a radio or television licence 
(public bodies, local authorities, religious or political organisations, 
advertising agencies, etc. ). 
These provisions vary widely between Member States. In some 
countries (Italy) a media company can own 100% of a television 
channel, whereas in others the ceilings are 49% (France), 50% 
(Germany), or even 25% (Greece). In most countries there are 
numerical limits on licences one person can hold but in others such 
restrictions do not apply to satellite or cable channels (United 
Kingdom). A few countries allow newspaper publishers unlimited 
access to television and radio ownership (Belgium, Finland), while in 
others are subject to restrictions (for more information see Appendixes 
I to VI). The concern is that these discrepancies of existing national 
rules on media ownership create obstacles to the freedom to provide 
services across borders and the freedom of establishment, thereby 
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preventing media operators from benefiting from the advantages of the 
Internal Market. They produce distortions of competition between 
firms from different states by placing companies operating in liberal 
regimes in a better position than those established in systems with 
stricter rules. Such difference in national legislation might also hamper 
media companies in developing pan-European strategies - creating 
subsidiaries in different Member States or investing in new media 
outlets across Europe. According to Margot Frohlinger (1995: 1-8), 
Head of Unit E/5 'Media, Commercial Communication and Unfair 
Competition', the differing national laws on media ownership affect not 
only growth and competitiveness of the European media industry but 
also adversely affect pluralism since foreign operators entering national 
markets often contribute to political, cultural and linguistic diversity. 
She concludes that there is a demand for action at EU level in order to 
guarantee the fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market. 
In part four, the Green Paper proposes three ways of responding to the 
situation, without the Commission expressing a preference for any one 
of them at that stage. 61 The first is taking no action at all. This option 
means that the Member states would continue settling the matter on 
their own and EU action would only be justified if the individual states 
failed to achieve results. However, such a laissez-faire approach would 
not by any means lead to the convergence of disparate national laws, 
thereby slowing the European consolidation of the media. Indeed, two 
European countries have already introduced new rules to regulate 
media ownership, 62 while others (i. e. Germany) have announced their 
61 It should be noted however that, given the space the Green Paper devotes to explore the third 
option (i. e. taking action), one might conclude that this was the preferred way from the very 
beginning. The position that the 1994 Follow-up to the Green Paper takes warrants that conclusion. 
62 In Britain, the former National Heritage Secretary Steven Dorrell presented to Parliament in May 
1995 the government's policy document'Media Ownership: The Government's Proposals', Cm 2872, 
London. In Greece, the then Minister of the Press and the Mass Media Eleftherios Venizelos presented 
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intention to review their media laws. The second option is a 
recommendation to enhance transparency in the media. The aim would 
be to facilitate the disclosure and exchange of information on media 
ownership between national authorities. As shown above, the need for 
transparency has been pointed out repeatedly both by the European 
Parliament63 and the Council of Europe. 64 In the Commission's view 
though, transparency as such does not raise serious problems which 
have to be dealt with at Community level. The Green Paper states that 
the Commission has not been notified of any obstacles in the exchange 
of information between competition authorities so that there is no need 
for an institutional mechanism (GP, 1992: 79-80). 
The harmonisation of national restrictions in the area of media 
concentrations either via a Directive or a Regulation or by the creation 
of an independent committee consists the third option. The intention 
would be to establish common rules that would strike a balance between 
the objective of diversity of media ownership and access to the media. 
The above desired dual objective would probably be better achieved 
through an effective and directly applicable instrument, such as a 
Regulation rather than a Directive, which leaves Member states room 
for manoeuvre in applying the law. The drawbacks, according to the 
Commission, would be firstly that the content of a potential Council 
regulation would have to be more precise in order to be directly 
applicable and secondly that the Regulation would create inflexibility 
for measures at the national level (GP, 1992: 117). Regarding the 
to Parliament in June 1995 the new media Law 'Nomiko kathestos tis idiotikis tileorasis kai tis 
topikis radiofonias, rithmisi thernaton tis radiotileoptikis agoras kai alles diataxis' ("Legal Regime of 
Private Television and Local Radio, Regulation of the Audio-visual Market and Other Provisions"), 
No 159/1995, Athens, which contains provisions for the regulation of media ownership. 
63 Esp. in the Resolution on media concentration and diversity of opinions, 16 September 1992. 
64 Esp. in the Resolution adopted at the Third Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, held in 
Cyprus, 9- 10 October 199 1. 
Media CompetitionlConcentration Policy in the European Union 136 
setting up of an independent committee, with the task to facilitating the 
application of the harmonisation rules and expressing an opinion on 
media concentration issues (a European Parliament's proposition), the 
Commission has its reservations. The approximation of legislations 
accompanied by the establishment of an independent body presupposes 
the existence of national independent authorities competent for audio- 
visual matters. None the less. ) not all Member States have such 
bodies. 
If the Member States were obliged to set up audio-visual authorities, 
the argument follows, it could lead to a centralisation at EU level of 
matters that could be handled at national level (GP, 1992: 118). 
The three policy options mentioned by the Commission in its Green 
Paper should be considered in the light of the four objectives that have 
become apparent from the above analysis. It should be obvious by now 
that the chief objective is the completion and the proper functioning of 
the Single European Market. The craving for the harmonisation of 
national media ownership rules has more to do with ensuring the 
smooth operation of the single market rather than safeguarding 
pluralism as such. 65 This might be the reason why harmonisation would 
affect ownership rules only and not rules related to the content of the 
mass media, since the latter do not normally influence the performance 
of the internal market. In any case, the accomplishment of this 
objective could, in the Commission's opinion, help to increase 
pluralism by providing more opportunities for media entities. 
Pluralism is once again invoked to justify the second major objective, 
that is the implementation of an industrial policy to foster the 
competitiveness of the media industry. By making media firms 
65 As already pointed out, the sole objective of safeguarding media pluralism is, in the Commission IS 
view, neither a Community objective nor a matter coming within Community jurisdiction as laid 
down in the Treaty of Rome or the Treaty on European Union. 
Media Competition/Concentration Policy in the European Union 137 
competitive, the Commission seeks to contribute indirectly to media 
pluralism. The main concern though is to create an economically viable 
media sector, boost production and assist the formation of big units 
able to compete internationally. Differing national regulatory 
frameworks on media concentrations, mergers and acquisitions might 
affect the competitiveness of media undertakings. This is in line with 
the conclusion of the 1989 Booz- Allen & Hamilton study which, as 
indicated above, called media firms to make use of the opportunities 
offered by the Single European Market in order to match their US 
counterparts. 
The formation of an audio-visual policy to create the European audio- 
visual space is the third Community objective. The national 
inconsistencies and sometimes media policy anachronisms could indeed 
affect the operation of trans-frontier channels. However, trans-border 
activity should not, according to the Commission, result in Euro- 
conglomerates that might affect fundamental rights and especially 
pluralism and freedom of expression. The Commission is of the 
opinion that respect of fundamental rights is of paramount importance 
and therefore constitutes an obligation which embraces the three 
previous objectives. 66 
Our impression is that DGAVs approach, as expressed through the 
Green Paper, is to conflate two different although sometimes 
overlapping goals. On the one hand, it tries to pursue an industrial 
strategy which would enable European media undertakings to become 
66 Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union reaffirmed the case-law of the Court of fundamental 
rights in which respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law 
which the Court of Justice ensures are respected. The Court explicitly ruled in Case 11/1970 
Internationale Handels2esellschaft [ECR] 1970 1125 that fundamental rights must be protected within 
the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community (see GP, 1992: 61). 
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big and therefore both compete effectively globally and prevent, by 
their presence, the takeover of a country's media by foreign interests. 
The deregulatory move that this aim implies carry a price, that is the 
threat to the diversity and circulation of ideas that might be caused by 
the concentration of political power in the hands of a few. The 
Commission is careful to ensure that its policies 'do not adversely affect 
pluralism'(GP, 1992: 7). It also argues that competition law 'can also 
contribute to pluralism in the media'(GP, 1992: 60). The positive point 
is the GPs acknowledgement that competition and pluralism are 
different criteria and cannot replace one another. Yet it affirms that 
there is a connection between them. ) since the former can have positive 
effects on the latter. As stated by Jonathan Davis (1993: 9) however, 
the twin aims of competition and pluralism are safeguarded in different 
ways. The first is fostered by removing barriers to entry whereas the 
second is guaranteed by 'positive' content regulation. The Green Paper 
itself admits that the achievement of the pluralism objective requires 
tighter regulation than that of competition (GP, 1992: 82). It seems 
thus that the Commission has embarked upon a dubious task of 
conflating diverse and incompatible concerns. It remains to be seen 
whether it will achieve the desired end. As we shall see though, the 
industry's reply was not encouraging. 
3.5 THE CONSULTATION PROCESS 
As soon as it was adopted, the Green Paper was transmitted to the 
European Parliament and the Council of Europe. The Commission also 
asked the Economic and Social Committee to deliver an opinion on it. 
In addition, federations and associations representing industry interests 
at European level as well as individual operators were also asked to 
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make contributions on the seven specific questions raised in the GP (see 
Appendix IX). In launching a wide-ranging consultation process, the 
Commission sought to provide a basis for discussion on whether 
Europe-wide legislation in the field of media concentration is 
necessary. The purpose was to feed the Commission with the 
information it requires if it is to adopt a position on this sensitive issue. 
The Commission document refrains from any ambitious proposals, 
although it reveals a slight preference for taking action. 
The consultations lasted over a year, with more than seventy 
organisations sending written comments on the Green Paper. The first 
hearing between the Commission and European associations and 
federationS67 was held on 26 and 27 April 1993 (see Appendix X for a 
list of participants). It became clear, from the outset, that no agreement 
between the interested parties was about to be worked out. The 
majority of proprietors were against any kind of intervention at 
Community level while non-proprietary interests regarded EC action as 
essential. Overall, however, the industry's position was in favour of 
imminent change concerning the national rules on media ownership so 
as to be compatible with globalisation and the development of new 
technologies. The diversity of the interests concerned was especially on 
the question of the level - national or European - at which the change 
should take place. The industry was reluctant to take a position on this 
matter without knowing in advance the exact content of the rules. 
Having analysed the results of that hearing, the Commission decided to 
send a complementary questionnaire to all interested parties on 28 July 
67 Only European organisations were invited due to space constraints but, according to the 
Commission, the positions of other interested parties were taken fully into account. 
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1993 (see Appendix XI). The aim was to obtain more information on 
the issues raised during the preliminary reactions to the Green Paper 
and, in particular, on the impact of the new technologies, the potential 
development of national regulation and the content of the rules 
('audience' and 'control' criteria68). That complementary questionnaire 
together with numerous contacts and informal bilateral meetings that 
took place between the relevant Commission departments and the 
interests concerned helped, in the Commission's view, to increase the 
latter group's awareness of the need to take part in the consultations. 
Nevertheless, apart from European industry federations, thorough 
comments from interested parties were received from three countries 
only (United Kingdom, Italy and Germany) while some positions were 
originated in France, the Netherlands and Greece. The television sector 
made the most numerous written contributions (about twenty), whereas 
some fifteen positions emanated from the press industry, six from the 
radio sector, eight from multi-media groups and five from journalists' 
federations and employees in the media sphere (see Appendix XII for a 
list of replies to the complementary questionnaire). The big absentees 
were consumer associations which were not invited to the consultation 
process. The non-participation of consumer federations is highly 
regrettable since it is in the name of consumers that the changes will 
take place. 
3.5.1 Media Proprietors' Response 
Most media proprietors' federations were against an EC initiative to 
harmonise legislation on media ownership at European level. The 
European Newspaper Publishers Association (ENPA), in its April 1993 
68 These are discussed extensively in the next Chapter. 
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response to the GP, supports Option I (taking no action) because: a) a 
lack of pluralism and diversity is unproved; b) the status quo is 
preferable to opening the door to what they believe would be greater 
restriction; c) they feel that the imperative of national pluralism 
regulation will take precedent over Commission action; and d) they 
question the legal competence of the Commission to rule in this area. 69 
In its 1994 response to the complementary questionnaire, ENPA adds 
that if the Commission is to take action with regard to cross-ownership, 
such action should definitely not bring about more regulation but its 
opposite, deregulation. It concludes that changes in the media caused by 
new technologies (i. e. digitalisation and compression) will create many 
new sources of information, giving the public a vast array of choice. 
The public will immediately turn to another source as soon as it realises 
that there is one-sided information. 70 A similar approach was taken by 
the Association of Commercial Television (ACT), the European 
Publishers Council (EPQ and the Federation of Associations of 
Periodical Publishers in EC (FAEP). FAEP's view, in particular, was 
that special regulation for the media is unnecessary since there are 
sufficient instruments at hand covering companies in general, 71 while 
the EPC considered cross-media activity essential if newspaper and 
magazine publishers are not to lose competitive advantage in the 
developing multi-media world. 72 
Big media units such as News International p1c, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Rupert Murdoch's multi-media company News 
69 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 14: 1-8. 
70 Consultation Volume IV, February 1994, item 6: 1-18. 
71 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 7, pl-7. See also Consultation Volume IV, February 
1994, item 8: 1-3. 
72 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 6: 1-9. See also Consultation Volume IV, February 
1994, item 7: 1-10. 
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Corporation and Fininvest Communicazioni, Silvio Berlusconi's multi- 
media group, held that the Commission ought not to take any action at 
EC level to discipline media concentrations. The variety and 
configuration of media products on offer is, according to them, the best 
way to ensure freedom of thought. A positive approach would insist on 
action to eliminate the restrictions, not harmonise them, and therefore 
create the greatest possible space for freedom of enterprise. Both 
companies argued that, since there is little evidence that the diversity of 
national pluralism regulation causes distortion of the internal market., 
there is no scope for Community action to harmonise it. 73There were 
quite a few medium-sized firms, however, which were in favour of a 
change of the status quo. Three UK-based media companies 
(Independent Television Companies Association, Channel Four 
Television and Pearson p1c), together with the Milan-based multimedia 
group Editoriale L'Espresso supported a harmonised, although 
liberalised, system of regulation. ITCA's response, in particular, 
focused on the distortion of competition in the UK market caused by 
BSkyB, a satellite channel in which Murdoch owns a 40% share. Since 
BSkyB has been classified as a non-domestic satellite broadcaster, it 
falls outside UK jurisdiction with regard to ownership regulations. This 
loophole enables Murdoch's News International to own 40% of this 
national satellite TV channel, whilst also owning about 37% of the 
national press in the UK. In contrast, an ITV company can only hold 
20% of a national newspaper or 20% of a satellite channel. Pearson p1c, 
a then shareholder in BSkyB and publisher of The Financial Times, 
also called for EC action to eliminate inequities in media investment 
opportunities in Member States which arise by virtue of diverse 
national rules. Pearson however, like Channel Four Television and 
73 See Consultation Volume 11, April 1993, items 7& 11: 1-22 & 1-22 respectively. 
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Editoriale LEspresso, argued that a liberalised system of regulation 
setting minimum but adequate transnational standards would be the 
only way to create a 'level playing field' without resorting to 
divestment. 74 
3.5.2 Media Professionals and Workers' Organisations 
Response 
Representatives of media professionals and trade unions formed 
another group considering EC action desirable. The European Group 
of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), for example, after 
linking the pluralism notion with that to access to information channels 
and diversity of information sources available to the public (a citizen 
rather than an operator-oriented approach), criticises the Green Book 
for using as its starting point the concept of the single market and 
putting pluralism in second place. On the question on whether 
Community has the competence to regulate pluralism, the IFJ accepts 
that the protection of pluralism as such is primarily a matter for the 
Member States but urges the Commission to at least ensure that 
Member States are in a position to protect pluralism through national 
regulation. Media policy in Europe would thus guarantee that 
concentration in the media did not adversely affect pluralism, 
democracy and diversity of opinion. Although concentration can, in 
theory at least, safeguard the autonomy of editorial groups vis-a-vis 
advertisers and political power, the plain fact, according to IFJ, is that 
concentration of media ownership as such has not resulted in a more 
critical media serving the public interest. Having been critical of other 
arguments supporting media concentration (i. e. the argument that 
74 See Consultation Volume 11, April 1993, items 2,4,5 & 8: I-M 1-16,1-9 & 1-14 respectively. 
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concentration saves unprofitable publications from closing down, or 
that it enables media firms to compete effectively in the global market), 
the lFJ concludes that the identified high level of concentration of 
media ownership harms fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression and pluralism. A comprehensive media policy at European 
level, taking into account not only economic but also cultural factors, is 
thus urgently needed. 75 
The European Graphical Federation (EGF), the European Committee 
of Trade Unions in Arts, Mass Media & Entertainment (EGAKU), the 
Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinernatograph & Trade Union (BECTU) 
and the Comite des Industries Cinernatographiques et audiovisuelles des 
Communautes Europeennes et de PEurope extracommunitaire (CICCE) 
were also convinced of the need for an initiative to preserve cultural 
goals like pluralistic information and cultural/linguistic identity. The 
EGF strongly favoured EC action. It provided examples of 
transnational concentrations that show clearly the links between 
individual large firms and how such links are used in part to 
circumvent national constraints on the size of shareholdings in media 
undertakings. For this reason, it pointed out that national capacity to act 
must be protected by European agreement on basic principles and 
minimum rules. It went on to criticise the GP for leaving out important 
measures to create information pluralism, such as legal minimum 
standards for 'internal pluralism of the press' and workers rights, the 
protection and encouragement of different forms of ownership and 
commercial organisation, and the safeguarding of journalistic 
principles. The EGF urged the Commission to introduce Community- 
wide limits on owning interests in companies, directives on press and 
75 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 9: 1-14. 
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advertising concentration and tax advantages and other subsidieS. 76 
Both EGAKU and CICCE called the Commission to develop, in co- 
operation with the Member States and representative professional 
organisations in the media, a truly European cultural policy that will 
maintain the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity. 77 Finally, 
BECTU, a trade union representing 55,000 members in the British 
broadcasting, film and theatre sectors, illustrated the need for limits on 
media concentration, for consistency of regulation across the 
Community and for limits on non-EC concentration of media 
ownership. 78 
3.5.3 Public Service Broadcasters' Response 
In its answer to the complementary questionnaire sent by the EC 
Commission, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) stressed first of 
all the risks that the digital technology carries for media pluralism. It 
pointed out that the expected proliferation of channels will not bring 
about a wider variety of programmes; on the contrary, the new 
channels will offer more of the same due both to financial restraints 
and limited audience shares. An additional risk to media pluralism 
highlighted by the EBU is the increased competition for programme 
material that the new technology will cause and its adverse 
consequences on small and newly formed firms. Only those enterprises 
that are in a position to establish vertical links with programme 
suppliers will have a strategic advantage. Multimedia concentration, 
integration between software and hardware sectors, and the 
convergence between media, telecommunications and data processing 
76 Consultation Volume 111, July 1993, item 1: 1-42. 
77 See Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, items 5& 11: 1-4,1-3 respectively. 
78 Consultation Volume II, April 1993, item 1: 1-3. 
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will also increase the risks of biased programme information and 
programme selection systems. For these reasons, the EBU declares that 
national measures on media ownership will become inadequate. 
However. ) 
it claims that EC harmonisation would not solve the problem, 
since broadcasters will be free to set their activities outside the 
Community and use the frequencies of a non-EC country. On the 
contrary, transparency measures are highly desirable. In any case, it 
advanced the position that public service broadcasting organisations 
must be exempted from a potential harmonisation instrument. This is 
because they cater for internal pluralism, that is the multiplicity of 
opinions and information which are reflected within a company, as 
opposed to external pluralism, which presents a situation where many 
firms are varied to such an extent that together represent a 
MUltipliCity. 79 Indeed, by setting limits on the concentration of 
ownership and the control of media companies, the Commission wants 
to foster external pluralism. Similar positions were advocated by 
German public broadcasters ZDF and ARD. They rejected option III 
(harmonisation) and supported option 11, favouring transparency 
measures. 80 
3.5.4 Advertising Sector's Response 
Advertisers and advertising agencies have decided to remain silent on 
the question of media concentration. The European Advertising 
Tripartite (EAT), promoting the common interests of the advertising 
business - advertisers, advertising agencies and media - at 
European 
level as well as national and international 'tripartite' advertising bodies, 
79 Consultation Volume IV, February 1994, item 3: 1-9. 
80 Consultation Volume II, April 199, item 9: 1-5. 
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did not wish to put forward a specific position on media ownership. In 
its letter of 15 April 1993 to the Commission, it suggested that a more 
detailed approach to this important dossier should be best 
communicated to the Commission by its members on an individual 
basis. 81 Similarly, the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA), in a 
two-page communication chose not to be involved in this issue. 82 Yet 
the general question of the advertising industry's position vis-a-vis 
pluralism and media concentration remains high on the agenda. The 
European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 1994 urging the 
Commission to submit a proposal for a Directive (see below). Among 
other things, it calls for an in-depth investigation of dominant 
influences in the field of advertising, the excluding of specific groups, 
such as advertising agencies, from owning media properties and for the 
application of stringent national and Community provisions for 
controlling media buying groups. Therefore, advertisers do not 
constitute a disinterested group in the whole debate on media 
ownership. As Toby Syfret83 puts it, 'issues on media ownership and 
pluralism are very much the advertising sector's business, in a business 
senset. 
81 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 4: 1. 
82 Consultation Volume 1, April 1993, item 10: 1-2. 
83 Personal communication, 04-06-1995. See also Syfret, 1994: 45. 
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3.5.5 The Economic and Social Committee'S84 Response 
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) adopted an opinion on the 
GP on 22 September 1993.85 Regarding the safeguarding of pluralism 
as such, it declared, as trade unions and journalists' federations did, that 
there is a risk that information pluralism may be affected by 
monopoly-type mergers so that action at EC level to maintain it is 
required. It considers Community's decision to avoid taking action to 
maintain pluralism as not correct, adding that economic health and 
competitiveness of business do not automatically increase it (ESC, 
1993: § 3.1). Recognising the special role of the media in the 
democratic process, the Committee advocates minimum democratic 
standards in the European press and audiovisual sectors. It thus calls 
upon the Milan Declaration of 5 March 1993 of the International 
Federation of Journalists, which stressed the need both for securing 
pluralism within media and protecting editorial independence (ESC, 
1993: § 3.1). The Committee approves most of the European 
84 The Economic and Social Committee has played an active role in the formation of European media 
policy. In its Opinion of 25 September 1985 (OJ C 303,25-11-1985, p13) on the Green Paper on the 
establishment of the common market for broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable (Doc. COM 
(84) 300 final), it argued that the licensing of radio and TV channels should be left to Member States, 
whereas the Community should take measures to protect pluralism of information and opinions. It 
called for the protection of minors, right of reply and copyright safeguards while, at the same time, 
advocated an in-depth investigation on the influence of advertising agencies on the trade in 
programmes. In its Opinion of I July 1987 (OJ C 232,31-08-1987, p29) on the proposal for a 
Council Directive on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities (OJ C 179, 
17-07-1986, p4) as well as in its Additional Opinion of 27 April 1989 (OJ C 159,26-06-1989, p67) 
expressed the concern that pluralism and freedom of information will be eliminated unless measures 
are taken to prevent the creation of a dominant position in the broadcasting sector. In its Opinion of 
20 December 1989 (OJ C 62,12-03-1990, p26) on a fresh boost for culture in the European 
Community (OJ C 175,04-07-1988), after noting the trends towards concentration, 
internationalisation and monopolisation in the media, the Committee urged for anti-trust and 
transparency measures, together with the creation of a European Media Observatory with the task to 
monitoring economic concentrations and promoting freedom of information and cultural pluralism. 
Finally, measures to combat the development of monopolistic structures in the record, cassette and 
film distribution business were also voiced in the Committee's Opinion of 20 September 1990 (OJ C 
232,31-12-1990, p174) on the Commission Communication to the Council accompanied by two 
proposals for Council Decisions relating to an action programme to promote the development of the 
European audiovisual industry -'Media' 1991-1995 (OJ C 127,23-05-1990, p 13). 
85 OJ C 304,10-11-1993, p17-24. 
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Parliament's observations pointed out in the resolution of 16 September 
1992 and, in particular, the drafting of a charter for European non- 
profit making broadcasting organisations, the protection of Europe's 
cultural heritage, the formation of a Media Code with the intention to 
maintain professional ethics, a Directive securing journalistic and 
editorial independence, and the proposal for measures to tackle 
concentration in the media including transparency (ESC, 1993: § 1.7). 
However, it rejects action relating to transparency separate from rules 
on media ownership (option 11) because it believes that both types of 
measures should be dealt with together to be effective. Therefore, it 
calls for a drafting of a proposal for a directive and considers sub- 
option c (establishment of an independent Committee) to be 'both 
reasonable and effective' (ESC, 1993: § 4.7). 
3.5.6 The European Parliament's Response 
The European Parliament reacted to the Commission's GP through its 
Resolution of 20 January 1994.86 That resolution was based upon a 
report that was drafted by the authors of the 1992 resolution 
Luxembourg and German Socialist MEPs Ben Fayot and Dieter 
Schinzel. 87 The report requests that the European Commission prepare 
a proposal for a Directive firstly to harmonise national anti-trust 
legislation in the media industry and secondly to enable the Community 
to interfere should a dominant position that might undermine pluralism 
arises. That would give the Commission unprecedented powers to 
intervene in the media sector, wherever it felt that a proprietor owned 
too many newspapers or TV channels. The two rapporteurs suggested 
86 Oj C 44,14-02-1994, p 177-9. 
87 Document EN/RR/242/242609, PE 204-759/final, 05-01-1994. 
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that the Directive should cover all media and carry on investigating 
concentration patterns well beyond formal ownership (for example, 
'sleeping partners'). They also asserted that advertising agencies should 
be excluded from running media companies, that firms buying 
advertising space should be subject to anti-trust rules in order to ensure 
that they cannot exercise undue influence on the media, and that links 
between broadcasters and programmers should be restricted. 
According to the rapporteurs, the accomplishment of the above goals 
requires an action programme including the following: a) a Directive 
on the right of access to information from both the European Union 
and national bodies, similar to the Freedom of Information Act existing 
in the United States; b) a European media code to preserve professional 
ethics; and c) a framework Directive to retain journalistic and editorial 
independence in the entire media sector. Particular reference was made 
to the creation of a European Media Council whose role would be 
monitoring developments in the media, providing expertise and 
opinions to the Commission on mergers, and ensuring transparent 
relations between media firms. 
The European Parliament adopted the report by 112 votes in favour, 
60 against and two abstentions. Although the majority of the European 
Parliament voted in favour of the report, the result clearly reveals that 
not all MEN thought that more regulation in the area of media 
concentration is in the public interest. The vote on the report split the 
European Parliament along ideological left-right lines, showing that the 
battle for Community policy in the area of media concentration and 
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pluralism has not only a juridical basiS88 but, above all, a political hue. 
Indeed. 
) 
if one takes a look at the debates for the adoption of the 
Fayot/Schinzel report, 89 it will become clear that, even though all 
MEPs agreed on the need for pluralism, some argued that the 
achievement of this goal should come through stricter rules and others 
asserted that liberalisation is the appropriate root. The MEPs divided 
according to their political positions. The Socialists backed the report 
since it was drafted by two of their associates, while the Greens argued 
that it should go even further to protect job losses. On the contrary, the 
Liberal Group and the European People's Party, both pursuing right- 
wing policies, opposed the text claiming that it is far to interventionist 
and does not take adequate account of crucial economic and competitive 
aspects. Christopher Jackson (UK), draftsman for the Opinion of the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, 
although agreeing with the rapporteurs on preserving pluralism, also 
mentioned that media concentration in Europe must be encouraged in 
order not to allow Japan and the United States to take the lead. His 
associate Hoppenstedt (Germany) declared that 'certain concentration 
operations are simply an economic necessity', whereas Mrs Lavire 
(Netherlands) called for less bureaucracy and opening of the market. 
Rawlings (UK) emphasised: 'the rapporteurs' exclusive preoccupation 
with pluralism of ownership has blinded them to the real issue now 
facing the European media, meaning the convergence of new 
88 It might have become clear by now that the question of media ownership has created a complicated 
and frustrating interplay of European competence versus national competence. Under Articles 57(2), 66 
and 100a of the EC Treaty, the Community has indeed powers to enact harmonising measures. 
However, the Commission recognised in the 1992 Green Paper that any harmonisation measure 
should respect the principle of subsidiarity. The principle (clearly defined in Article 3b and further 
clarified at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992) dictates that the Commission should only propose such 
action where this is both necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty and an area where Member 
States are unable to legislate effectively. As mentioned elsewhere, and in accordance with the 
Commission's statements (see p98-9,103 of the Green Paper), our interpretation is that the only 
relevant objective in this case is that of development of the Internal market. 
89 OJ No 3-441,20-01-1994, p228-36. 
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communication technologies and digital compression. The Internal 
Market Commissioner Vanni d'Archirafi, closing the debate, reckoned 
that no Directive would be able to harmonise behaviour patterns and 
attempted to reach a compromise by stating that 'if pluralism is to be 
protected, we need a strong, competitive communications industry in 
Europe. The former, pluralism, cannot exist without the latter'. He 
then promised that the Commission will reflect on Parliament's 
proposals and take a position in spring 1994 on the necessity of 
Community-wide action. 90 
3.6 THE 1994 COMMUNICATION 
The Commission thus set itself an ambitious timetable for action. That 
timetable though has never been achieved. The Commission postponed 
plans to introduce a law on cross-border media ownership, something 
that would have caused a major reform of the European media 
industry. Instead, it submitted a Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament on 5 October 1994 (COM(94) 353 final), in 
which it presented the outcome of the first consultation exercise and its 
evaluation. The Communication also called for further consultations on 
the subject across the media industry, with the dual objective of 
I rejecting or confirming the need for a Community initiative' and 'in 
the event that such an initiative would prove necessary, define its limits' 
(COM(94) 353: 6). At first glance this seems to be a positive step 
towards maintaining and developing Commission's links which were 
forged with MEPs and the interests concerned during the first 
consultation process. Yet the first issue - the need for EC action - was 
dealt with extensively in the first consultation round, where the 
90 Document EN/RR/242/242609, PE 204.759/final, 05-01-1994. 
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European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
majority of the 70 companies and industry organisations answered 
positively on the necessity of such action. That result was confirmed by 
the Communication itself (COM(94) 353: 15-21). Bearing in mind that 
the second objective - content of an initiative - was also tackled in the 
complementary questionnaire, one could safely conclude that the first 
consultation exercise which lasted one and a half year was pointless. 
This was not what Commissioner Vanni d'Archirafi wanted to happen. 
In the debates preceding the publication of the Communication, the 
sitting Internal Market Commissioner presented a paper on the issue 
for discussion at the European Commission's weekly meeting on 21 
September 1994.91 He tried in vain to convince the Commissioners that 
harmonisation of national ownership rules is needed in the name of 
smooth operation of the Internal Market. Many participants highlighted 
the difficulties arising from the subsidiarity principle. Competition 
Commissioner Van Miert argued that the Commission should be careful 
not to offend national sensibilities by taking measures which would 
have an impact on media pluralism, an area which is within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Member States. Mr Van Miert presented his 
country's experience where there is a complex regulation system in 
force with the aim to maintain a balance both between language groups 
and television and the press. Belgium, he declared, is against an EC 
initiative which would require it to liberalise its media market. Most 
Commissioners agreed with Mr Van Miert, asserting that the European 
Union should avoid intruding on subsidiarity territory, although 
admitting that national regulation on pluralism could constitute 
obstacles to free movement of services and freedom of establishment. 
91 Tech Europe, October 1994: 5-7. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
Thus the drafting of a directive on this hot issue proved to be 
politically unworkable. As a result, the final document passed refrains 
from any ambitious proposals and simply announces a second 
consultation phase based on another questionnaire (see Appendix XIII). 
In fact, this constitutes a third round taking into account the 1993 
complementary questionnaire. The Commission's unwillingness to 
commit itself to a policy proposal could mean either that it is playing 
for time or, even worse, that the 'no action' option is still on. Those 
hesitations made the European Parliament express its disappointment to 
the non-decision-making policy course. In its resolution of 27 October 
1994,92 the European Parliament calls the Commission once again to 
take action to harmonise national legislation on the media with the 
objective of creating and maintaining a diverse and pluralistic forum of 
opinion in the media (EP, 1994: § 6). In addition, it urges the 
Community to give a precise calendar for the presentation of a draft 
legislation in the field of media concentration and pluralism. 
However, the probability of a directive looks extremely low at the time 
of writing. The Commission is still in the process of analysing the 
results of the second survey. Although it promised the presentation of a 
potential initiative during 1995 (COM(94): 44), this is not the case any 
more. There are several factors that complicate the outcome. Firstly, 
there is the conflict among the Commissioners about the viability of the 
plan. The media concentration topic has been a political hot potato 
within the EC for several years. Secondly, there is the question of the 
content of the scheme. The creation of a European Media Council 
92 OJ No C 323/157,21-11-1994. 
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seems highly unlikely, while some other of the European Parliament's 
proposals to maintain diversity, such as controls on advertising and 
bartering, could be taken by DG-XV. The question of how to measure 
media concentration though is likely to create unsolvable problems. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the 'audience criterion' envisaged in 
the 1992 Green Paper has given rise to misunderstandings and has not 
been viewed in a favourable light. The only recommendation that DG- 
XV is likely to heartily endorse is the proposal that guarantees access 
for all broadcasters. In any case, if there is to be an initiative of some 
kind, the Commission is far from deciding precisely what form it will 
take. In the meantime, the big players continue forming alliances, 
taking advantage of non- deci sion- making policy course. Murdoch's 
tentative talks to take a stake in Fininvest, the 0 billion merger 
between United News and Media (publisher of the Daily Express) and 
MAI (the broadcasting and financial services group which controls two 
ITV franchises) in February 1996, the partnership between the French 
Canal Plus, the German Bertelsmann and Murdoch's BSkyB in March 
1996 in order to develop digital technology and pay-TV in Europe, and 
the merger between Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion 
(CLT) and UFA (which holds Bertelsmann's business in the electronic 
media sector) in April 1996 (subject to the approval of both German 
and Brussels competition authorities) are four examples of the on-going 
tendency towards concentrated ownership power. These examples 
provide a good illustration of the extent to which delays in policy 
making can benefit big players. 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS OF NkASURING 
MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this chapter is the exploration and analysis of the 
different methodologies of measuring media concentration. The 
appropriate measure depends on the objective of the measurement. The 
crucial question that should be asked beforehand is what is the purpose 
of the measurement: the examination of economic power or an 
assessment of whether market structure might restrict diversity in the 
media industry? So far media academics have borrowed measures that 
were developed by economists. Regarding the examination of economic 
power, economists have used companies' market share, shares of assets, 
value-added, sales, advertising revenue or even number of employees 
in forming an opinion of their bulk in the economy. These measures 
are more appropriate for industrial structure and manufacturing sector. 
In the media, because of their nature and their significant role in 
culture, society and politics measures examining the media firms' 
economic power alone seem to be inadequate. The special social 
significance attached to the media's role in disseminating information 
requires an investigation of whether a concentrated media market 
restricts the free flow of information. 
To overcome this limitation of economic-based measures a few media 
analysts have proposed a number of media concentration measures 
which take into account their importance to the public. The view that 
has emerged from the recent debate on media concentration at 
European (initiated by the EU 1992 Green Paper) and national (Arthur 
Andersen's 1994 study UK Media Concentration) levels, is that it is 
possible to measure the 'influence' exerted by the media by applying 
audience-based criteria. It has been put forth that while financial units 
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are close to the traditional systems of concentration measurement which 
permit assessment of media market concentration or even the existence 
of a dominant position (concentration of resources), audience-based 
methods are coherent with the cultural/political standpoint and can be 
held to be most effective for the measurement of pluralism and 
influence in the market-place for ideas. Nevertheless, influence over 
the audience cannot be assessed by using audience-based criteria, 
whether that is readership, audience reach, viewing or listenership 
share, etc. Audience exposure to mass media is certainly not the same 
as influence over the audience. In the end, these so-called new measures 
are nothing but refinements of measures of market power. 1 They 
measure market power, although in a more sophisticated way. They are 
a form of market share measurement, which is a classic economic 
measurement. 
This chapter examines the problems associated with both types of 
concentration measures and assesses their appropriateness in the broad 
context of media concentration's impact on the public interest. It will 
be argued that both financial and audience-based units apply, since 
economic power and diversity (especially in the range of material 
offered) are closely linked. A thorough definition of the markets in 
which market shares would be calculated is firstly provided, followed 
by a discussion on the measurement of economic power. In discussing 
the measuring of shares in the political/cultural market, the notion of 
the 'media controller' is firstly analysed, followed by an extensive 
examination of the various units that have been said to capture a media 
operator's ability to influence public opinion. At the end of this chapter 
There is nothing wrong with that, provided that one realises that 'influence' is very difficult to assess 
and therefore, as a substitute, market power is being measured. 
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alternative proposals are put forward in an attempt to develop a better 
measure which takes into account a large number of public interest 
issues. 
4.2 DEFINITION OF MARKETS 
4.2.1 Defining the Geographical Market 
When focusing on levels of concentration, one has to define the 
relevant market for which the market shares would be calculated. 
Relevant markets are defined firstly in terms of geography and 
secondly in terms of products or services (the good in question). The 
definition of the market-place can have an impact on what is perceived 
as its structure. The geographical dimension of market definition 
determines the scope of the market, that is, whether markets are 
defined as being local, regional, national or even international. The 
issue of the relevant geographic market being examined is particularly 
important, since the adaptation of either narrow or wide market 
definitions may lead to totally different results in measuring levels of 
concentration. 
Most media economic studies have adopted fairly narrow definitions of 
markets. Regarding the newspaper market structure, those studies were 
often restricted to local markets for dailies. US mass communication 
researchers have investigated newspaper concentration for decades 
assuming that the city was the appropriate territory. Nixon (1968) 
talked about competition as a city phenomenon while Busterna (1988b, 
1988c) analysed levels of concentration in cities. Picard (1988) moved 
away from the traditional way of describing markets and examined 
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daily competition in metropolitan areas. After considering the national 
newspaper market and thirty markets from the largest 100 
metropolitan areas, he reached the conclusion that newspaper 
concentration increased as the geographical size of the market 
decreased. Finally, Lacy and Davenport (1994) examined the degree of 
concentration and competition in the US newspaper industry based on 
the county. They argued that although daily newspaper markets showed 
higher concentration and lower competition than other US industries, 
these markets were less concentrated and had a greater potential for 
competition in 1983 to 1988 than suggested by other studies using cities 
as the geographic market. 
It is obvious then that using the city as the geographic market yields 
different descriptions of market structure than using the county as the 
geographic market. The same could be said about national and local or 
regional markets. The Arthur Andersen study, 2 for instance, adopted a 
national perspective in examining UK media concentration. As we shall 
see below, in order to measure company shares in the national cultural 
market, the consultancy used the time that the public actually spends on 
the media. It is easily understood that, under such interpretation, 
regional channel Carlton's share will be smaller in relation to media 
with national coverage (i. e. BBC). In fact, the above analysis found that 
BBC's share in the national market is 44.1% while Carlton's share in 
the same market is just 6.9%. However, it is meaningless to calculate 
Carlton's national market share since people living outside the London 
area do not have access to that channel. 
2 Shew, W. (Arthur Andersen Economic Consultancy), July 1994, p1 -20. 
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Broadly speaking, some markets such as the financial ones may be 
international. ) while others such as that of magazines may be regional or 
national, and others such as cable or the sale of advertising may still be 
very local. Local advertisers, for example, are interested primarily in 
the local market and thus normally restrict themselves to consideration 
of local markets. So there are several definitions of the geographical 
market depending on the product in question. One thus should be 
careful when establishing the sphere of competition and trying to 
determine the extent and effect of competition on pluralism. 
Insufficient competition and therefore excessive influence may arise at 
a number of levels - local, national, regional, or international. The 
regulator must ensure reasonable diversity and balance in the 
information and entertainment available at all these levels. Referring to 
the UK media market, Robinson et. al (1995: 57) argued that'the main 
worry, from a pluralism viewpoint, is that a company might acquire 
excessive influence in a local market through its ownership of both a 
local newspaper and the local commercial TV franchise. Yet, if such a 
company operated only in one English region, its share of the national 
media markets would be so small that it would comfortably pass under 
all the proposed thresholds . 
The above discussion illustrates that cross-ownership between a local 
TV channel and a local newspaper (or a local radio station) would lead 
to elimination of competition and therefore increased concentration in a 
media market, only if they are based in the same area. This is generally 
true since different newspaper groups or broadcasting channels 
operating in different regions do not compete for the same audiences. 
Yet they might be in direct competition for advertising revenue. 
Referring to the newspaper business, VeIjanovski (1990: 18) stated that 
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'national newspapers are seeking a greater share of the classified 
advertising business dominated by the regional and local press, through 
regional editions and inserts, and the regional character of their 
readership. Regional newspaper companies which each own many local 
and regional newspapers, now offer attractive rates for advertising 
simultaneously in all their newspapers'. From a pragmatic viewpoint 
thus, it cannot always be assumed that regional and national media 
outlets are not in direct competition for advertising revenue. 
4.2.2 Defining the Product Market 
Besides being geographically -defined, markets are also product (or 
service) -defined. 'The products chosen must form part of a group with 
characteristics which separate them in an economically sensible way 
from all other products' (Frazer, 1992: 14). The economic criteria for 
market definition are based on the notion of substitutability across 
products as measured by their price elasticities. According to 
competition policy, two products belong to the same market when their 
producers' price-setting behaviour is interdependent. There must be 
substantial interchangeability (if not homogeneity) between these 
products and others. According to Frazer (1992: 14-16), the degree of 
interchangeability may be assessed from both producers' and 
consumerst viewpoints. The first method of assessment - supply-side 
analysis - seeks to identify those firms which are either supplying the 
products, or which will be willing and able to supply the products if 
there were an increase in their price. The second method of assessment 
- demand-side analysis - measures the willingness of consumers to 
substitute one product for another. If there is a high degree of 
substitution between the two products, then they will be considered to 
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be part of the same market. If, for example, consumers are willing to 
substitute free-access television (whether financed by advertising or 
licence fee) for pay-TV, then these will form part of the same market. 
The current technological developments in the media sector have made 
it difficult to reach a proper product market definition. Indeed, in the 
current 'multimedia' age (i. e. proliferation of new media, convergence 
of technologies), the question of what products are part of the same 
market is becoming hard to answer. The above described studies 
concerning the US local newspaper industry, narrow the market by 
ignoring the impact of non-local dailies and of print sources other than 
dailies (other non-print media). Given that a meaningful definition of a 
media market must indicate the range of alternative sources of supply 
open to readers, listeners and viewers, conventional ideas about control 
of the market by publishing or broadcasting companies must be open to 
criticism (Peacock, foreword in C. Ve1janovski, 1990: 6). Cento 
Ve1janovski (1990: 16) illustrates this by giving the example of one 
firm which produces 100 per cent of the domestic output of white 
handkerchiefs. This may indicate that the company is the only domestic 
producer, but it is not evidence of complete monopoly and does not 
imply the ability to influence price unilaterally. Such a manufacturer 
faces competition from imports, substitute products (including 
handkerchiefs of another colour or tissues), and from potential 
entrants. Similar considerations, the argument follows, apply to the 
media industry. Television companies compete for audiences not only 
between themselves but also with VCRs, cable and satellite TV, and for 
advertising revenue with all these and also with radio, newspapers and 
magazines. Competition among media sectors thus must be taken into 
account when defining the relevant product market. 
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The fact that different media are seen as substitutes is shown if someone 
looks at local news which could be found on television, radio and local 
papers, and at national news which could be found in all these and also 
in cable TV, regional radio outlets, and so on. The same or similar 
information can be delivered via print, on-line, teletext or audiotext 
and there are products and services which combine different 
communication modes: images, text and audio. What is the definition of 
the broadcasting market then? If we take as an example the release of a 
film which can be viewed firstly in a cinema, then as a TV programme 
and lastly in a home video, then the market for this product should 
include all these sub-markets. A soap opera, on the other hand, may 
only be used as a TV programme and therefore the market for this 
product is television. Thus the market for soap operas and films is 
defined differently. Further, should the definition of the broadcasting 
market cover electronic publishing? However, if electronic papers are 
defined as televised media, then they should be covered by the very 
same rules that applied to the broadcasting sector (many would strongly 
oppose that). As stated by Jonathan Davis (1994: 7) 'it will be necessary 
to adopt a much more fungible approach to market definition than 
either competition authorities are used to or is currently applied to the 
media'. 
As the distinction between both electronic and non-electronic media and 
terrestrial broadcast TV and telecommunications services becomes 
more and more blurred, so does the definition of the relevant market. 
The presence of close substitutes can expand the market, resulting in 
lower levels of concentration. Therefore, several alternative market 
definitions need to be considered simultaneously. Levy and Setzer 
(1984), for example, considered concentration levels in the US national 
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video market-place under alternative definitions of the video market- 
place-broadcast only, broadcast plus cable, etc. There have also been 
many studies that, by trying to identify the user of the medium while 
measuring concentration, draw a distinction between audience markets 
and advertising markets. Mc Fadyen et al. (1980) noted the difference 
between market for revenue (through time sales to advertisers) and 
market for audiences and measured concentration in Canadian 
broadcast markets separately for the two groups. Larson (1980) not 
only considered concentration in the US television industry at both 
national and local levels but he also looked at levels of concentration in 
broadcasting and among broadcast advertisers. Levels of seller 
concentration (TV stations) were measured by station net weekly 
circulation3. ) estimated TV station income, network advertising 
revenues and by national and regional advertising revenues. Buyer 
concentration was treated both by advertising agencies, who purchase 
time in the industry for television advertisers and by the advertisers 
themselves, who are the ultimate consumers of the television time. 
These studies make it clear that much of the media serve two general 
markets - that of consumers and that of advertisers - and further 
distinctions within these markets based on specific types of advertising 
and/or region have to be drawn. 
The main point so far has been that media today can be seen as close 
substitutes because of the convergence of technologies. However, it is 
not only the substitutability in distribution networks that matters but 
also substitutability in content. We indeed have convergence in 
distribution today but that does not necessarily mean that what is on TV 
3 Larson defined weekly circulation as the tabulation of the number of unduplicated television 
households which view a station for at least 5 continuous minutes at least once a week. 
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is substitutable for what we read in newspapers, or listening to the 
radio is substitutable for watching television. Newspapers may be read 
through computers today (i. e. Internet) but the content that is provided 
to Personal Computers (PCs) is the same. In economic literature, 
substitutability relates to the question of whether a range of goods or 
services in a market are essentially, as far as the consumer is 
concerned, choices between one or the other in terms of quality or 
price; or are they provisions of alternative goods, in which case the 
choice between them will depend on the consumer's criteria of utility. 
People do make choices between going to the cinema or going to 
restaurant, but these do not compete in the same market (they are not 
substitutes). On the other hand, going to a restaurant and take-away 
from a restaurant are probably substitutes. 
When it comes to the media industry, the question not only is whether 
television is a substitute for newspapers but also whether advertising in 
television is a substitute for advertising in newspapers; or news and 
opinion output (where pluralism matters greatly) provided by 
newspapers is a substitute for news provided by TV. From a consumer 
point of view, does it make any difference if he/she orders a video tape 
from a telephone company or takes it from a video store? Surely such 
decision has nothing to do with content at all; it is just the convenience 
of delivery which is competitive and that makes a big difference on 
policy grounds. Referring to the television sector, Bates (1993: 7) 
argues that 'audiences are concerned primarily with video signals, no 
matter the delivery channel. In this sense, audiences may not make 
much of a distinction between regular broadcast television, cable and 
alternative delivery systems such as home satellite dishes, low power 
TV, multi-point delivery systems, etc., at least to the extent that such 
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alternatives are available'. The definition of substitutability thus has to 
be drawn very carefully, encompassing both substitutability in 
distribution networks and substitutability in content. 
These distinctions suggest that considerations of the print and broadcast 
market structure need to be based on multiple definitions of markets, 
with separate considerations of local, regional, national and 
international markets, of audience and advertising markets and of 
potential substitutes. Apart from this aspect of the problem however, 
one has to find an appropriate standard for the measurement of market 
share. There follows an assessment of the relative merits of both 
revenue and audience related criteria firstly for the measurement of 
economic power and secondly for the measurement of diversity and 
pluralism. It will be argued that both financial and audience-based units 
apply, since economic power and diversity (especially in the range of 
material offered) are closely linked. 
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC POWER 
One of the arguments about levels of concentration concerns the 
measurement of the magnitudes. The most usual method consists of the 
presentation of absolute numbers: rankings according to turnover, 
profits, number of employees in the companies or, in the media 
industry specifically, number of TV stations or newspaper titles, and so 
on (Seymore-Ure, 1991). Shepherd (1979) argued that one can use 
firms' shares of assets, value-added, employees, or profits in forming 
an impression of their bulk in the economy. Nevertheless, he also noted 
that each measure has a slightly different meaning. Assets may be the 
best indicator of the firms' economic power while value-added shows 
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their role in the country's production process. The large companies' 
share of workers reflects their influence over jobs or even votes 
whereas profits reveal their ability to gain market advantages compared 
to the rest. All these 'technical' problems in measuring corporations' 
scope (size) indicate that there is no single best measure of 'aggregate 
concentration' in an industry. 'Bigness' therefore is something 
everyone understands but no one can measure definitely. 4 
Apart from these problems there is the question of which number of 
large firms is the 'best' one for defining the share of large firms. As 
indicated elsewhere, measuring concentration in media markets 
requires both a measure of the market (identification of the market) 
and a measure of concentration. A number of indexes have been 
developed since the 1950s in the USA for both purposes. The Bureau of 
Census and scholars of American industries have presented 
concentration data and ratios as a percentage of control of a measured 
value by the largest 4, largest 8, and largest 20 ownership units in an 
industry (see Larson, 1980: 25). The 4,8 and 20 criteria were used by 
Caves (1962,1966) in his airlines and in his water industry studies, and 
by Bain (1968) in his studies of business concentration. One thus can 
slice the large-firm share at any of a number of levels. Shepherd (1970, 
1979) however argued that the four-firm concentration index is the 
most commonly used measure of concentration in general industry 
studies. The advantages of a concentration ratio are firstly that it shows 
the degree of concentration of few-firm leadership directly and 
correctly and secondly that it shows changes in market power with 
special clarity. The defects though are that concentration ratios are 
4 Although there is no best all-purpose index, in practice, sales and assets are the most commonly 
used measures of size. Picard (1988), for example, defined concentration as the proportion of sales 
controlled by the largest firms in an industry. 
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often too inclusive, embracing scores of disparate products and distinct 
regional sub-markets. The national ratio of, let say, 10 per cent for 
newspapers for instance, may conceal very high local concentration. In 
addition, concentration ratios may be too narrow. In some cases 
imports, not included in the ratios, cause concentration in total sales to 
be lower than the ratios state. 
The 4,8 and 20 criteria were also used by scholars including Nixon 
and Hahn (1971) who specifically treated concentration in the 
newspaper industry. A more recent analysis carried out by Picard 
(1988) used four ways to measure concentration in the US daily 
newspaper industry: the one-firm concentration, the two-firm 
concentration, the three-firm concentration and the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index (HHI). The first three concentration measures are the 
percentage of circulation controlled by the largest circulation 
newspaper, the two largest circulation papers and the three largest 
circulation titles respectively. The HHI is a way of placing 
concentration on a continuum from 0 to 10,000, the latter representing 
a monopoly. The index is determined by summing the squared value of 
the market shares of all of the firms in a market. The HHI uses shares 
ranging from 0 to 10,000. But at what point is the market considered 
concentrated? Stigler (1983), one of the supporters of using the HHI 
for concentration measurement purposes, argued that one can roughly 
identify markets with HHI>1,500 as tight oligopolies and those with 
HHI<1,000 as loose oligopolies. If the index falls well below 1,000 then 
the market is unconcentrated and when it falls above 1,800 then the 
market is highly concentrated. 
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As regards the television market, in particular, the evidence shows that 
little variation can be found in the most commonly used concentration 
ratios (2,3,4,8 , or even 20-firm). Larson's 1980 study referred to 
above, measured levels of concentration in the US TV industry using a 
3,8 and 20 breakout and concluded that all the used measures revealed 
that the TV station industry was not highly concentrated. 5 Such 
conclusions may not be true, not least because television broadcasting is 
not an ordinary, typical industry. The television market is distinctive in 
a number of ways: a) in that the question of economic power has 
manifested itself in two distinctive policy arenas. On the one hand, 
there is concern over the impact of concentration on economic conduct 
and performance, pricing behaviours, barriers to entry and limitation 
of output (Ferguson, 1983; Bates, 1993). On the other hand, there is 
the question of the social performance of the market (pluralism, 
diversity, and so forth); b) TV stations are operating in several markets 
simultaneously. In one market they trade programming for audiences 
and in another market they sell audience to advertisers (Bates, 1987, 
1993); and c) television stations operate in a number of geographical 
levels (Compaine, 1981,1985). Therefore, according to Bates (1993), 
the strict barriers to entry and the domination of affiliates of the three 
networks make the concentration ratios of little importance in 
measuring concentration in the US local TV markets. 
5 Larson found the TV industry to be highly concentrated only when he considered an 'additional' 
measure, that is, the product representative function of the networks (i. e. their networking functions 
involving programme and advertisement sales). 
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4.4 MEASURING SHARES IN THE POLITICAL AND 
CULTURAL MARKET 
Large companies' sales and turnover may be the best indicator of their 
economic power and reveal their ability to gain market advantages 
compared to the rest. In other words, very powerful firms can 
influence economic conduct, performance and pricing behaviours and 
have an impact on barriers to entry and limitation of output. 
Therefore, when the purpose is the traditional examination of market 
power then a high revenue company share may provide a quite useful 
guide. When it comes to the media however, the concern not only is 
over the impact of concentration on economic aspects but there is also 
the question of the social performance of the market (i. e. pluralism and 
diversity). Are measures tailored to measure economic concentration 
good enough to capture concentration levels in the political and cultural 
market, the so-called 'market-place for ideas'? 
The view which has emerged from the recent debate on media 
concentration at European (EU 1992 Green Paper) and national 
(Arthur Andersen's 1994 study UK Media Concentration) levels, is that 
it is possible to identify a sort of relevant 'market for ideas', which 
does not coincide with the economic definition of relevant market; and 
that de facto restrictions of pluralism and diversity are the results of an 
abuse of power in such market (abuse of political and cultural power). 
There are three problems associated with such approach. Firstly, there 
are substantial difficulties in defining a suitable notion of relevant 
market in the political and cultural sense. As the relevant product tends 
to extend across different media, the cultural/political notion of the 
relevant market may be significantly broader than the economic one. 
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The problem is bound to be exacerbated as multimedia conglomerates 
expand their activities further, and ownership of complex transnational 
media chains becomes widespread. To illustrate, how does one assess 
the effective combined share of, say, News International in the broader 
market for information, culture and political opinion, comprising 
newspapers and TV outlets in several countries? Secondly, the exact 
nature of the potential abuse is not clear and explicable and cannot be 
specified in the same way as abuses of economic market may be 
specified. What then counts as an abuse of power in the political/ 
cultural market? Beyond the general assumption that all media exercise 
some form of political and cultural influence on the public, there have 
emerged no satisfactory criteria so far for the definition of a broad 
political and cultural market in which spheres of influence by a single 
controller could be assessed. 
The most serious reservation concerning this approach though has to do 
with the selection of the criteria for measuring diversity in the market 
place for ideas. It has been put forth that while financial units are close 
to the traditional systems of concentration measurement which permit 
assessment of media market concentration or even the existence of a 
dominant position (concentration of resources), audience-based 
methods are coherent with the cultural/political standpoint and can be 
held to be most effective for the measurement of pluralism and 
influence in the market-place for ideas. Nevertheless, influence over 
the audience cannot be assessed by using audience-based criteria, 
whether that is readership, audience reach, viewing or listenership 
share, etc. Audience exposure to mass media is certainly not the same 
as influence over the audience. In the end, these so-called new measures 
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are nothing but refinements of measures of market power. 6 They 
measure market power, although in a more sophisticated way. They are 
a form of market share measurement, which is a classic economic 
measurement. Audience-based units are the equivalent of, say, 
measuring sales - i. e. market share - which is a classic economic 
measure of market power. 
In any case, political/cultural diversity and economic power are closely 
linked. It might be worth at this point spelling out the arguments about 
the relationship between economic power and the range of material 
offered. There is a clear relationship between economic measures of 
media power and influence/pluralism because economic power 
determines the control over choices offered. In fact. ) in terms of the 
public interest and debates about regulation and concentration of media 
ownership, there are two wide-spread arguments. On the one hand, 
there is the argument saying that a highly concentrated market 
structure in the media sector is of concern not only for the possibility 
that it may lead to abuses of economic market power, but also for the 
potential effects on pluralism. A large media player who controls a 
substantial portion of at least one media sector (for example daily press 
or TV) has the potential for forcing his/her views across a range of 
products (politic al/cultural bias), and thus for restricting the choice of 
products available to the public in political and cultural terms. In this 
sense, a competition policy decision aimed at curbing an abuse of 
economic market power (excessive pricing, creation of barriers to 
entry, etc. ) may also increase pluralism, at least in the sense of 
reducing bias. 
6 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, provided that one realises that 'influence' is very 
difficult to assess and therefore, as a substitute, market power is being measured. 
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On the other hand, there is the argument saying that increased 
competition may lead to less pluralism in the market. Increasing the 
number of firms in an industry does not necessarily imply greater 
diversity in the quality and variety of products on offer - especially 
where price competition is weak. If firms compete on price, product 
differentiation provides a device for softening the intensity of 
competition: in a simplified world with only two companies, they will 
have an incentive to locate themselves as far as possible from each 
other on the product line (i. e. to offer as diverse a product as possible 
in terms of product variety and quality). Proximity of location would 
mean that prices are gradually eroded as the companies compete for 
each other's business. However, if there is no explicit interaction in the 
firms' pricing decisions, the opposite result obtains: the firms will 
locate as close as possible to one another, as the 'market share effect' 
(the incentive to be where demand is, or to increase one's market share 
given the market structure) prevails over the 'strategic effect' (the 
interdependence of the two firms'pricing decisions). Thus the incentive 
to differentiate products is weaker when companies are able to operate 
in the near-absence of price competition. The tendency to converge on 
tried-and-tested formulae poses a potential danger to welfare in terms 
of the variety of products offered by the market. Hotelling (1929: 41), 
who originally discussed this effect., talked of 'an undue tendency for 
competitors to imitate each other'. Therefore, a more fragmented 
industry structure in the media sector may not necessarily deliver the 
socially desirable level of product differentiation because it may be 
more profitable for the companies to locate 'where demand is' (i. e. 
stick to the middle ground in order to catch the widest audience). 
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A further important question relates to the possibility that too much 
competition might display a bias in favour of certain types of products 
and neglect others. The particular bundle of commodities that are 
actually produced in the media market (the type of programme s/title s 
available) might be sub optimal from a social welfare point of view. 
When demand for products in a particular category is generally 
inelastic, the products which are being actually offered may end up 
positioning too close to each other (sub optimal product diversity); and 
those products for which the elasticity is comparatively lower may not 
be produced at all. The implication could be that some segments of 
tastes and preferences might systematically not be catered for, although 
there might be a large number of different media products. 7 So, Strictly 
from the point of view of pluralism, there might be no automatic 
advantage to be gained from a more diverse media structure. On the 
other hand., so the argument runs, a very concentrated industry 
structure might lead to great diversity, if the dominant firm(s) seeks to 
prevent entry in the market by filling all gaps in product space. 
Having provided, to some extent, an argument that economic power 
affects the range of material offered, and having spelled out the 
arguments as to whether concentration or a fragmented industry can 
deliver best the desired diversity, we now turn to the question of which 
criterion is the 'best' one for measuring concentration levels for media 
pluralism purposes. The close relationship between economic power 
7 See on this point Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who argued that there is a bias against inelastically 
demanded products which are demanded intensely by a few customers. According to London Econormcs 
1995 study, a media-based example of this effect is the time devoted relatively to snooker and opera on 
British television. Opera is demanded by only a few customers who would be prepared to pay a high 
price for it, but snooker, which is in greater demand, provides broadcasters with higher profits relative 
to costs. Under some value systems, this could lead to a welfare loss - despite the far greater number 
of snooker fans than of opera lovers - because of the high value that opera lovers place on being able 
to see opera. With the introduction of new payment mechanisms for television though, minorities 
would be able to watch their favourite programmes like opera, provided they can afford it. 
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and pluralism/diversity indicates that criteria that are being used for the 
measurement of market power can also be used, at least in principle, 
for the measurement of media influence and vice versa. Financial 
criteria, for instance, a long- established method for measuring market 
power, could also be adopted for measuring 'influence' (audience 
exposure to the mass media); and audience figures, supposed to be 
more efficient for measuring diversity in the market place for ideas, 
could also be a measure of economic power, especially as they are sold 
to advertisers. There are still problems though, since different criteria 
might give a rather different picture in terms of the participants' 
individual shares and may lead to disparate inferences on their roles 
and importance. The rest of this chapter examines the problems that are 
inherent in defining an appropriate measure of concentration in the 
information market. 
4.4.1 Criteria Based on the Number of Licences Controlled 
by a Single Operator 
Media concentration rules in the audio-visual sector have traditionally 
been placed on the number of licences or franchises a single operator 
can hold. Most Western European countries have developed such 
restrictions with the aim of preserving pluralism in the market. For 
Frohlinger (1995), head of Unit E/5 'Media, Commercial 
Communication and Unfair Competition' of DG XV, there were two 
reasons for this: the scarcity of available frequencies, which required 
the prevention of one person or body from using all or most of the 
spectrum; and the lack of reliable audience measurement. However, 
technological change together with the proliferation of channels and the 
convergence of different forms of distribution imply that it 
is no 
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longer necessary (or even suitable) for governments to limit the 
number of licenses. Further, the progress in audience measurement 
enables the calculation of reliable figures on the basis of which 
thresholds for the access to media ownership can be fixed. 8 This is one 
of the reasons why the European Commission wants the replacement of 
numerical restrictions on the number of licences by thresholds based on 
audience share. As is explored below, the Commission is of the opinion 
that the audience share criterion would allow more flexibility, growth, 
innovation and increased diversity in the media market. It would 
facilitate, in particular, the launch of multi-channel packages (packages 
of specialised or thematic channels) which under existing laws limiting 
the number of channels are difficult to develop. 
Rules placing limits on the number of licences or channels a person 
may control are indeed not appropriate by themselves as measures of 
plurality in the media market, since they pay no attention to media 
revenue, coverage or audience. These rules may measure diversity of 
media ownership but are crude as measures of the existence in a society 
of a number of different points of view. To illustrate, in the UK some 
Channel 3 licences are much larger than others in terms of advertising 
revenue and audience, so that rules limiting the number of franchises 
one can own but taking no account of revenue and audience size cannot 
prevent undue influence. It is imperative thus to take total revenues and 
population coverage into account, in addition to the number of outlets 
8 Television audience measurement, in particular, the so-called peoplemeter technique, can be held to 
be very reliable. Peoplemeters measure individual viewing by means of dual metering, with one meter 
monitoring set status, whilst another push-button device (nowadays a remote control handset) registers 
individual presence as a viewer. Each household member has his own button, which he presses at the 
beginning and termination of each viewing session. Later, the overlay of set meter and individual 
viewing records yields estimates of audience by channel or other set activity (for example, use of 
teletext, pre-recorded video cassettes, video games, etc. ) (for more information on audience 
measurement techniques see ESOMAR's 1994 Report on Newspal er and Magazine Readership 
Measurement in Eurol2e and ESOMAR's. 1995 Report on Radio and Television Audience Me-asurement 
in Eu=e). 
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owned by an individual or a group, when constructing rules on media 
ownership. Lessons from press regulation are useful here. The press 
has never been subject to rules counting the number of titles one may 
hold. Traditionally provisions aimed at limiting press concentrations 
have fixed thresholds based on circulation figures and not on the 
number of titles that can be owned by a single publisher. In most 
European countries a merger qualifies for investigation on the basis of 
circulation, and not on the number of titles controlled. 9 
4.4.2 The criterion of the Media Controller 
Diversity of media ownership could thus be measured by using the 
criterion of the number of media carriers (TV channels, newspaper 
titles or radio outlets) owned by a single 'controller'. The purpose is to 
find a definition that makes it possible, when a new channel or 
newspaper is launched by a group or an individual (or when he/she 
acquires control of an existing channel or newspaper), to estimate the 
number of media that are already controlled by the group or individual 
and broadcast or distributed over the same area as that of the new 
scheme. Determining who controls what media has a distinct advantage. 
This sort of knowledge undoubtedly makes it possible to provide the 
legal certainty for investment and sufficient effectiveness for avoiding 
circumvention. In addition, the concept of media controller is more 
accurate compared with the concept of owner or majority shareholder 
in the media company, since there may be several shareholders with the 
same proportion of ownership. The problem is that it is not always easy 
to identify clearly who is the controller with decisive influence. Who is 
9 In Greece however, under the recent Law 2328/1995, the press has become subject to counting rules 
(see Appendix 1) 
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the actual controller of a media outlet in the case, say, where there are 
three shareholders each having 33 per cent share of the capital of the 
medium? 
There is thus a technical issue of the relationship between levels of 
ownership and control. Before discussing that however, it seems to us 
that a preliminary issue arises, and that is the question of whether 
owners are controllers at all. In other words, can we simply equate 
ownership and control? Does ownership actually translate into control? 
Undoubtedly the answer is yes in cases where the founder of a media 
company holds the majority of the shares and his/her family the rest. 
Traditional press company structures have been formed along these 
lines. 10 Today things are different though. The formation of large 
vertic ally- integrated and diversified units has led to a corporate 
structure in which shares are normally dispersed, in which financial 
institutions and industrial corporations have significant shareholdings, 
and in which highly qualified managers make key decisions. In 
situations of dispersed share ownership, who can be said to control the 
finn in question? When ownership is dispersed, does that mean that the 
share owners still control it? 
The measurement of control in terms of ownership has weaknesses 
because it does not take into account other ways and means by which 
influence can be exerted over a firm's decision-making centres. 
Managers, for example, have been appointed in key positions in 
diversified enterprises (and often given the opportunity to hold 
minority stakes) because their specialised knowledge and expertise has 
10 In the inter-war period (1920-1939) in the United Kingdom, for instance, five men - Lords 
Northcliffe, Beaverbrook, Rothermere, Camrose and Kernsley - enjoyed a dominant position in the 
press sector by launching titles and retaining the majority of the shares (for more information see 
Curran and Seaton, 199 1). 
Methods of Measuring Media Concentration 179 
been considered essential for the smooth running of the modem media 
enterprise. This, however, creates an agency problem, i. e. it poses the 
problem of the relationship between owners/shareholders and 
management, often putting the editorial control with the management. 
An agency problem is always evident in the presence of delegation, that 
is, in all cases where one individual is contracted to carry out a task on 
behalf of another and the parties' incentives do not coincide a priori. A 
typical case is the shareholder/manager relationship, where the 
manager's decisions reflect his/her own preferences (which might 
include greater power or increased prestige) rather than the 
shareholder's goal of profit or value maximisation. The instrument 
available to the shareholder for aligning the manager's incentives with 
his/her own is the contractual arrangement: by making the manager's 
compensation also a function of his/her same objective (firm's profit or 
stock market value) the efficiency loss from delegation might be 
reduced. II 
Some economists12 stated that the above argument has great validity in 
cases where there are few shareholders but it might be open to question 
where there are many minority holdings. They pointed out that solving 
the agency problem and placing an effective control on management is 
II Owners however might be reluctant to monitor managers, not least due to the 'free-riding argument 
in management monitoring'. If one shareholder were to engage in the task of specifying and enforcing 
the managerial contracts, he/she would bear the full cost of that activity but receive only a fraction of 
the total gain, while conferring external benefits on all other shareholders. This reduces his/her 
incentives to do so and therefore the intensity with which managers are monitored are low. The 
discipline role non-nally exercised by capital markets is also supposed to keep managerial discretion in 
check: when managers pursue objectives which are at variance with what is perceived by the stock 
market to be consistent with maximising the firm's profits, share prices would fall and the firm would 
become vulnerable to take-overs. While this is generally true, it is also true that the potential role of 
take-overs in changing corporate control is relatively well-developed only in British-style securities 
markets. Elsewhere in Europe, stock markets tend to be much smaller and their role is not perceived as 
being one of disciplining managers; instead banks and families have controlling interests that impede 
the take-over process (see Franks and Meyer, 1990). 
12 Kosmopoulos, DGX, personal communication (01-06-1995), Caffara, London Economics, 
personal communication (12-10-1995). 
Methods of Measuring Media Concentration 180 
relatively easy in cases where there is one or few shareholders. 
Nevertheless, it is far less likely to be successful where ownership is 
significantly fragmented across a large shareholder base. Dispersed 
share ownership, according to them, has important implications for the 
effectiveness of shareholder monitoring of management. In the media 
sector, the implication of having fragmented ownership due to strict 
ownership rules, might be that the editorial control would rest entirely 
with the management. To the extent that management might also pursue 
a particular agenda, ownership restrictions would then simply replace 
one form of potential threat to pluralism (that from the owner) with 
another (that from the management). Therefore, while the dominance 
of a single individual or shareholder group might be prevented, the 
management might in turn pursue objectives which are not less 
damaging in terms of pluralism and diversity. Within a company thus 
there is clearly a question of who actually controls the company's 
policy - the owners or the managers. It seems to us that a case-by-case 
analysis is required to assess who makes the key decisions which 
influence the editorial content. 
It is not only the emergence of the new elite of managers that has raised 
questions over the relationship between ownership and control. It is 
also the links between advertising industries and the media that have 
masked the above separation. There have been two trends in the 
advertising industry that justify such assumption. Firstly, the 
progressive concentration of the advertising mediators (agencies and 
buying houses) and the separation between the creative activities 
(agencies) and the management of accounts (buying houses) have 
changed a key stage in the relationship between the media and the 
advertisers: the determination of the prices of insertion and other 
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contractual conditions of advertising space and time. Secondly, new 
advertising formulae for advertising and commercial promotion such 
as bartering, product placement and teleshopping represent a means of 
integration between the advertisers and programme production 
industries and undoubtedly weaken the barriers between production, 
programming and advertising. Despite the economic advantages of 
bartering, 13 for example, this formulae for advertising poses the risk of 
loss of editorial control by broadcasters, as does teleshopping and to a 
lesser extent product placement. 14 
The increased involvement of other concerns such as financial 
institutions and industrial corporations in media share ownership is 
another trend that needs consideration. Marxists like Murdock and 
Golding argued as early as 1977 that 'shareholdings in the large 
corporations have become progressively concentrated in the hands of 
the dominant financial institutions and of other large corporations' 
(Murdoch and Golding, 1977: 30). They added that'compared with the 
general passivity of most private shareholders, institutional investors 
are likely to pursue a much more "interventionist" policy with respect 
to the operations of companies in which they have holdings' (ibid: 30). 
For Murdock and Golding though, such interconnection of the major 
communication firms with the dominant financial and industrial 
interests prove the fact that the ownership has not actually been 
13 Bartering has become established in Europe due to the relative scarcity of entertainment 
programmes resulting from the proliferation of channels in the 1980s. In this way, some advertisers 
provide programmes in exchange for advertising time on a particular channel. In the majority of cases, 
the advertisers provide soap opera, quizzes and other light entertainment programmes, devised to attract 
large audiences (EIM, 1993). 
14 Teleshopping and product placement are similar to bartering in the sense that they blur the 
separation between the audio-visual and advertising industries. Teleshopping consists of offering 
products or services directly to the public, in a similar way to selling by mail. Product placement 
means presentation on the screen, within programmes (like films or soap operas), that do not tend to 
have product advertisements. This technique is not really industrial integration but is similar to the 
previous activities in that they may lead to loss of editorial control on the part of broadcasters (EIM, 
1993). 
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separated from control. 'Control over the key processes of resource 
allocation is still significantly tied to ownership' (ibid: 32). They 
supported that argument by saying that both interests - communication 
and industrial/financial ones - share similar views. In their words, 'the 
owning group continue to constitute an identifiable capitalist class with 
recognisable interests in common' (ibid: 33). Negrine (1994b: 63-4) 
however challenged that statement on the grounds that it is 'too general 
to be meaningful', it is a general assumption 'pertaining to a concern 
for success and survival'. For Negrine the media exist in a competitive 
market place and have to employ whatever means possible to survive in 
that market place. So the general validity of the argument concerning 
the allocative power of ownership is in no doubt. What is in doubt for 
him, in view of lack of evidence, is the assumption that economic aims 
constitute the basis of pursuing a particular ideology ('conservatism') in 
the media. 
The question of whether ownership is equated with control (and the 
search for a proper interpretation of 'control') is still with us today and 
forms a significant part of the current debate over establishing common 
ownership rules at European level. The Commission has initiated a 
study on this subject in order to reach a definition of 'controller' which 
will reflect experience at national level and will be in line with the 
various definitions of control already used in competition law and 
company law. 15 The study, carried out by the European Institute for 
the Media (EIM), 16 tried to identify who is genuinely in control of a 
press or broadcasting enterprise. After reviewing several criteria for 
defining the controller in a number of European countries, it identified 
15 For an account of 'media controller' definitions in selected European Union countries, see 
Appendix XIV. 
16 The European Institute for the Media, 1994, pl-20 (English text). 
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five means of influencing a firm's decision-making centre: direct links, 
indirect links, family connections, external financial or contractual 
relationships and unofficial agreements. Despite the fact that direct 
links with the enterprise appear at first glance to be the most influential 
means, it would be wrong, according to the analysis, to underestimate 
the others. Owning a stake in a company either indirectly or through a 
relative (Kirch, for instance), could be just as effective a means of 
wielding influence as being a majority shareholder. Likewise, 
appointing the management (Murdoch's strategy) could be as powerful 
a means of exerting influence as being appointed to a management 
position. The study also identified four ways of wielding influence: 
influence through ownership links (capital), influence through links 
with staff, influence through financial links (debts) and influence 
through contractual links (supplies, distribution). It concluded that 
ownership links are the most effective way of gaining influence over 
the board of directors, although the other three - financial, staff and 
contractual links - should also be taken into consideration. 
On the basis of these criteria it is then possible, with respect to each 
player directly or indirectly involved in the operation of the media in 
question, to evaluate by which ways and means he/she may exert a 
decisive influence on the operation. Margot Frohlinger of the European 
Commission (1995) argued that such a qualitative definition of media 
control seems both to be better adapted to the complexity of current 
ownership and control/dependency structures and respond to various 
attempts at circumvention of media ownership rules. Indeed, the EIM's 
analysis suggests that 'control' must be interpreted as widely as possible 
to include any means of exerting influence over the actions, editorial 
content, strategic direction and so on of the media organisation in 
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question. Apparently though the Commission is concerned that the four 
criteria of wielding influence defined in the study are not clear enough 
to ensure fair and impartial application throughout the EU. This 
concern is expressed in its Questionnaire No 111, questions E. I-E. 8 (see 
Appendix XIII) where it seeks opinions on which of those criteria are 
most important and which have subsidiary status. According to 
National Economic Research Associates (NERA, 1995), it does not 
seem feasible to put together so many different variables for 
monitoring media control. Their conclusion is that the only satisfactory 
approach is to abandon hope of achieving absolute legal transparency, 
and to adopt a discretionary test based on an ownership criterion such 
as that provided by the newspaper provisions of the British Fair 
Trading Act (i. e. control applies where one person owns a certain per 
cent of the voting rights of the media enterprise). 
It is indeed impractical to determine theoretically whether one 
particular criterion is of more importance than another. According to 
British Broadcasting Corporation (The BBC's Views: Pluralism and 
Media Concentration in the Internal Market, 1995), there are two 
reasons for that: a) the relative importance of criteria is changing over 
time; and b) in some cases a 'weak' link can be used to exert more 
influence than a 'strong' link in others - for example, non-voting shares 
offer less opportunity to influence editorial control than friendship 
with the editor. However, any definition of the controller based on 
ownership links (or the voting rights of a media company) should be 
complemented by at least one of the other criteria identified in the EIM 
study, that of contractual links. The inclusion of the criterion of 
contractual links is particularly important because it makes it possible 
to cover cases of vertical integration. The EIM analysis has the merit of 
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demonstrating how growing vertical integration and how concentration 
on so-called 'intermediate markets' (i. e. programme supply and 
distribution) have an increasing effect on media pluralism. In 
particular, the study examines the possible consequences of the 
introduction of new technology and concludes that both upstream and 
downstream industries of the media enterprise are developing in a way 
which is likely to reverse the balance of power against the broadcasters. 
According to the European Broadcasting Union (EBU, 1995), it is not 
so much vertical integration as such that poses a problem for media 
pluralism but concentration in intermediate markets at different stages 
of the audio-visual chain. Indeed, there is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with vertical integration. The fact that a broadcaster has its own 
network of correspondents, produces a great part of its programmes 
and operates its own transmitter network helps it to maintain its 
independence and probably contribute to media pluralism. Vertical 
links become a threat to media pluralism only if they are coupled with 
dominant positions in intermediate markets, thus undermining the 
independence and development of the broadcasters (either by imposing 
or by withholding certain programme material). 
Downstream activities such as distribution are increasingly developing 
into industries in their own right, separating their activities from those 
of content provision, and facing increasing competition as new 
technologies facilitate the entry of new players. This means that their 
bargaining power in terms of contractual links will take on an 
importance not seen in any of the traditional media. The ownership of 
conditional access systems by broadcasters is an example of this trend. 
The provider of the conditional access system that consumers need to 
decode encrypted digital broadcasts becomes the 'gatekeeper' of the 
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digital broadcast, able to limit the flow of broadcasts and the access of 
broadcasters to his/her system. If the conditional access company is 
owned by a broadcaster, that broadcaster can restrict competition in the 
market17 (BBC, 1995). Thus ownership of this form of distribution 
system should be included among the list of criteria for identifying the 
nature of the media controller and the exercise of that control. 18 
Contractual rights to content should also be added to forms of control 
that can be exercised. Certainly, control can be exercised by buying the 
rights to be in the popular markets of sports and films. This is what is 
happening with BSkyB imposing conditions on cable channels with the 
right to carry its programme. 19 Media groups should not be in a 
position to control the preceding stage of the audiovisual chain to an 
extent which would allow them to prevent broadcasting services not 
belonging to the same group from having access to film catalogues, 
sports transmission rights, television advertising, or other resources. 
Having setting up the arguments and explained, to some extent, that 
there is a difference between ownership and control and therefore 
diversity of ownership might not lead to the desired levels of pluralism 
in the media market unless we extend the notion of 'control' to 
encompass influences exerted by managers, advertisers, companies 
upstream or downstream, etc., we now turn to the question of how 
17 The regulatory solution to this problem might be either to prevent the formation of such 
gatekeepers wherever possible or, if they form, to ensure that they cannot restrict the entry of 
competitors or access to service providers such as broadcasters. In the case Of conditional access 
systems, the inclusion of a 'common interface' on digital set-top boxes to allow any conditional access 
system to plug into a standard set-top box would rapidly expand the digital broadcasting sector and 
attract competition in conditional access. However, since conditional access is today a virtual 
monopoly, conditional access providers must be obliged to provide fair and non-discriminatory terms 
of access to any who wish to use their system, together with published tariffs (BBC, 1995). 
18 Consideration of the degree of vertical integration and the control of gateways like conditional 
access systems was given for the first time by DG IV's Merger Task Force in its decision to prohibit 
the MSG Media Services project in 1994 (see previous chapter). 
19 At the moment the vast majority of cable subscribers in the UK do so to get access to Murdoch's 
channels, not to 'cable-exclusive' TV -a serious indictment of the quality of its product (The 
Guardian, 
06-09-1995, p 18). 
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control can be defined technically. A controlling interest (over 501T) or 
the ownership of a certain percent of the voting rights of the company 
should be enough to imply control of the enterprise in question. The 
problem arises where there are two or more large share-holdings in the 
same medium (for example, two persons having over 20% stake). The 
simplest way is to treat only the biggest shareholder as the controller of 
the medium in question. Although this way does not cause any 
problems in numerical terms, it has two major drawbacks. Firstly, the 
largest shareholder is not always the effective controller of an 
enterprise. Secondly, this method gives incentives for small 
shareholdings across different media. 
Another approach would be to attribute owners influence according to 
their share-holding level. There is an on-going debate in Europe, and 
in Germany in particular, on whether owners above a certain level 
should be treated as controllers of a media unit. The German regulators 
suggested in September 1994 that an audience-share model to control 
TV ownership should be adopted (a reorientation of the debate is now 
under way, with consideration of a new model based on commercial 
revenue). The setting of a limit for each investor's holdings at 25% of 
total viewing share, could define the controller(s). Bertelsmann and the 
Kirch Group argued that it is unfair to take into account the whole 
audience share of a channel in determining whether an investor's 
overall share breaches the limit; instead, a proportion of the share, 
equivalent to the investor's stake, should be considered (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 
How German TV Groups Would be Affected by the Media 
Authorities' Plan - and bv their Own Cannte-r-nInn. Q 
Audience shares to count towards 
companies' combined audience share 
Groups and 
channels 
Percentage 
stake % 
Audience 
share % 
Authorities 
model % 
Bertelsman 
model % 
Kirch model 
% 
Bertelsmann 
RTL 37.1 17.8 17.8 6.6 6.6 
RTL 2 7.8 3.4 3.4 - 0.3 
Vox 24.9 1.9 1.9 0.5 0.5 
Premiere* 37.5 - - - - 
Total 23.1 7.1 7.4 
Kirch Group 
Sat 1** 43.0 14.6 14.6 6.3 6.3 
DSF 24.5 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.3 
Premiere* 25.0 - - - - 
Total 15.8 6.6 6.6 
If Th. Kirch 
chnnels incl 
Pro 7 47.5 9.2 9.2 4.4 4.4 
Kabelkanal 45.0 2.0 2.0 0.9 0.9 
Overall 
Kirch total 
27.0 11.9 11.9 
CLT 
RTL TV 47.9 17.8 17.8 8.5 8.5 
RTL 2 15.0 3.4 3.4 - 0.5 
Total 
6ý 
1 21.2 8.5 9.0 
Source: Satellite TV Finance, 29 September 1994 
Note: The authorities recommended that an investor's stake of 5 per cent or more attracts 100% of a 
channel's overall German audience share, and that an investor's combined share should not exceed 25 
per cent. Bertelsmann argued that only investor stakes of 20 per cent or more should be taken into 
account, and that only an equivalent proportion of the audience share should be allocated. Kirch also 
mentioned that proportionate audience shares should be allocated, but there should be no lower stake 
limit. An investor should be allowed a combined audience share of 35 per cent. 
Shareholdings in Premiere are not relevant (a separate structure was to be developed for pay-TV) 
** No account is taken of Kirch's stake in Sat I shareholder Springer 
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Although the companies asserted that pro rating each person according 
to their stake is an impartial method that provides for fair company 
treatment within a media sector, we will agree with the German 
authorities that this model is complicated and may also be used to 
conceal an owner's real influence in a channel. 
A more reasonable and feasible approach would be to treat all those 
with a shareholding above some threshold as controllers of the firm in 
question. Each of the partners above a certain level of control should 
be considered as a 100% controllers in terms of their position in the 
market, and should be subject to the same constraints and 
responsibilities as if they were the sole controller. There are still two 
problems with this approach. Firstly, it is likely to lead to totals 
summing to more than 100%. Pearson, for instance, owns the Financial 
Times and the Economist, and it has a 14% stake in 'Yorkshire/Tyne 
Tees TV', to name but a few. 20 The second problem is to fix the 
threshold above which an operator would be regarded as the controller 
of the medium in question. NERA (1995) proposed that a 20% stake 
should be considered as the minimum threshold that a media operator 
should have in order to be regarded as controller. The analysis assumed 
that ownership below 20% does not confer control. The 20% level was 
chosen arbitrarily using three reference points, namely the 20% limit 
on cross holdings and accumulation of holdings in the British 1990 
Broadcasting Act, the 25% limit for newspapers mergers, and the 15% 
test level used by the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) in 
judging the likelihood of material interest. The 20% level seems 
reasonable and close to that used in other European countries' 
legislation such as Germany (25%) and Greece (25%). One point that 
20 For more information about how the British media are related see Williams, 1994. 
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should be born in mind though is that in the United States a shareholder 
can be deemed to be in full control of a company once he/she has a 
stake of as little as 5% of its capital. 
Any restriction setting a ceiling on the maximum share of the market 
which may be held by one controller (individual or interest group) 
runs the danger of being not only arbitrary but also easy to bypass. 
Choosing the admissible ceiling is a delicate decision, as a simple 
example may reveal. Suppose it is established that no individual may 
hold more than 5% of the media sector as a whole, and assume that this 
includes one television station which accounts for 9% of the overall 
media audience and one newspaper which accounts for 7%. The 
implication is that the rule makes it equally possible for the individual 
to hold 55% of the TV channel (which implies full control), or, for 
example, 22% of the TV channel plus 43% of the newspaper (in both 
situations he/she holds under 5% of the total media market). Yet if the 
ceiling is raised, say from 5% to 8.2% of the media market, then it is 
possible for the operator to control both the newspaper and the TV 
station (8.16% of the market accommodates 51% of both). If, on the 
other hand, the ceiling is reduced even slightly to 4%, the operator will 
not have even the formal control of the TV channel (and indeed nobody 
will: with a 4% ceiling, any one party may control at the most 44% of 
the television channel) (see Table 4.2). It is obvious then that setting too 
'high' a level may defeat the purpose of having diversified media 
ownership. 
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Table 4.2 
Thresholds of Ownershin 
1. Share of total TV Station Newspaper Other Total 
media market taken 
by each medium 9 7 84 100 
Scenario A 
2. Share of medium 55 
3. Share of market (=2xl) 4.95 4.95 
Scenario B 
4. Share of medium 22 43 
5. Share of market (=4xl) 1.98 3.01 4.99 
Scenario C 
6. Share of medium 51 51 
7. Share of market (=6xl) 4.59 3.57 8.16 
Scenario D 
8. Share of medium 44 
9. Share of market (=8x 1) 1 3.96 1 1 1 3.96 
Source: London Economics, April 1995 
The key point is that restriction rules based on universal thresholds 
may have different results depending on the underlying distribution of 
the shares of the various component parts of the market - TV channels, 
radio stations, press titles, etc. The danger is that a pan-European rule 
established at the Commission level would have a significantly different 
impact in different national contexts. The fixing of a limit on the 
maximum share of the market which may be held by one operator is a 
question of media policy and, above all, a political decision. Given the 
great heterogeneity of the national media ownership regulatory 
frameworks though, it is doubtful whether there will be a consensus on 
this sensitive issue. In addition, there is the issue of how media 
ownership rules may be actually enforced. Most rules setting a ceiling 
on ownership can be de facto bypassed, for example through 
interlocking shareholdings or the formation of stable syndicates and 
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interest groups. Thus where an owner is forced to divest from part of 
his/her holdings, there are ways in which his/her original editorial 
control might still be maintained, for example through transfer of 
shares to sympathetic partners, or business allies, or even to family 
members (i. e. Berlusconi in Italy). 
The crucial question however should not only be who controls a media 
company but also how much influence does he wield over the diversity 
of opinions. To answer this question, the European Commission 
(through both its 1992 Green Paper on Pluralism and Media 
Concentration and the 1994 Follow- Up to the Green Paper) and various 
economic consultantS21 stated that one should have a clear picture of the 
diversity of media ownership by measuring the audience reached by 
media controllers. They rejected revenue-based criteria on the grounds 
that they are only suitable for the measurement of media economic 
market power and not for assessing plurality. Audience-based measures 
(daily reach, time spent reading, viewing or listening and so forth), 
they suggested, are preferable for evaluating plurality because they 
reveal directly the impact of media controllers on the citizens. What 
should become clear however, is that neither criteria reflecting media 
consumption nor financial data will tell us how much influence is 
wielded over the diversity of opinions. What would measure influence 
is a very difficult question to answer and no satisfactory criteria have 
emerged so far. In the absence of a direct measure of influence, crude 
numerical (counting) measures which attempt to proxy for influence 
can be used as a substitute. We first examine market shares measured in 
21 Arthur Andersen Economic Consulting (1994); GAH Group (1994); British Media Industry Group 
(1995); National Economic Research Associates (1995). 
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terms of revenue to the media enterprise. We then move on to assess 
the potential use of audience-based measures. 
4.4.3 The Criterion of Revenue 
The most obvious criterion for the calculation of the individual 
controllers' shares, which is the analogue to the standard calculation of 
market shares in any industry, is the reference to total revenues. The 
general rationale for using the revenue criterion is that if a company 
produces a large proportion of an industry's total output or turnover, 
its actions will have a greater impact on that industry's supply, and 
therefore on the level of prices. In this classic sense, a high revenue 
share provides an indicator of the firm's market power. Is revenue a 
good unit for the assessment of the level of concentration in the market 
place for ideas? 
To answer this question, it might be helpful to distinguish between two 
rather different categories of revenue for the media companies, that is 
advertising revenue and consumer expenditures on the media. One can 
link these distinctive markets with the two basic arenas of policy 
concern: the concern over economic equity has focused on the 
advertising market, while the concern over the market-place for ideas 
and diversity places grater emphasis on the market for audiences and 
the programming that attracts them. Advertising revenue reflects 
advertisers or advertising agenciest willingness to pay in order to reach 
a particular audience. Advertising then is not considered as an 
expenditure by families to obtain information; instead, it is considered 
as an expenditure by companies to acquire audiences. Arthur 
Andersen's 1994 study pointed out that, while in assessing media firms' 
Methods of Measuring Media Concentration 194 
economic power advertising revenue may indicate their strength in a 
market, in measuring media influence it seems to be a poor guide. The 
reason is that, in the latter situation, the crucial issue is the audience's 
use of media products. Hence, consumer expenditures on the mass 
media, whether that is subscriptions to TV channels or revenue from 
newspaper sales, seem at first glance to be more suitable for measuring 
concentration in the political and cultural market. 
By focusing on consumer expenditures on the media however, we will 
not be able to determine plurality in a market. The money that the 
public spends on various media does not reveal either how the public 
uses the media products or how people's beliefs are influenced by the 
media they choose. In any case, both advertising revenue and direct 
consumer expenditures on the media have a major defect as a way of 
measuring concentration of influence. Some media such as pay-per- 
view channels or most of public service broadcasters across Europe 
obtain no advertising so that, by the advertising revenue standard, they 
would gain no share in the market-place. Likewise, other media such as 
the free press and commercial broadcasters depend entirely on 
advertising revenue and consequently, by the consumer expenditure 
criterion, they would gain no share in the market-place. 
Another indicator of a media operator's influence might be his/her 
share of the total expenditures on creating programmes or publishing. 
Many media as well as disseminating information produce much of the 
material they distribute. Other media spend huge amounts in acquiring 
programmes and bidding for rights and talents. It is logical thus to 
raise the question of whether expenditures could be a more suitable 
criterion for assessing a media owner's influence on the public. The 
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obvious drawback when using this standard is that it yields rather 
narrow interpretation of market power, as given by the channel's share 
of the industry's spending. There are two additional disadvantages. 
Firstly, there is the problem of data availability since few companies 
publish expenditure figures. Secondly, the expenditure standard tends 
to emphasise the weight of public service broadcasting organisations 
where expenditures represent a larger proportion of revenues. Since 
the vast majority of public channels are not profit- maximi s ation 
oriented and cater for creating innovative programmes, the expenditure 
criterion would grant them untrue influence. 22 
Another hypothesis is to calculate a media proprietor's influence on the 
basis of cross-subsidisation, that is, an operator's ability to finance his 
loss-making sector with revenues extracted from other businesses he 
may possess. Rupert Murdoch, for instance, decided in 1993 to cut the 
price of his three newspapers in the UK - The Times, the Daily Mail 
and the Sun - at a figure that his rivals could not match, even, in the 
case of The Times, at a loss (he recently put them up again). Of course, 
he was able to finance this loss-making paper through his other 
businesses (BSkyB and other assets abroad). The emerging newspaper 
price-cutting war is most likely to lead to huge losses for newspaper 
companies and even closure of some titles. The plurality of British 
newspapers is apparently at stake and readers face less choice. Another 
example is the use of the substantial profits of Robert Maxwell's 
Miffor Group Newspapers (before 49 per cent of the company was 
22 Here, there arises the whole question on whether public service broadcasters (psb) should be subject 
to a possible EU initiative to set rules on media concentration and to a potential single measurement 
unit proposed. It seems to us that a separate treatment for psb is needed due both to their obligation to 
provide internal pluralism (i. e. a range and diversity of material and views within their output) and to 
the fact that public channels are not available for sale or take-over. However, to the extent that psb 
seek access to private media ownership and become controllers of commercial media firms which do 
not provide services of a public service nature, then they should be covered by the same rules on media 
ownership as any private entity. 
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floated in the early 1990s) to invest in other private side firms (see 
Financial Times, 17 October 1995, p9,20). Once again however, the 
selection of the cross- sub sidisation criterion bears rather narrow 
interpretation of market power. 
Measures based on revenue have been rejected by the Commission 
through the 1994 Follow-up to the Green Paper on Pluralism and 
Media Concentration in the Internal Market (COM(94) 353 final) on 
the grounds that they can only apply to the measurement of economic 
market power and not to assess influence. As stated in the Follow-up to 
the Green Paper, the disadvantage of the market share standard is that 
'it duplicates the efforts of competition law, which uses this criterion 
to assess the behaviour of economic operators among themselves 
(taking account, in particular, of earnings) and not to evaluate as such 
the impact of media control on the 'citizen consumer" (COM(94) 353: 
42). Indeed, as Robinson et al. (1995: 40) argues, if the European 
Commission were to legislate in this way, it would be prejudging work 
that is elsewhere left to the empirical investigations of the Merger Task 
Force. There would therefore be a potential conflict between one part 
of the law and another. Revenue-based measures have also been 
dismissed as inappropriate in the Andersen's study which also pointed 
out that revenue can only be used to evaluate a company's economic 
power. 
Nevertheless, it may not be right to reject revenue as a measure of 
pluralism so easily. A significant revenue-based market share is related 
to economic strength and normally (although not necessarily) reflects 
plurality in the market indirectly. Revenue may serve as a useful 
element to be considered because it captures power in the market place 
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to acquire rights, for example, in a way that other criteria (such as 
audience share) fail to do. Of course, mapping the breakdown of media 
revenues could not be considered as the only criterion for measuring 
pluralism, not least because of the complexity of definition of 
pluralism. However, it seems useful to consider the possibility of 
collecting revenue data for regulatory purposes. The advantage, as 
Lange (1995: 8) reminds us, is that this kind of system could be based 
on hard data (i. e. company turnover) already available and published in 
the general framework of general company lawS. 23 In addition, 
revenue-based measures have the advantage of providing an 
appropriate unit for measuring concentration across media. In this way, 
they are suitable for aggregation and, combined with direct measures 
of audience (as it is argued below), they could capture in principle an 
operator's ability to influence public opinion. 
4.4.4 The Criterion of the Media Consumer 
As stated in the 1994 Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Pluralism and 
Concentration in the Internal Market, in addition to the question of who 
actually controls a media company, one has to find out the actual 
number of consumers reached by a media company or 'controller': 
I when it comes to the question of pluralism in the mass media, it is 
necessary to determine the effects of concentrations on the "citizen 
consumer". We summarise here the arguments listed in the 1994 
Follow-Up to the Green Paper to support the use of the audience 
standard: 'compared with the criteria based on company share holdings, 
the media consumer criterion does not duplicate the efforts of 
23 Nevertheless, Lange also mentions that a certain number of firms (mostly press groups) refuse to 
publish their accounts, not respecting their legal obligations. In fact, this is the case for two of the 
leading press groups in France and almost all press groups in Greece. 
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competition law, which uses the above standard to assess the behaviour 
of proprietors among themselves. Moreover, compared with the 
criterion of the number of channels that can be controlled by an 
individual. ) the consumer unit is more suited to the expected 
development of digital compression technology which will lead to a 
proliferation of channels. Whether a media company controls two or a 
hundred outlets will then no longer be decisive in itself in determining 
the granting of licences. The important point will be how many 
consumers are already being reached (within a relevant market) by 
these different outlets (TV, radio or the press). 24 In this respect, this 
criterion has also the advantage of covering all branches of the media, 
whether that be newspapers, television, magazines, radio etc., thereby 
being a good indicator of evaluating multimedia concentrations. 
Furthermore, it could be economically more sensitive and less harsh in 
the sense that it could facilitate the creation of a large number of 
specialised channels which normally do not attract large audiences. The 
criterion of the number of channels controlled by a single person could 
prevent this and therefore limit the level of pluralism in a particular 
area. Likewise, the audience standard may be more effective as regards 
preserving pluralism since a single channel with a large audience could 
also frustrate pluralism' (COM(94) 353: 42). 
Despite these arguments, the criterion of audience share has met a lot 
of scepticism by both the media industry and some academics. In their 
response to the Commission's complementary questionnalre asking 
specifically about the possible use of the audience criterion, the 
majority of media firms and media representatives expressed 
24 There are two objections on this point. Firstly, it is related to the whole question of 
substitutability in distribution networks and in content we referred to above. Secondly, as we shall see 
below, it might not be quite healthy for a democratic regime to have one media company controlling 
several outlets, even though the total audience reached by it is negligible. 
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reservations about its use. Those reservations regarded both the 
adequacy and the feasibility of such a criterion. The European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU), for example, stated that it would not be 
possible to apply the same audience thresholds in different contexts (i. e. 
different kinds of media and different distribution areas). Indeed, in 
smaller countries and restricted language areas there may be room for 
one or two generalist channels, whereas in large markets an audience 
share of, say, 25% would already appear very high. In addition, it 
mentioned that pluralism must be safeguarded within each relevant 
media sector. Even within one and the same media sector, for example 
television, further distinctions would have to be made between pay-TV 
and television free at the point of reception, between generalist and 
thematic channels, and between different kinds of thematic channels 
(news, sports, culture, etc. ). In view of such differences, EBU argued 
that, in case 'audience' was selected, thresholds should distinguish 
between media and be fixed at the national/regional level only in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 25 This is linked to the 
question of the proper definition of the market, to which we have 
previously referred. 
Many media organisations argued that the use of the audience criterion 
would punish growth and penalise the success of a proprietor. The EPC 
(European Publishers Council) and ENPA (Association Europeenne des 
editeurs de journaux), for instance, pointed out that if audiences grow 
in response to a company's commercial success, then the effect would 
be to restrict that success, something which seems pointless when the 
aim of any new regulation should be to stimulate the market and give 
25 Consultation Vol. IV, 1994, item 3: 1-9. 
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media firms more opportunities in the Single market. 26 Others 
challenged the Commission's argument that the use of the audience 
criterion will encourage the establishment of thematic channels. EGTA 
(European Group of Television Advertising) and ITCA (Independent 
Television Companies Association) stressed that there is a strong 
possibility that the opposite effect will result, as a preliminary question 
must be asked once again about the definition of the market. What is 
the position of, say, a specialist channel taking 50% of the viewers in its 
niche market but an insignificant overall share? 27Even those in favour 
of a possible use of the audience standard (i. e. Independent Television 
Commission) questioned its robustness and its capability of applying 
equally in different circumstances and between different media, or 
argued that it must be accompanied by a 'harder' unit such as 
revenue. 28 
There has also been opposition to the application of audience shares for 
assessing media concentrations from the academic side. In an article in 
The Independent, Barnett (1995a: 15) expressed strong disapproval of 
the 'share of voice' argument29 and criticised any kind of proposals that 
attempt to shift the emphasis from ownership. Ownership for him still 
matters, for different owners have different versions of the world and 
different attitudes to news. It is then wrong to replace existing rules 
based on the number of outlets an operator can possess by rules based 
on newspaper circulation, television viewing and radio listening. In a 
later paper in Public Policy Review, Barnett (1995b: 1-5) proposed that 
26 Consultation Vol. IV, 1994, items 6,7: 1-18 & 1-10 respectively. 
27 Consultation Vol. IV, 1994, item 5: 1-2; Consultation Vol. 11,1993, item 5: 1-9. 
28 Consultation Vol. 11,1993, item 10: 1-8. 
29 That is, to measure what share of the total media cake is owned by which organisations. As 
defined 
by British Media Industry Group (BMIG), share of voice is 'any one media company's overall 
percentage share of the combined consumption in any given market of national and paid-for regional 
newspapers, of radio listening and of television viewing'. 
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regulators should allow owners to possess media outlets in just one 
sector and bar completely cross-ownership. In his words, 'we simply 
need to maintain a clear distinction between them [media sectors], and 
to insist that those who wish to own newspapers should continue to be 
debarred from owning television channels and vice versa' (ibid: 5). 
Similar views had been expressed earlier on by Curran and Seaton 
(1985: 342-3). Lange (1995: 7-8) criticised the pertinence of the 
audience standard from both a technical point of view and from a 
conceptual point of view. The technical problems he saw are firstly that 
there are important margins of errors of audience and circulation 
measurements, and secondly that these measurements are meaningless 
unless they are done on different geographical scales. 30 From a 
conceptual point of view, he challenged the assumption that audience 
measures are more appropriate for evaluating pluralism. In fact, the 
I audience' proposal analyses the question of pluralism in terms of 
consumption of information and not in terms of offer (i. e. in terms of 
possibilities to access a great diversity of information). Audience 
measurement is a quantitative analysis of consumption by readers, 
listeners or viewers, developed for market analysis purposes. Pluralism 
means basically 'diversity of information'. However, this is a 
qualitative objective both in terms of offer of information and in terms 
of reception of that information. Audience research, the argument 
follows, does not measure either the diversity of offer or the quality of 
reception. 31 
30 As explained above, in some countries the problem of media or cross-media ownership seems 
problematic at the local/regional level. There is thus the risk of a local/regional monopoly of a 
company on the local/regional audience/circulation market, which might not be shown in national 
statistics. 
31 Lange argued that the quality of offer could be analysed on the basis of various criteria: structural 
possibilities of access to media expression for all citizens, variety of information sources, programme 
variety and independence of creators, programmers and journalists. Examining the quality of reception 
indeed includes analysis of the quantitative aspects of consumption such as audience practice. For 
Lange however it also means analysing the serniotic process of appropriation of a message by a 
receiver. 
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The audience criterion thus has raised a number of serious questions. 
This has prompted the Commission to launch a feasibility study 
examining the comparability and compatibility of the different national 
systems of audience measurement, the types of audience measurement 
that can be used and the possibility of using a single composite criterion 
or of combining several types of measurement depending on the 
configuration of the media in question. 32 The study distinguished 
between monomedia audience maps (where only one medium is under 
review) and multimedia ones (where TV, radio and newspapers are 
combined). In constructing monomedia audience maps, it recommended 
the use of audience share for television, circulation share for 
newspapers and listenership share for radio measurement purposes. In 
the case of multimedia maps, it recommended using the daily average 
contacts as a criterion that satisfies the requirement that the measures 
are equivalent across media. The analysis concluded that, although 
there were disparities among national audience measurement systems, 
the use of audience measures to examine pluralism across the EU is 
both valid and practically feasible. It takes the consumer as the point of 
reference and will therefore be of maximum effectiveness in relation to 
the objective sought, namely that of serving the interests of the media 
consumer. One has to remember though that the study was 
commissioned by DG XV which would very much want a definite 
statement on the application of audience measures as indices of 
pluralism. It comes as no surprise that the GAH Group's findings are in 
line with the DG XV's wishes, as many times although not necessarily 
the employee wishes to satisfy the employer. 
32 Audience Measurement in the EC, Internal Report prepared for DG XV E/5 by the GAH Group. 
September 1993, p1 -104; Feasibilitý, of Using Audience Measures to Assess Pluralism, 
Position 
Paper, prepared for DG XV E/5 by the GAH Group, November 1994, pl-38. 
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In fact, there has been much criticism of the GAH Group's work. 
Leighton Andrews (1995: 26), head of Worldwide Corporate Affairs 
BBC, stated that the study 'simply demonstrates that comparable 
audience data is available across the EU, it does nothing to make the 
argument as to why audience share is the most suitable measure of 
dominance'. As mentioned above, the EC's consultants came to the 
conclusion that despite the differences in national audience 
measurement systems the measures are comparable and compatible and 
can be the basis of uniform thresholds to be applied throughout 
Europe. However, it left a number of questions unresolved. In 
particular, the question of weighting the audience of different types of 
media such as TV, radio and the press and the question of where to fix 
the thresholds. Of course the latter is a matter of media policy but, due 
to the great heterogeneity of the current European media map, it will 
be very difficult (if not impossible) to find a political consensus on such 
a threshold at a European level. 
The first problem - the establishment of market shares based on the 
number of people reached by each medium - is equally difficult to 
solve. How is it possible to create an overall market share of, say, a 
company holding 20 per cent of the TV market, 10 per cent of the 
national newspaper market and 5 per cent of the radio sector? As 
Robinson et. al. (1995: 59) argue, 'we need to find some robust and 
objective method of constructing a weighted average of these three 
market shares to arrive at a single figure for the media market as a 
whole'. The absence of a weighting will lead to false results as the GAH 
Group's analysis reveals. The EC's consultants recommended the use of 
daily reach as an indicator of influence. As demonstrated by the 
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National Economic Research AssociateS33 the use of daily reach in the 
UK media market gives a high weighting to television and radio and a 
low weighting to the press (see Table 4-3). According to NERA, this is 
because most people have ready access to all TV and radio stations 
every day, and can switch between them in deciding what to watch or 
listen to. Nevertheless, they generally choose one or two newspapers a 
day and cannot pick and choose content from one or another. This 
results in a much smaller number of daily contacts for the press, which 
is not necessarily a measure of relative influence. 
Table 4.3 
Use of Reach Wei2htinp- in the UK Media Market (1994) 
Sector Weighting Total Daily Reach Contacts 
Television 55.3% 133,815,268 
Radio 18.9% 45,714,000 
National Press 15.6% 37,578,186 
Regional Press 10.2% 24,715,286 
Total 100% 241,822,740 
Source: NERA, based on data supplied by BARB (television), RAJAR (radio) and 
Pressad/JICREG, Newspaper Society, ABC, NRS (newspapers) 
Note: TV reach is based on people over the age of 4; other reach figures are based on 
adults over the age of 15 
Undoubtedly it will be difficult to develop a suitable and generally 
accepted method of ascertaining these figures. One such method, taking 
into account the different sizes of, and power wielded by, different 
media, has been proposed by the British Media Industry Group, 34 a 
consortium of four big newspaper groups (Associated Newspapers, the 
Guardian Media Group, Pearson and the Telegraph Group) set up in 
33 NERA, Economic Consultants Methods of Media Market Measurement, a study for the 
Department of National Heritage, London, August 1995. 
34 BMIG, A New Approach to Cross-Media Ownership, a study for the Department of National 
Heritage, London, February 1995. 
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August 1993. Their study uses the well-e stabli shed audience figures to 
calculate market shares for television and radio, and circulation figures 
to assess market shares for newspapers. In calculating overall share of 
voice in the UK media market, they recommend that radio listening be 
down-weighted by 50% compared with newspaper circulation and TV 
viewing. BMIG justify these weightings on the grounds that radio has 
lower impact on diversity of view issues, either due to the prevalence 
of music-based radio formats, or because radio is normally consumed 
in parallel with other activities. 
According to the study thus 1% of newspaper circulation or TV 
viewing is deemed to have more impact on diversity of view issues than 
1% of radio listening. So their suggested weighting is 28.6% for 
television, 28.6% for national press, 28.6% for regional press and 
14.3% for radio. Their findings, shown in Table 4.4, give BBC the 
highest audience share (19.7%). The next top two places are occupied 
by News International on 10.6% and ITV network combined on 
9.4%. 35 The top 8 media firms have 57.4% of national share of voice. 
The main advantage of the BMIG approach is that it treats television, 
national newspapers and regional titles equally. The inclusion of 
regional papers, in particular, is a positive step towards realising that it 
is not only the national market that matters but local/regional 
monopolies should also be tackled. Further, the selection of the most 
appropriate units to measure market shares for each medium 
(circulation for national and regional papers, share of viewing for 
terrestrial TV, cable and satellite, and share of listening for regional 
and local radio) provides a more or less accurate picture of market 
shares within each media sector. 
35 The ITV network figure is a London Economics estimate using BMIG methodology. 
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Table 4.4 
Media Concentration in the UK Under Audience Share 
Analvsis (1993/94) 
Media Groups % share of audience 
BBC 19.7 
News Intemational plc 10.6 
(ITV Network)* 9.4 
Daily Mail & General Trust plc 7.8 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd 7.6 
United Newspapers plc 5.7 
Carlton Communications plc 3.1 
Channe14 2.9 
Total as a% of papers/TV/radio 57.4 
Source: BMIG (February 1995), Robinson et al. [London Economics (LE)], 1995 
Note: Radio down-weighted by 50% 
* LE estimate using BMIG methodology 
This last point however becomes a disadvantage when it comes to 
measuring aggregate shares. Robinson et. al. (1995: 59) argue that it is 
inconsistent to measure shares in the printed media market on the basis 
of circulation (which is essentially a household based measure) while 
using audience shares (which count individual viewers) for the 
electronic media. As the EC's consultants showed, it is more consistent 
to use readership figures when it comes to comparing different 
media. 36 Another problem with the study is that it does not give any 
weight to consumer periodicals. A further criticism to the share of 
voice approach is that it, including the BBC and Channel 4, 
underestimates the way the rest of Britain's media ownership is 
concentrated in so few private hands (Peak and Fisher, 1995: 227). The 
36 Many economic consultants such as GAH Group, NERA and BMIG itself recogn, se that 
newspaper readership would be a theoretically better measure for the purposes of ensuring diversity of 
view. However, they all agree that newspaper circulation figures are a more established currency in the 
media industry. Moreover, not all European countries publish reliable readership figures. Anyway, 
percentage share of newspaper circulation is in practice not very different from percentage share of 
readership. 
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most serious problem with the BMIG approach though is their 
unreasonable decision to down-weight radio listening by 50% 
compared with the other media. It is true that radio lost much of its 
appeal after the appearance of television. It is also true that radio is 
mostly an entertainment medium and there has been a proliferation of 
music-based radio formats. It is finally true that radio can be listened to 
while people are engaged in other activities. All these points make 
radio seem as a 'secondary medium'. But they do not prove that radio 
is less influential and of less importance to diversity of news. The 
influence of news-based radio formats, broadcasting news, current 
affairs and other programmes devoted to commentary and opinions is 
considerable. 37 Even music-dominated radio stations have regular news 
bulletins normally announced every hour. No matter whether one 
accepts that the influence of radio is less than that of television or the 
written press, BMIG's proposal to down-weight its influence to 50% is 
both arbitrary and gives no objective justification. 
There has been no objective basis so far for the choice of weights. It 
has proved difficult to identify satisfactory criteria for a measure 
which successfully aggregates media with very different patterns of 
consumption and use. This difficulty is inherent in another study, the 
Arthur Andersen's analysis, which uses a single unit of measurement 
for the cultural market. In order to measure company shares in that 
market, Shew used the time that the public actually spends on media. 
Here, the potential of the mass media to influence public opinion is 
37 The Greek national commercial news-based radio station Sk-N', for instance, currently attracting the 
largest audience share at 15.7% (ICAP HELLAS SA, April 1995), is said to influence a considerable 
section of the Greek population. Many are prepared to accept that the defeat of the conservative party 
on the 1993 general elections was due to the change of attitude of its owner Alafouzos (who also 
controls a large number of other national stations and titles) who decided to support the Socialists (see 
Papathanassopoulos, 1994: 245-98). Radio in Greece thus can set the political scene and is regarded as 
more influential than other media. 
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assessed best by examining how people distribute their time over them. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of applying this methodology. What is 
interesting is that the amount of time spent watching BBC and ITV is 
nearly twenty five times as great as that spent reading News 
International's newspapers. In fact, there is an obvious exaggeration of 
the impact of TV compared to the press, since no other press groups 
appear in the top seven. 
Table 4.5 
Media Concentration in the UK Under Time-use Analysis 
(1993) 
Media Groups % of time spent 'consum 
BBC 44.1 
(ITV Network)* 25.4 
Carlton Communications pIc 6.9 
Channe14 6.2 
Granada Group pIc 4.1 
Capital Radio pIc 3.4 
News Intemational pIc 3.4 
Total as % of the press TV & radio . 
93.5 
Source: Shew (Arthur Andersen) 1994, Robinson et al. (LE) 1995 
* LE estimate using Arthur Andersen methodology 
In the Andersen's study each controller's individual share of the total 
media market is calculated as the share of his/her medium in the total 
time spent by the public consuming media. This definition may be both 
too vague and too limited. It is vague because it does not tackle the 
nature of the media consumed. For instance, how much of the time 
watching TV is spent viewing news and how much sports? Moreover, 
one could not treat equally time spent reading The Guardian and time 
spend reading The Racing Post (both national newspapers). A greater 
value should be added to the former title due to in-depth coverage of 
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current affairs. Regarding the different media, it may also be false to 
use the time standard for assessing their impact on the public. One hour 
TV watching (which is normally passive) may not be comparable to 
one hour newspaper reading (which requires greater effort). It seems 
safe to argue that the influence of the latter is greater. Equally, it is 
hard to compare the influence of a 15-minute news bulletin with that of 
a newspaper headline on the same topic which is on display the whole 
day and can be read by thousands or even millions of passers-by. In the 
latter case, the item is most probably being watched for a fleeting 
moment. ) 
but its influence lies in the fact that it is being watched by 
many people. The analysis is also too limited. Although it includes 
reading periodicals, it excludes viewing of pre-recorded videos, which 
are a direct substitute to television viewing. 
These fundamental problems aside, Shew argues that where there is 
cross-ownership of different media by the same controller, his/her 
share is arrived at simply by summing each of his/her channels' or 
titles' shares in the total time spent by the public consuming media. 
Therefore, if owner A controls both channel X and paper Y, which 
take up 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of the public's total 
time, then A's share in the hypothetical total cultural market is said to 
be 30 per cent. Similarly, in case he/she controls only a fraction of a 
channel or title, his/her share is calculated as that same fraction of the 
time devoted by the public to that particular channel or title, relative to 
the total time spent consuming media: if controller B has 25 per cent 
share in channel Z, which is found to account for 40 per cent of the 
public's total 'consuming media' time, then B is said to control 10 per 
cent of the total market for ideas. 
Methods of Measuring Media Concentration 210 
This methodology is troublesome and biased towards both television 
relative to the press and national channels and titles relative to 
regional/local ones. It artificially inflates the market share of television 
and particularly of national channels, while it understates the relative 
importance of the press and of all regional/local channels and titles. 
This is because the average weekly hours spent watching TV are nearly 
seven times as great as those reading the press (according to the study, 
it is 24.1 hours for TV against 3.5 for papers), so the apparent market 
'influence' of a TV controller will be vastly more significant than that 
of a newspaper publisher if measured in this way. If, in addition, the 
issue of the effective geographical coverage of a channel or title is 
ignored, it is hardly surprising that the total time spent with a 
regional/local channel by all viewers in a particular area will be small 
in relation to the aggregated time spent by a national audience watching 
a national channel. To illustrate, watching Carlton television is not an 
option for those who live outside the London area, and it is therefore 
meaningless to calculate Carlton's national market share as the time 
spent by anyone watching Carlton over the total time spent by the 
public consuming all media nation-wide. It is obvious that Carlton is 
share will be dwarfed relative to media with national coverage such as 
the BBC. 
A partial refinement of the Arthur Andersen approach has been 
provided by London Economics. 38 That study attempted to weight the 
respective UK media shares by some measure of the inherent impact of 
the medium. The analysis proxies this by the amount that advertisers 
are prepared to pay to reach a consumer audience through a particular 
medium. It formed the following hypothesis: if advertisers pay 
38 London Economics, Pluralism and Concentrath-m M the Media Sector, April 1995. 
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according to the relative impact they believe a particular medium has, 
then the relative price per consumption minute across media provides a 
market-based approach to cross-media weighting. This is shown in 
Table 4.6, where the analysis estimated the relative cost of advertising 
across media in Britain using relative advertising cost per viewer 
minutes spent on the media. The advertising-based weightings suggest 
that the printed media are significantly more important, and radio far 
less significant, than in the Arthur Andersen paper. 
Table 4.6 
Relative Advertisin2 Costs in the UK Media Market (1994) 
Medium f per hour* per capita 
Television 1.16 
Radio 0.22 
Newspapers 2.52 
Cinema 2.66 
Magazines 2.82 
Source: Advertising Association handbook, 1994; Arthur Andersen, 1994; London 
Economics analysis, 1995 
* of viewing, listening to or reading advertisements. London Economics analysis 
makes the assumption that people spend the same time on advertisements for each hour 
of reading newspapers and magazines, as for each hour of viewing or listening to 
commercial television or radio 
The London Economics study re-calculated the Arthur Andersen 
estimates of audience share using a methodology in which the time 
devoted to each media sector is given a weight which reflects its value 
to advertisers (as shown in the above table). The effect, as presented in 
Table 4.7, is to enhance the market share attributed to the press at the 
expense of television and radio. In particular, the BBCs share falls 
from 44.1% to 28.3%, Capital Radio's share falls from 3.4% to 0.3%. 
whereas News International's share rises from 3.4% to 12.5%. These 
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results demonstrate how sensitive the final outcome is to input 
assumptions. This methodology however, as London Economics itself 
admits, remains subject to the basic objections made above to Arthur 
Andersen approach, namely the problems with product and market 
definitions. For example, the figure of Capital Radio would rise if the 
study took the London metropolitan area as the relevant market - which 
would be appropriate for Capital Radio, as metropolitan London is the 
limit of its broadcast range. 
Table 4.7 
Alternative Measures of UK Media Concentration 
Media Group Simple time use* Weighted time use** 
BBC 44.1% 28.3% 
Carlton Communications plc 6.9% 9.8% 
Channe14 6.2% 5.5% 
Granada Group plc 4.1% 6.9% 
Capital Radio plc 3.4% 0.3% 
News Intemational plc 3.4 % 12.5% 
Source: London Economics, 1995 
* Arthur Andersen analysis 
** Using time data from Arthur Andersen paper modified to reflect the different value 
of time to advertisers in different media 
4.4.5 Critique of all Audience-based Measures 
Mono-media market measures 
Overall, there are a number of aspects that should be considered in 
methodologies which set out to examine mono-media or multi-media 
cultural power in terms of audience. The relative influence of a 
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communication vehicle depends on a number of different factors. It 
obviously depends on the number of people it can reach39 -a 
newspaper sold to one million people will tend to have more influence 
than one which reaches only fifty thousand people. However, the fact 
that a newspaper is bought (something that can be measured) does not 
necessarily mean that it is read, or read by only one person (readership 
is much harder to measure than circulation). Furthermore, a title that is 
read carefully will have more influence than one which is merely 
La skimmed, and whereas we can use surveys to find out how many peopm. 
read each newspaper, it is impossible to know how carefully they read 
them, or what they read in them. Serious news, current affairs and 
political comment compete for the readers' attention with sport and the 
TV listings. Moreover, it is difficult to establish whether publications 
with more editorial content count for more influence. Some 
newspapers (particularly the Sunday titles) are fat because they offer 
readers a choice of specialist material which is not opinion- forming. 
Finally, there is the problem with the weekly and Sunday press. Should 
the latter be given one sixth the weight of the daily press, in proportion 
to the average daily reach of each? There are two problems with this 
assumption: first, weekly papers tend to have a longer read period; 
second, multiplying the circulation figures for daily newspapers by six 
to produce a weekly circulation figure and putting them together in 
terms of a weekly market (as the BMIG did), presupposes that daily 
and Sunday papers are entirely substitutable for readers. This however 
is a strong assumption to make. The Sunday Times, for example, 
dominates the UK Sunday quality newspaper market but its sister paper 
39 'Reach' is the number of people who have a contact with a publication or channel within a certain 
time period. The measure is sensitive both to the length of time over which it is measured and to the 
definition of contact used. For instance, the weekly reach of a radio station is the number of people 
who tune in at least once a week, while daily reach or hourly reach is necessarily rather smaller. Reach 
of TV broadcasts is typically measured by counting contacts of at least fifteen seconds and reach for 
radio is typically measured by counting contacts of at least five minutes (see ESOMAR, 1994,1995). 
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The Times has a much lower market share of the quality newspaper 
daily market (see ABC figures, June 1996). 
Similarly for the TV programme to have any influence, the set must be 
switched on and tuned to the right channel, which can be measured 
electronically. In some countries, like the Netherlands, Germany and 
Britain, there are also surveys which establish who is watching it and 
for how long. But the degree of attention with which it is being 
watched is almost impossible to establish. Another dimension to the 
problem concerns who is in the audience. A programme or newspaper 
article that reaches a single person may have a lot more influence than 
one which reaches a million if the single person happens to be the 
President of the State. Programmes and articles which regularly reach 
opinion formers and policy makers such as members of the parliament, 
editors and journalists clearly have influence which cannot be measured 
just by counting heads. Thus what counts is not simply how many 
people watch (and read and listen) as the BMIG assumed, but who 
watches and what they watch. 
'Reach' in general is less attractive as a measure of the influence of 
broadcast media. People who contact a broadcaster may rapidly switch 
away from it, in contrast to the press. People typically contact several 
TV channels or radio stations each day to find out what is on. That 
results in a measure that shows little difference from channel to 
channel. In addition, people spend more time with some channels than 
others in proportions that are not reflected in all national daily reach 
statistics. On the other hand, people have less opportunity to flick 
between press publications than between broadcast channels. Therefore, 
the total number of daily contacts for television and radio is much 
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greater than the total number of daily contacts with the press. This does 
not reflect relative influence. What does reflect is the much shorter 
decision period the audience has in deciding where to spend its time in 
the different media. 
Time spent consuming media is intuitively attractive as a measure of 
influence. The distinct advantage of this approach is that time use is a 
common denominator across all media. Thus if there is any validity in 
the basic proposition that the influence of a medium of communication 
is proportional to the time taken to absorb the message, the time use 
measure can be used to assess concentration across all media. Time can 
be used as a measure of market share in each medium, and by simply 
summing the time use across all media we can calculate an overall 
market share. Audience time may be suitable for the measurement of 
the broadcast media influence because programmes are viewed at the 
same speed by everyone, so that time may be a good indicator of 
content taken in. The problem is that the time that people spend to 
watch television or listen to the radio is certainly not the most suitable 
indicator to establish impact over them. Time spent watching or 
listening to the media does not necessarily reflects influence. Apart 
from this problem, which is common in all audience-based criteria, 
there is the issue that television and radio, in particular, can be a 
backdrop to household activity. High audience hours may arise as a 
consequence of the broadcast being used as background to other 
activities. 
The methodological weaknesses of audience time measures are more 
apparent in the press for a number of reasons. Firstly, reading speed is 
variable, so that reading time becomes less attractive as a measure of 
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the influence of the print media. Secondly, the newspaper reader can 
focus on what is of interest and value for him/her and ignore the rest. 
According to how much 'filling' the reader chooses to edit out, similar 
levels of 'influence' might be achieved in very different lengths of time 
spent with the publication. Thirdly, and according to Arthur Andersen 
study described above, the amount of time spent reading national 
newspapers is nearly seven times less than time spent watching TV. 
This figure may substantially exaggerate the impact of television 
compared to the printed medium. However, national newspapers have 
an impact that lasts longer than the time spent reading them. Newspaper 
headlines are seen by, and influence, millions of people who may not 
buy them. But it is the newspaper headlines that largely determine the 
current affairs agenda at the start of each day, and that influence 
persists even though news sources of information are obtained from 
television in the evening. There is indeed extensive discussion of press 
opinions in other media, perhaps because the press is permitted to give 
opinion whereas broadcasters (particularly public service broadcasters) 
are constrained to treat news 'impartially'. 
Having explored, to some extent, the pros and cons of the audience- 
based criteria, our impression is that time measures are preferable for 
broadcast media than reach measures. The nature of TV and radio 
means that reach or contact with a station can happen almost 
incidentally as people switch between channels searching for one that 
captures their attention. Data for television viewing is readily available 
and reliable, whereas radio listening data are adequate for the majority 
of the stations in all European Union countries (see ESOMAR, 1995). 
Concerning the print media, daily reach might better reflect the 
influence of the press than time spent reading, as for the most part 
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people buy newspapers with the intention of reading them. Also data on 
time spent reading is either non-existent or unreliable. The choice 
between circulation or readership as the reach measure is difficult. 
Arguably, the influence of newspapers depends more on the number of 
readers than on the number of copies sold, just as the influence of TV 
programmes depends more on the number of viewers than on the 
number of sets tuned. Therefore newspaper readership would be a 
theoretically better measure of influence of the printed media. 
Readership data though is not available for Portugal, Greece and 
Northern Ireland and is not collected on a regular basis for many 
regional titles. This would create insoluble problems in case we want to 
establish a Europe-wide regulation based on this criterion. By contrast, 
circulation data is the most robust and comprehensive audience measure 
for the press. It is thus a more established currency in the industry. In 
practice though, and as the GAH (1994), BMIG (1995) and NERA 
(1995) studies found, percentage share of newspaper circulation is not 
very different from percentage share of readership. 
The aggregation of media market measures 
Once a satisfactory method of calculating audience shares within each 
media sector has been devised, some method is required to compare 
audience shares across media. A likely policy aim of deregulating 
media ownership rules at national or even European levels is to allow 
cross-media ownership in a manner which is proportionate. Put it 
another way, the permitted holdings in one sector of the media would 
be subject to the size of holdings in other sectors of the media. 
However, there is no obvious solution to the problem of creating an 
overall market share. If a particular company has 15 per cent of the 
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television market, 20 per cent of the press market and 5 per cent in 
radio, what is its share of the total media market? We have to devise a 
method of calculating an average market share of the whole media. If 
shares in each sector are measured in the same dimension, for example 
a consistent reach statistic (as recommended by the GAH Group), then 
there is a natural method of aggregation by adding all the shares. If, 
however, market shares within the media are measured in ways which 
are not directly comparable (and this would be wiser since, as we 
explained above, some measures are more suitable for the press and 
others more preferable for broadcast media), then a weighted average 
of all market shares must be constructed in order to arrive at a single 
figure for the media market as a whole. 
A weighting can be based on some objective data which, one might 
assume, compares the relative influence shares of the media on an 
aggregate basis. A weighting could also be constructed on policy 
grounds, reflecting a policy view of the relative influence of the media, 
which may or may not be based on some objective information. As 
shown in great detail above, the BMIG falls down on the arbitrary 
nature of its weighting system. Their approach uses audience figures to 
calculate market shares for radio and television and circulation figures 
to calculate the market share for newspapers. They then construct an 
average share of the overall media market by assigning weights of one 
to television, national and regional newspapers, and 0.5 to radio. 
However, there is no objective justification for the arbitrary figure of 
0.5, especially as it is far from obvious that radio has a low level of 
news and current affairs compared to other media. The London-based 
Capital Radio FM and the nation-wide Virgin Radio, for example, both 
music-based radio formats, have regular news bulletins as well as other 
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programmes devoted to commentary and opinions. This is a pattern 
followed by most radio stations. The other problem with the approach 
is that it is not consistent to measure shares in the printed media market 
on the basis of circulation (which is basically a household-based 
measure) while using audience figures (which count individual viewers) 
for TV and radio. 
As the European Commission's consultants stated, it would have been 
more consistent to use newspaper readership, rather than circulation, as 
the basis of comparison. So they recommended the use of daily average 
contacts as a measure of the overall market share. This method 
however results in a much smaller number of daily contacts for the 
press (see Table 4.3 above), which is not necessarily a measure of 
relative influence. A weighting could also be based upon the hours of 
use or audience time of the media (Arthur Andersen's approach). The 
idea of using hours of use as the basis of a weighting appears intuitively 
appealing until one sees what figures it implies (see Table 4.5 above). 
People spend very much more time with television and radio than with 
the press. Most people would not find it credible that the press has such 
small influence in relation to other media. In addition, the data for the 
average time spent reading the press is well known to be unreliable. 
But the major problem associated with this approach is that it seems 
intuitively unlikely that time spent consuming media directly proxies 
the influence of a particular medium. The influence deriving from the 
intrinsic impact of the medium and the influence due to the number of 
minutes for which the medium is consumed are being conflated. 
It seems to us that a much more appropriate way of measuring overall 
market shares and possibly influence across media would be to weight 
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the respective audience shares by advertising expenditure. By 
examining the behaviour of advertisers, that is, by examining how 
much advertisers are prepared to spend on which medium, we will 
have a more thorough picture of the relative influence of the media. 
Advertisers pay according to the relative impact they believe a 
particular medium has. They buy space in national and regional 
newspapers and time on television because of beliefs regarding the 
influence of those media. They also recognise that it is not just the 
number of viewers, listeners and readers that matters; it is who they 
are. Therefore, advertising expenditure on the media provides a 
reasonable market-based approach to cross-media weightings. This can 
be shown in practice. London Economics analysis, for instance, 
attempted to weight the respective time spent media shares (Arthur 
Andersen's approach) by the amount that advertisers pay to reach 
consumers through a particular medium. The chief merit of the 
London Economics approach, the results of which are shown in Table 
4.7 above, is that it finds that the printed media are significantly more 
important than in the Arthur Andersen analysis. The time devoted to 
each media sector is given a weight which reflects its value to 
advertisers and the effect is the enhancement of market shares 
attributed to the press at the expense of the electronic media. 
Data robustness 
A necessary condition for using audience measures to assess 
concentration levels and pluralism within local, national or supra- 
national markets also depends on the quality and comprehensivity of the 
surveys in use. In an ideal world, surveys would measure every single 
television and radio channel, and every single newspaper title 
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uniformly and with equal precision and accuracy across the European 
Union. The existence of regular surveys is hardly a problem as all EU 
Member States (with the exception of Luxembourg) possess their own 
national surveys for TV, press and radio. There is also a certain level 
of continuity of data collection in the EU, as all current TV surveys 
collect audience data on all days of the year, and the majority of press 
and radio surveys collect data across at least ten months of the year (see 
ESOMAR, 1994,1995). But it is also essential that audience surveys 
are comprehensive in their coverage of the media. A specific limitation 
of television audience measurement is the restriction of almost all 
national surveys to measuring viewing in the home, although some 
(such as Italy and Sweden) measure guest viewing and treat it as a 
substitute for out-of-home television viewing in other TV homes. 
Regarding press readership surveys, their main drawback is their 
limited coverage of titles. In the case of newspapers, readership surveys 
invariably cover all the national distributed titles, but there are some 
big gaps in the coverage of regional titles in France (see ESOMAR, 
1995). By contrast, circulation data are quoted for almost every 
newspaper and virtually all are audited. 40 Regarding radio surveys, the 
one instance where a radio survey appeared to give well below full 
coverage of stations was the Dutch Intomart survey, which excluded the 
non-commercial local stations (ibid. ). 
There is also the issue with the universality of coverage. Almost all 
national surveys measure media consumption across national universes. 
However, the Greek AGB Hellas (television) covers urban areas only, 
whereas the Portuguese Bareme (press and radio) covers mainland 
40 This is one of the reasons that many economic consultants such as GAH Group, NERA and BMIG 
prefer circulation figures to readership figures in studying levels of media concentration. 
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Portugal. Geographical restrictions, as between urban versus rural 
areas, could have a significant effect on measures of total audience, 
where significant variations exist in media availability that coincide 
with the geographic restrictions. The problem really only arises for 
some media in Greece and Portugal. In addition, there is the issue of 
harmonisation of measures. It is important for supra-national 
framework legislation that audience measures are comparable across 
borders. The GAH Group report concluded that comparability is not a 
significant obstacle for the construction of audience maps. The 
European Commission's consultants found that national surveys within 
each media category all employ the same fundamental concepts of 
media consumption, even where the methodologies vary (as with 
'Recent Reading' and 'First Read Yesterday' measures of reading). And 
although TV surveys are divided between those which treat viewing as 
presence in room with TV set switched on and those which require 
individuals to be present and watching, the end differences are almost 
certainly negligible. So cross-border comparisons are broadly feasible. 
In future though, with the expected increase in the number of media 
outlets, it is possible that the quality of the data will decline unless the 
industry spends more money on increasing the size of survey samples. 
Perhaps more crucially, as new opinion-formers operate through the 
Internet, it will become increasingly difficult to measure their 
I audience'. While it is possible to calculate the number of 'hits' on an 
individual Web site or bulletin board, it would be quite unrealistic to 
know how long each hit lasted, or what percentage of them came from 
outside the country. As technology develops, cross-media measurement 
based on audience share will become more and more difficult to realise 
unless further research is conducted. There are some encouraging signs 
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though. The Audit Bureau of Circulations initiated a plan in January 
1996 to measure the readership figures for UK on-line titles and the 
results of its trials should come out later this year. The plan is to 
provide advertising agencies with a certificate showing how many 
people have registered for the site and how many have visited it in the 
last month. A bit of software, running on the same computer as the 
electronic publication, will make random checks and e-mail some of 
those who have registered to make sure they exist (see the Guardian, 
Monday February 5 1996, pp. 12-13). It remains to be seen whether 
the trials will succeed. 
4.5 CONCLUSION - ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
In this chapter, we tried to analyse critically different methods of 
measuring media concentration and influence. The relevance of the 
existing counting criteria (i. e. rules based on the number of channels 
controlled by a single operator) was briefly reviewed, followed by an 
analysis of the audience and revenue-based units. Although it became 
evident that numerical rules are not appropriate on their own to 
measure levels of concentration in the multimedia era, it might not be 
right to abandon them altogether. Many, including the European 
Commission, argue that today it does not matter how many outlets one 
owns, but how much revenue or audience he/she reaches. However, we 
will agree with Steven Barnett that ownership still matters. It seems to 
us that it is not acceptable, from a pluralism point of view, for one 
owner having the majority of a country's opinion-forming TV channels 
broadcasting news bulletins or current affairs, even when these 
channels reach small audiences and obtain negligible amount of 
commercial revenue. This is because, under these conditions, the 
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proprietor will be free to exercise excessive power to advance his/her 
own political and socio-cultural views. The controller of a large 
number of titles and/or channels disseminating political commentary 
can easily pursue the values and political beliefs he/she espouses. He/she 
may also be in a position to influence the outcome of an election, as the 
Greek example described above clearly indicates. In addition, he/she 
may cater only to bourgeois tastes and not to others so as the latter 
cannot gain public exposure. 
Such influence may not only be dictated by political and socio-cultural 
considerations but also by commercial or other considerations. 
Monopoly or excessive control of a number of channels may allow 
proprietors to promote a particular economic philosophy (foster, for 
instance, positive attitudes towards free enterprise and unbridled 
competition). Although the question of whether media controllers' 
influence over what people think is much disputed (precisely because 
influence is hard to measure), another example may help us to form a 
clearer opinion of the matter. In 1989 in Britain, the Broadcasting 
Research Unit (BRU) examined some opinion data collected by the then 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (now Independent Television 
Commission) on whether people thought the licence fee was the proper 
way of paying for the BBC. Murdoch's newspapers (and The Sun in 
particular) opposed the BBC and its licensing system. They did so 
because Murdoch was preparing to launch his satellite channel BSkyB 
at that time and wanted as few competitors as possible in order to 
provide a major boost to News International's UK television interests. 
The BRU found big differences in opinion between readers of News 
International newspapers and non-readers: 37% of News International's 
readers approved of the BBC's funding system while 56% disapproved: 
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but amongst non-readers, the position was reversed [nearly half 
approved (49%), whereas 44% disapproved]. According to Barnett 
(1993: 17) one cannot be absolutely sure that the result was due to 
Murdoch papers' editorial line which developed a general feeling of 
opposition to the licence fee between their readers. Barnett however 
adds that such enormous differences can scarcely be coincidental 
Media concentration in political coverage and commentary (where 
pluralism matters greatly), but also in philosophy and opera criticism, 
science and business, entertainment, 41 etc. is thus not tolerable. 
Performances in the media affect such varied aspects of national life as 
dress codes, political opinions, religious beliefs and so on. At least 
potentially, undue concentration in cross-media ownership might lead 
to an over-enthusiasm for particular parties, or to excesses of approval 
or disapproval of particular forms of dress, among other things. 
Television, radio and the press have a unique role in the free 
expression of ideas and opinion, and thus in the democratic process. 
The main objective must therefore be to secure a plurality of sources of 
information and opinion and a plurality of editorial control over them. 
Public policy has to ensure that viewers, listeners and readers benefit 
from the multi-media revolution and that a provision of a number of 
opinions from different sources are available. Ownership restrictions 
should thus be maintained. It is imperative though that they are 
supplemented with audience and/or revenue-based measures, since 
41 Many would argue that the owner of a large number of thematic channels providing light 
entertainment, music or sports does not represent a threat to pluralism. It is true that in this case the 
issues are different because the reasons for not having monopoly or excessive control are largely 
economic (i. e. unfair competition, exclusive rights) rather than cultural/political. Anyway, since \, kc 
expect packages of thematic channels to develop, consisting of both light entertainment and opinion- 
forming channels (Murdoch's strategy, for example), we believe that ownership restrictions should 
be 
maintained and enforced. 
Methods, qf Measuring Media Concentration 226 
using the number of channels or titles as a sole criterion is meaningless 
without some consideration of coverage or financial strength. 
The two different sets of methods illustrated above (audience and 
revenue -based) are said to correspond to two levels of measurement of 
concentration in the information market: the political/cultural or 
pluralism and the economic or concentration of resources. It has been 
put forth that revenue-based methods are close to the traditional 
systems of concentration measurement which permit assessment of the 
existence of a dominant position (concentration of resources), whereas 
audience-based methods are coherent with the cultural/political 
standpoint and can be held to be most effective for measurement of 
pluralism. However, due to the close relationship between economic 
power and pluralism, audience figures could also measure market 
power. In fact, audience-based measures are a form of market share 
measurement, which is a classic economic measurement. 'Audience' are 
the equivalent of measuring sales (i. e. market share), which is a classic 
economic measure of power. Therefore, the distinction between 
economic measures and cultural/political measures is irrelevant. Both 
sets of media market measurement assess market power. In the absence 
of a direct way of establishing 'impact', crude measures based on 
market power (i. e. criteria about market structure) are used instead. 
And what the audience and revenue-based methods are doing is in fact 
that - they evaluate market power. 
The search for the 'best' criterion for measuring concentration levels in 
the media sector has been centred on structure and not on content. 
Neither financial data nor audience figures and certainly not the 
number of media outlets controlled by the same entity are fully reliable 
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indicators of the controller's impact on public opinion. Such an impact 
depends to a large extent on the content of the channel/title, which is 
not taken into account by either of these methods. Ideally, pluralism 
would be best assessed if account was taken of the editorial 
characteristics of the medium in question (type of programme or 
column, editorial opinions, etc. ) and studies were conducted to evaluate 
whether the citizen-consumer genuinely benefits from such diversity. 
However, it would not be possible to assess the content of different 
media and consequently their impact on pluralism/diversity. Studies 
that measure content quantitatively and qualitatively in order to assess 
whether content is balanced and whether it is pluralistic or biased are 
not readily available. Given the complexity of these analyses, it would 
be a very costly and time-consuming exercise (let alone subjective) to 
carry them out for the special use of the media authorities. 
Disaggregating media concentration by content area (i. e. classifying 
individual programmes by type or subject matter) is also impractical 
since most individual media vehicles present content covering a broad 
range of issues. Thus, in the absence of such studies, pragmatic 
solutions based on already available data have to be found and 
enforced. 
Having made that clear that neither end-use based indicators nor 
revenue-based ones can directly measure media firms' impact on public 
opinion, the question is whether it is possible to isolate one of these 
measures and use it as a single unit that would best determine media 
companies' market power (and possibly reveal their impact on public 
opinion indirectly). The currently favoured audience share measure is 
not a subtle measure of cultural power. The GAH study prepared 
for 
the Commission is flawed because, although it offers a useful summary 
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of the availability of audience measures across the European Union, it 
does not assess the suitability of audience share data as a measure of 
'influence'. The problems with the approach of setting uniform 
Community-wide thresholds based on the as yet untested new concept 
of audience share are with the definitions of the relevant market and 
with market share. Regarding the relevant market, audience share 
cannot effectively compare media with entirely different intentions and 
market segments such as a racing magazine and a political commentary. 
In addition, audience share cannot extend to all substitutable products - 
time spent watching pre-recorded videos can be as important as time 
spent viewing scheduled television. Finally, audience share cannot 
compare media with differing geographical reaches - measured on a 
local level the market share of a local TV company can dwarf the local 
share of a national TV channel. 
Regarding market share across media, it is very difficult to compare 
the relative significance of many shares in several different media or 
different media organisations with high shares of a smaller number. It 
might be the case that an individual has a high aggregate market share 
which is spread across many media. This however will cause no 
concern on behalf of the competition or media authorities, since he/she 
does not have formal control over any of the separate media. Secondly, 
media with relatively low audience shares could have higher impact 
than media with high audience shares. The London Financial Times, 
for instance, with a national daily circulation of just under 300,000 , is 
regarded as more influential than, say, The Sun, with a national daily 
circulation of more than 4,000,000 (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 
January 1995). Thirdly, audience shares are constantly changing, and 
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therefore no single limit could be applied with any degree of accuracy 
in practice (BBC, 1995). 
Thus audience shares criteria are not a priori better indicators for 
measuring media concentration than revenue-based ones. The use of 
revenue market shares of whatever kind (advertising, subscriptions, 
sales, grants, licence fees, etc. ) seems to be less problematic since it 
avoids the need to find practical solutions to the various problems 
arising from the use of audience data. Audience data are neither fully 
harmonised nor equally reliable across Europe (see ESOMAR'S 1994 
and 1995 reports). On the other hand, common accounting principles 
already exist. Financial data for different media sectors are easily 
comparable. A system based on financial data would make it easier to 
achieve closer co-operation and synergy effects between the authorities 
responsible for competition and those in charge of the media. Instead of 
building up two completely separate systems, this approach would at 
least make it easier to collect data and to enforce transparency rules. 42 
It should also be mentioned that financial data have the advantage of 
reflecting media consumption - the higher the audience ratings, the 
greater the revenue from advertising; the larger the number of 
subscribers, the greater the revenue from pay-TV fees. 
The main advantages of applying a revenue-based measure are firstly 
that it is a long established and tested method for measuring market 
concentration, and secondly that it provides a common currency of 
measurement across media. However, the NERA 1995 study pointed 
42 As indicated above, the Commission argued that criteria based on company share holdings are used 
by competition law in order to assess the behaviour of proprietors among themselves. The application 
of this standard for measuring media concentration and pluralism would thus duplicate the efforts of 
competition law (COM (94) 353: 42). According to EBU (1995) however, the fact that competition 
law and media law have different objectives, does not automatically imply that they have to use 
different cnteria and methods of measuring market shares. 
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out a number of reasons why revenue may be an inappropriate 
measure: a) excludability. The capability of an enterprise to earn 
revenue depends upon the degree of control it can exercise over those 
who consume it. Most radio and TV broadcasts do not require the 
audience to pay, but rather rely on advertising income or taxation, thus 
not obtaining most of the consumer value of their product. The 
available technology for making broadcast audiences pay is at an early 
stage of development and is still quite expensive. The problem of 
excludability is not present in printed publications, since people usually 
pay a small amount to buy a newspaper or magazine-, b) advertising 
potential. Broadcasts and publications which cover a wide area, or are 
targeted at a general audience, earn less income per unit audience than 
narrow area and special interest broadcasts, because they are less well 
targeted. This distorts the comparison between different types of 
supplier in all media. TV advertising revenue is determined, in part, by 
limits on the number of channels permitted to supply advertising time 
and by limits on the amount of advertising per hour; c) cost structure. 
Different media have different underlying costs, and unless supply is 
heavily constrained (as in the case of television) revenues will, as a 
broad approximation, tend towards costs through the process of 
competition; d) choice of influence over income. A proprietor may 
decide deliberately to forgo income in order to obtain greater 
influence. A media product which is less suited to high value 
entertainment might earn less, despite having much influence; and e) 
relative wealth. A publication aimed at wealthier classes or provided in 
a wealthier area of a country might earn more than others, without 
reflecting any greater influence (NERA, 1995: 13-4). 
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Establishing a method of measuring multimedia concentration on the 
basis of a single unit seems impossible. Some indicators (end-use based) 
come a bit closer to the concept of pluralism since they focus on the 
citizen consumer, while others (revenue-based) correspond more with 
the ways of concentration used in other sectors. But a single audience 
or financial criterion is hardly conceivable. Apart from the problems 
that each criterion pose on its own due, this is mainly because none of 
them has been tested yet for measuring influence. It might be 'safer' 
then if we took both criteria into account at this stage. The difficulty in 
finding a system that is applicable to all information services with their 
different characteristics, leads us to the conclusion that a mix of the two 
methods described above could provide a valuable alternative. 
Combining the two types of measurement depending on the 
configuration of the media in question might provide a quite valid 
method. A combined test involving advertising and/or subscription 
revenues and audience shares (together, of course, with ownership 
restrictions) could effectively measure market power and possibly 
reveal influence on total media consumption. Regarding commercial 
broadcasting, for example, the main measurement of market share is by 
advertising revenue. However, the audience share should also be used 
as an additional measure, since the revenue by advertising and the 
prices for advertising spots almost entirely depend on the share of 
audience for a channel or a certain programme. 
That both methods are needed for an overall and accurate picture of 
concentration in the market-place for ideas could be shown through the 
following example. Let us consider the radio medium whose 
production and distribution costs are obviously lower than those of 
television. Assuming that both media vehicles attract the same audience, 
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the first method, based on end-use (audience), will attribute the same 
degree of market power to both media and consequently the radio 
contact will have identical value to television contact. The second 
method, based on monetary measurement, will attribute varying levels 
of market power to media having the same number of contacts (radio 
contacts will have a lower value than television ones). The two 
different methods thus come up with different measurements of the 
market position of the media. The combination of the two methods of 
measurement (the 'middle way' as we may call it) would eliminate this 
discrepancy and provide an avenue to arrive at a more or less accurate 
picture of concentration levels in the mass media field. 
The fact that a monetary-based measurement is by itself insufficient to 
reveal the exact level of media market power can be shown through 
another example. Revenues, which is the unit of measurement most 
heavily used in competition policy, is clearly related to economic 
power. A company which has a large share of revenues is likely to 
invest a larger portion of its resources in improving the quality of its 
product in order to stay ahead of its competitors. If the investment is 
successful, then the improvement in product quality can result into 
higher market share. In the media domain, a firm must be capable of 
retaining and therefore influencing its audiences, in addition to 
commanding its resources. However, the relationship between revenues 
and influence is far from straightforward and varies across different 
media. Consider a case of a newspaper which cuts its cover price. It 
will increase its circulation and hence its influence, but may reduce its 
revenue (depending both on the elasticity of sales and the importance of 
advertising revenue with respect to cover price). A powerful 
newspaper proprietor with deep pockets, like Rupert Murdoch, who is 
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determined to get his message across at any cost, could simultaneously 
reduce his market share and increase his audience by reduclntc--, the 
cover price of his newspapers. 43 Measuring Murdoch's shares only in 
terms of revenue will probably not reveal the exact strength of his 
market position. But by adding another dimension (i. e. measuring his 
audience share), a more accurate picture of his market position will 
come up. 
Marrying time use data with advertising expenditure data provides a 
more concrete example of our 'middle way' proposals. Advertising 
expenditure is the amount that advertisers pay for advertising, rather 
than the amount the media receive from it, since the former reflects the 
value to purchaser. The difference includes agency commission and the 
costs of producing advertising copy. As Arthur Andersen analysis 
indicated, time spent on television is over seven times more than time 
spent on newspapers. However, advertisers in Britain in 1993 were 
prepared to spend fl. 2 billion on national newspapers and E2.6 billion 
on television advertisements (Advertising Association, Advertising 
Statistics Yearbook 1994). So although TV is much more important 
than newspapers in terms of time use, advertisers only regard it as 
roughly twice as important. Advertisers also consider it essential who is 
in the audience, in addition to how many watch, read or listen. The 
43 As stated elsewhere, Murdoch decided in 1993 to cut the cover price of the Sun from 25p to 20p 
and the cover price of The Times from 45p to 30p. Further cuttings followed. Newspaper company 
results make it difficult to divine exactly how much circulation revenue each one has lost since the 
price war began. Anyway, a cut of j ust Ip would cost the Mirror roughly f 10 million, whereas a 5p 
cut at the Telegraph would cost E13 million (see the Guardian, Monday July 15 1996, p25). These 
estimates do not take into account the enormous sums spent on promotion and the crippling effects on 
newspapers which have been forced to absorb additional costs rather than risk price rises. So although 
we cannot calculate the exact Murdoch's loss, the fact that he increased The Times to 30p in two 5p 
rises in July and November 1995 together with the closure of Today indicate huge losses in revenues 
across his newspaper industry. By contrast, the circulation trend of his empire has been more than 
encouraging. The Times has doubled its sales frorn 1993 to 1996 (selling 724,839 copies in June 
1996 compared to 362,428 in June 1993), while the Sun was selling 3,970,155 copies in June 1996 
compared to 3,464,950 in June 1993 (ABC, 1996). 
Methods qf Measunng Media Concentration 234 
Independent, for instance, is a serious newspaper read by many 
influential people in business, the City, Whitehall and Westminster. So 
although space in the Independent is cheaper than space in the Sun 
(because there are far fewer readers), the cost per reader of advertising 
in the Independent is much higher than that of advertising in the Sun. 
This is illustrated by the advertising rate cards shown in Table 4.8. The 
amount that advertisers are prepared to pay to reach the highly 
influential Financial Times reader would buy access to no less than 
fourteen Sun readers. 
Table 4.8 
Advertisin2 Ratecard Costs of Selected UK National NewsDaDers 
Newspaper f/page f/000 adult readers 
The Sun 28,000 2.84 
DailyMail 22,680 4.80 
Independent 14,000 12.20 
Daily Telegraph 34,500 12.71 
Sunday Times 47,000 13.28 
Financial Times 29,568 39.69 
Source: BRAD, 1994; London Economics, 1995. 
These considerations reinforce the attractions of combining different 
measures for assessing media concentration levels and possibly 
establishing impact. The relationship between money and influence is 
certainly imperfect; however, monetary-based measures do at least take 
into account, in a way that head counts cannot, the fact that the 
influence of any medium depends on who it reaches in addition to how 
many it reaches. Advertising expenditure is thus an important candidate 
dimension in order to calculate influence shares. Nevertheless, although 
it gives us some indication of the influence of radio and TV compared 
to the press, it is hard to construct a consistent statistical measure of 
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influence. The exercise is heroic because print is bought by the column 
inch or page part while radio and television is bought by the second. 
Another point that must be borne in mind when making such attempt is 
that television (and therefore advertising in television) may be more 
influential at prime-time (usually between 8 to 11 pm), when the 
audiences are huge, rather than in day time. And space in newspapers 
may be more influential on some pages than others. We also have to 
make the assumption (as the London Economics study did) that people 
spend the same time on advertisements for each hour of reading the 
press as for each hour of viewing or listening to commercial television 
or radio. All these factors must be taken into account by authorities 
wishing to adopt this model. 
Another possibility in relation to complex combinations of media 
would be to set a percentage of market share in terms of revenue as a 
threshold for further examination of the position. This approach is 
taken in UK monopoly legislation in relation to newspaper ownership. 
Should a media controller breach the pre-determined revenue 
threshold, the argument follows, an audience share test will apply to 
determine whether he/she attracts a high percentage of consumers as 
well. This undoubtedly gives more weight to the economic criterion of 
revenue. The reason why it is considered here is that the sources of bias 
and error are potentially so many in all audience-based measures of 
shares in the aggregate media sector, that policy decisions based on 
such measures alone should be made extremely carefully. A long 
established, crude method for measuring market concentration such as 
revenue may moderate potential inaccuracies of the newly-conceived 
audience-based methods. 
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Finally, a system which can combine different measures such as 
numerical criteria, revenue, audience share and audience time spent 
consuming a medium has been proposed by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC, 1995; Andrew, 1995). According to BBC, a 
weighted points system which combines several measurement criteria 
may represent the most reasonable approach. It should have the 
following characteristics: a) the points system could award a certain 
number of points per channel or title owned according to the particular 
relevant market; b) the weighting by points would allow channel/title 
ownership to be informed by other criteria, rather than being applied 
as a sole criterion; c) the number of points would reflect the revenue, 
audience share and audience time spent which channels/titles in a given 
market typically command-, d) it would be important for the points 
system to be adjustable over time in order to take account of the 
changing impact of different media; e) points thresholds should be set 
to provide an indication of whether organisations are moving into 
positions from which they might have the potential to abuse pluralism, 
and to instigate an in-depth review; and f) the thresholds should be 
designed so as to limit the share of commercial revenues for single 
media (30% of revenues) together with a lower limit (20% of revenues 
across the relevant sectors) for cross media ownership. BBC stated that, 
used in this way, the lack of sophistication of the measure used is less of 
a concern for regulators, since more detailed information can be taken 
into account in the review itself. 
In any case, we are still a bit away from constructing a single indicator 
capable of assessing effectively multi-media concentration. Both the t) 
Commission and several European countries which are in the process 
of changing their national media ownership rules (i. e. Germany, Great 
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Britain) are aware of the need to examine more thoroughly certain 
questions concerning content before any initiative is presented. 
Germany's example, where until recently there seemed to be a clear 
preference for a new system based on audience data while there is now 
a consideration of a model based on commercial revenue, is an 
indication of the confusion over the 'best' possible measure of media 
concentration and influence. There are many possible different ways of 
measuring share of the market. Each one of these measures conveys 
some important information about the markets and the degree of 
influence of each firm within them; however, none is so perfect to 
assess the exact level of influence shares in the media industry. This is 
precisely the reason why we propose the use of a combination of 
measures. An over-reliance on one of the measures may lead to flawed 
policies. The media regulator must gather as much information as 
he/she can about a company's market share; he/she then must compute 
all of the different measures (or those he/she deems necessary to build 
up a complete picture of the market) and examine them carefully. By 
this way, he/she will be able to come to a definite conclusion about a 
potential excessive influence of the company in question. 
Finally, the regulator must ensure that the framework for media 
ownership regulation is clearly set out and not affected by day to day 
fluctuations in companies' shares. Audience shares, circulation, shares 
of revenue and so forth all very materially from day to day or month 
to month, something that may present difficulties. A firm may find 
itself in line with a proposed threshold one month but it may exceed it 
next month, simply owing to its own success relative to its competitors. 
It would not be right if media controllers were required to divest 
because, owing to their own market success, they have crossed some 
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line, quite possibly temporarily. One approach to such a problem 
would be to have delays built in to the rules. If an enterprise crosses 
some pre-determined line, action would only be taken if it were still 
over the line some period later. This would mean that action was not 
taken on temporary fluctuations. It would also give media controllers 
the ability to take corrective action of their own during the delay 
period. A second approach would be to have two limits, a lower one 
which may trigger a discretionary power, and an upper one which 
automatically triggers action or divestment. A third approach, 
suggested by NERA (1995), is to establish that the rules as to what was 
allowed would only come into play at times when mergers and 
acquisitions are proposed, and when licences are applied or re-applied 
for. So, for instance, if a media owner wished to acquire another 
newspaper, this would be prevented if it took him/her over the limit. If 
a TV licence owner went over the limit during the course of the 
licence. ) he/she would be prevented from reapplying. 
CHAPTER 5 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
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This work was initiated by the perception of a number of problems 
arising from the regulation and measurement of the media 
concentration phenomenon for the purposes of safeguarding the public 
interest in the media industry. The problems identified are: the de- 
regulatory moves of the 1980s did not acknowledge sufficiently the 
historic importance and effects of the public interest tradition in the 
media field; media concentration has reached an unprecedented level in 
the Western world under the free market philosophy. That poses a 
danger for the diversity of views and opinions expressed by the media; 
there is great difficulty in assessing accurately the level of media 
concentration in the current multi-media era; none of the proposed 
methodologies of measuring media concentration can effectively assess 
'influence' and establish 'Impact' in the market place for ideas; 
different indicators of assessing concentration are likely to lead to 
disparate conclusions of its level in a given market; a system that is 
applicable to all information services with different characteristics is 
hardly conceivable. These problems were aggravated both by the 
convergence of the communication technologies and the further moves 
at both national and European levels to relax rules concerning media 
ownership. The purpose of the work was to explicate and clarify these 
problems by investigating the historical background and the relevant 
present situation in the media concentration area. The following pages 
contain the conclusions of the research undertaken and the contribution 
of the thesis to the body of knowledge. 
In Chapter one, we analysed the way in which the public interest' in 
communications is affected by developments in the mass 
As already explained, this concept is critical as there is no such thing as an objective public interest. 
The public interest is a hold-all term, which a value 'udgement that can be used, as a rhetorical J 
symbol, to justify widely differing policies. At the lowest common denominator, the public interest 
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communication field. The mass media in the past, particularly the 
electronic ones, were subject to a complex system of regulation on 
grounds of a supposed public interest. They were among the industries 
being recognised in law and custom as 'business affected with a public 
interest', and public regulation was often applied to ensure equity, 
efficiency, fair and adequate provision to all at reasonable prices. The 
technology of telecommunications in both Europe and the United States 
was regarded as natural monopoly and as a public good, and 
governments emphasised the importance of the penetration of the 
technology in assuring access to all citizens at low costs. Broadcast 
media in both continents have taken a similar path of development, 
following the adoption of radio in the early 1920s as a means of 
communication to the general public. Access to the use of the airwaves 
and the permitted uses to which radio (and later television) could be 
put were governed by law, licence or regulation, even where the free 
market resigned, as in the USA. The reasons are many and vary: 
technical reasons and arguments about efficiency and the need to 
manage national resources have played a large part; there has also been 
the widespread assumption that these media have great power in respect 
of the morals of the young, public decency and order; there have also 
emerged the views, as the political and social significance of television 
became appreciated, that access to limited airwaves (as sender or 
receiver) should be allocated in an equitable manner. 
For all these reasons, the communication model widely developed in 
the past in Europe was that of a national media system in which citizens 
were largely dependent on the same, relatively limited, supply of news 
may be considered as referring to a common set of values which the state, legitimated by democratic 
elections, promotes and protects. 
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and culture which was distributed from a centralised metropolitan 
centre. Communication however, once carried out by the state or a 
handful of small firms operating in the context of a single country, has 
today transformed into a global industry characterised by rapid growth 
in the production and distribution of information, opinion and 
entertainment. A complex mosaic of technological, economic, political, 
cultural and even legal forces have undermined the traditional 
regulation of the electronic media and led in the 1980s to the process of 
deregulation, that is, the dismantling of regulatory controls and the 
introduction of competition and of market forces in the media industry. 
The supporters of deregulation (or light touch regulation) in the media 
have put forward the argument that free market conditions can serve 
best the public interest in communications by guaranteeing freedom 
from state control and coercion and by maximising consumer choice. 
In several ways, the media market works towards meeting many of 
these claims. In theory, the free operation of supply and demand could 
provide for access for all 'voices' which can pay for it and for the 
supply of content that satisfies all consumers. Market mechanisms can 
also lead to a continuous process of trial and error, innovation, product 
improvement and flexible response to potential communication needs. 
The market system can thus reflect the demands of would-be receivers, 
whether they are expressed directly by the audience (subscription) or 
indirectly through the advertising market. The market model can also 
stimulate the growth of new channels and new audience markets. The 
outcome can be increased numerical diversity, that is, more channels 
and more choice for consumers. 
From this account, it seems that a well-functioning market will 
maximise the benefits of both senders and receivers. In practice 
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though, the interests of the audience and senders do not always 
coincide. The direct media consumer market (which relies on sales or 
subscription for income and profit) is likely to produce a differentiated 
pattern which caters best (in volume and choice) for higher income 
groups. It is only in cases where less commercial media, with 
'idealistic' communication goals and no profit motive can survive on 
the basis of a small but committed support from their audiences, that 
this 'bias' can be eliminated. The advertising-based variant of the 
market model also operates best in the interests of some categories of 
the audience, since it is inclined to follow lines of income and locality. 
Advertisers choose vehicles for their messages in order to reach 
diversified target groups in a way which suits their own needs. They 
often neglect the poor or marginal groups of media consumers who are 
not very interesting economically. Accordingly the market model is 
likely to reduce the chances for certain kinds of provision, especially 
content of a specific local and regional kind (e. g. in a minority 
language), content dealing with minority problems, or content serving 
less wealthy target groups (including children, old and poor). LeDuc 
(1982), Hoffmann-Riem (1987) and many other scholars, reflecting on 
the new abundance of channels and the process of media deregulation 
in Europe and the USA, are very sceptical about the market having 
delivered any significant increase in alternative programming options 
for the audience. 
Mainly, though not only, because of the limitations described, public 
policy has often aspired to equalise chances of media access, to 
encourage fairer representation and to limit some of the imperfections 
or 'biases' of the market. The aims of public intervention are 
divergent: either to encourage media proprietors to overcome the 
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effects of fundamental inequalities in the society; or to ensure a diverse 
and representative media supply. The forms taken by public policy 
interventions on behalf of diversity vary according to local priorities 
and political cultures. In general, the broadcasting model (described in 
Chapter one), especially in its public service variant, was developed in 
order to promote regional, linguistic, political, cultural and in taste 
levels diversity under conditions of limited channel capacity. Press 
systems have been less open to direct intervention, but measures to 
encourage press diversity are not uncommon. As explored in Chapter 
one, these measures usually involve economic support for new or 
financially weak publications and also the setting of limits to private 
monopoly. Sometimes intervention is openly applied on behalf of 
groups which, for economic reasons, are unable to gain adequate access 
to the media system. In these cases, the intended beneficiaries of public 
intervention are usually political and social groups with less power in 
the market place. Thus communication policy for diversity is often an 
adjunct of wider social and cultural policy, aiming to secure not only 
better access conditions for 'senders' but also a more universal and 
diverse supply for audiences than the market, left to itself, would be 
likely to deliver. 
Diversity as access means that the various media provide adequate 
channels through which all legitimate 'voices' O. e. groups and interests 
which make up the society) can speak to the wider public and express 
and keep alive their own cultural identity. This kind of access allows 
different, critical and oppositional voices to be heard, something that is 
essential to culture, change and choice in a society. As Gamham (1990: 
162) stated., 'it is access to distribution which is the key to cultural 
plurality ... power 
in the cultural sector clusters around distribution, the 
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channel of access to audiences'. Media access can also help people to 
communicate among themselves and therefore keep cohesion and unity, 
especially where members of the same group live far apart. Mass 
media provision cannot of course be a substitute for autonomous and 
informal networks of interpersonal communication. But the media 
touch us closely because they remain a relatively constant part of our 
life experience. Other institutions may have a more powerful impact 
but not a more persistent and lasting one. Family affiliations and 
friendships change as an individual matures and ages. School occupies a 
limited length of our life-time. Only a minority of the population are 
faithful churchgoers. In contrast, the media are part of everyday life 
from early childhood until death and thus establish a pervasive 
intimacy. Furthermore, they have a universality that is absent from 
other institutions. The mass media provide a common set of ideas and 
images which make up the culture that one nation shares. 
Focusing on diversity as access, the central performance question can 
be summarised as 'who receives access to what channels, in what 
degree and on what terms' (McQuail, 1992a, 1992b). The answer 
depends first of all on the number of independent media channels that 
can be reached by the population in a media system. The more such 
channels operating in each region, the more access opportunities for 
different groups. Then the quality of access offered must be looked at. 
Where, for example, different channels are under the same ownership 
or editorial control (thus less independent), or where the programming 
schedule of the channels is filled up with repeats and cheap foreign 
imports, there is little access potential. Unbridled competition, as we 
have seen, encourages these trends and therefore limits the range of 
access diversity. Under free market conditions, the channels of 
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communication give disproportionally less access and attention to some 
topics, groups, actions and institutions on grounds of significance and 
financial earnings. In addition, much depends on the terms under which 
access is given. Some political parties or social groups may get a fair 
share of attention but not on favourable terms. There are two separate 
matters: one of access/attention in terms of media space and time; 
another of quality of treatment. The second refers to the balance, 
objectivity, impartiality and fairness in the presentation of social 
interests. Even if numerically equal or proportional access and 
attention is achieved, the implicit balance of evaluation in content may 
be one-sided. 
The practice of objective reporting of news and current affairs must lie 
at the heart of journalists' task because absence of objectivity often 
results in inaccuracy and tendentiousness. According to Boyer (1981) 
objectivity has the following six elements: balance and even-handedness 
in presenting different sides of an issue; accuracy and realism of 
reporting; presentation of all main relevant points; separation of facts 
from opinion; minimising the influence of the writer's own attitude, 
opinion or involvement; and avoiding slant, rancour or devious 
purpose. However, the journalists' role may conflict with two other 
goals: that of playing some active or advocative part in society, and that 
of providing some interpretation of the events. Other familiar 
conditions of news reporting set limits to the degree of objectivity 
which one expects. There is an enormous volume of potentially 
relevant information (requiring selection more than collection) which 
has to be processed under tremendous pressure of time. Sources may 
not readily supply information and there is often intense compýtition 
with other journalists for the same information. Information has also to 
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be selected and presented to please consumers and to attract attention, 
thus emphasising form more than content. The bureaucratic structural 
organisation of the modern commercial media enterprise can also set 
barriers to objectivity. Within a media organisation nobody advises the 
new employees what to do and how to behave; instead, there is a 
cumulative process of attrition, a sort of self-regulated socialisation 
which makes journalists obedient to the rules set by the 'gatekeepers' 
(i. e. those who decide what is going to be published and what not) 
(White, 1950; McQuail, 1969; Serafetinidou, 1991). In cases where 
journalists have to conform to the rules set out by the keepers of the 
gate, the objectivity and balance in the presentation of information may 
be eliminated. 
The impossibility of complete objectivity has been argued on several 
grounds. One is that the unavoidable process of news selection must 
also entail subjective judgement, of which journalists themselves may 
be unaware (White, 1950). Another is that all events and reports of 
events which are candidates for treatment as news have to be placed in 
wider frames of reference which give them evaluative meanings 
(McQuail, 1992). Thirdly, the omissions, gaps and silences which are 
unavoidable may also be eloquent, reflecting implicit and subjective 
judgements about relevance and assumptions about society and its 
values. Finally, news is always produced within a context of numerous 
and powerful external and internal pressures which might deflect 
journalism from any ideal goal of presenting 'truth'. As we all know, 
the main sources of commercial media finance come from owners or 
controllers and would-be advertisers or sponsors. Proprietorial 
influence on content may conflict with media claims to offer fully 
disinterested truth or independent opinion (Meyer, 1987). There may 
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also be objections on grounds of resulting political bias, particularly 
bias towards business interests and right-wing government. Dependence 
on advertising revenue, or on direct or indirect sponsorship, places 
media under a potential obligation to major commercial interests (The 
European Institute for the Media, 1993). 
One possible solution to these problems would be to provide financial 
measures that would strengthen media organisations and therefore 
guarantee their independence. Subsidies may sometimes be received 
from public funds, either in the form of exceptional economic help for 
financially weak publications (tax relief, loans and grants, direct 
payments, etc. ) or (as with many public broadcasting bodies) as general 
income from taxation or licence fees raised from the public. Other 
sources of income, for instance from political parties, churches, 
educational institutions, minority groups, etc., might even be more 
helpful, as long as the connection between outside interest and the 
medium is made clear. In such cases, 'sponsors' and media public are 
assumed to have a shared interest. We may go even further by arguing 
that editorial statutes safeguarding editorial independence need to be 
established in all European media. These statutes should give journalists 
and editorial departments a certain degree of independence vis-a-vis 
interests of the company and the advertising department. With editorial 
statutes journalists will have the right to maintain basic standards of 
reporting. Editorial judgements will not be subordinated to economic 
pressures, whether from proprietors, advertisers, sponsors, or other 
financial sources (for example, other business interests of a media 
firm). Whether there is potential influence from financial source on 
content this should be controlled and revealed. This can be achieved by 
a clear separation of advertising from editorial content, or by t: ) 
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reporting sponsorship, or by general openness about vested interests. In 
a highly concentrated media market, where few operators control the 
flow of information, editorial statutes at least guarantee a certain level 
of balance in the reporting of news. We therefore fully endorse the 
resolution of 20 January 1994 (OJ C 44,14-02-1994), passed by the 
European Parliament which, not only called on the Commission to act 
in the field of concentration of media ownership but also called for 'a 
proposal for a European framework directive safeguarding journalistic 
and editorial independence in all media'. 
Another major theme of the public interest which relates to the media 
is diversity as variety and choice for the consumer-citizen. According 
to the market-based model of communications, diversity is essentially a 
matter of degree of real choice available to the public. This version of 
the concept is central to the problems surrounding media monopoly 
and is increasingly relevant to the current expansion in the number of 
television channels. The principle of freedom of communication 
presupposes an abundance of channels and choices as desirable 
conditions for a free and democratic society. Proponents of free 
market arrangements claim that the market, left to itself, will deliver 
such benefits (Peacock, 1986; Ve1janovski, 1989). Critics reply that 
channel abundance is no guarantee against the trends towards 
globalisation and concentration of ownership or against homogeneity of 
content, resulting from competition for the same, more or less, 
audience. The relevant question that should be asked is about the 
relationship between choice of channels of communication and choice 
of content offered by these channels. We cannot of course assume that a 
larger number of newspaper titles or television channels available will 
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automatically offer more variety of content than a system with limited 
channels. 
There are a number of reasons, already explained in Chapter one, that 
warrant this statement. Commercial broadcasting is based not on the 
sale of programmes to audiences but on the sale of audiences to 
advertisers. Thus the introduction of more competitors reduces 
advertising revenues both by spreading them between a greater number 
of channels and by splitting potential audiences into even smaller 
groups. As the main incentive remains the attraction of the largest 
possible audience, the competing channels, less constrained by 
regulation to produce a variety of programmes, tend to show more of 
the same or similar programmes (Curran and Seaton, 1991). Here 
arises the issue of duplication of news content. The more the channels 
of communication are competing for the same 'market' of people or 
region at the same time, the more we should expect duplication of 
content. Evidence concerning American and British television news, 
under conditions of competing services, support this statement (see, 
among others, Glasgow Media Group, 1976; Morrison and Tumber, 
1988; London Economics, 1995). The rules of the market can also lead 
to the lowering of the standards to produce an improved product, since 
it is cheaper for organisations to buy an international i sed soap opera 
than make their own drama. This results in less variety in the kind of 
programmes that are not likely to attract top audience ratings. 
Thus the victims of media deregulation are choice, access, creativity 
and quality in product output. This situation is becoming even worse 
because of the increasing tendency towards concentrated ownership 
across the media industry. The current trends in media structure and 
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organisation are likely to lead to the loss of diversity in access, choice 
and in taste levels. Chain ownership of newspapers, cross-ownership 
between different media and many inter-lockings between the media 
and other industries are familiar processes in an unregulated world and 
have as a result the creation of a certain amount of standardisation and 
homogeneity in media products. A process of global horizontal and 
vertical integration, described in detail in Chapter two. has led to large 
software media enterprises being taken over by large electronic 
hardware firms or by companies outside the media sector. The motives 
of such a process were the gaining of straight market power and 
profits, the gaining of economies of scale, the gaining of 'synergy' 
resulting from interaction among differing technology within an 
enterprise, or even the desire to build an empire for prestige purposes. 
The proliferation of broadcasting channels in the hands of a small band 
of operators, 'liberated' by government policy from the obligations of 
public service variety, have a negative effect on diversity and on 
political depth. As the different media are converging on each other, as 
they compete for much the same market, it becomes harder for them to 
give attention to world affairs, domestic politics, or minority 
programming. Access to information is becoming more and more 
harder to achieve, sufficient balance in the representation of news or 
current affairs programmes is not safeguarded, whereas 'choice' has 
proved to be a myth as the market does indeed deliver more, but more 
of the same. 
The threats to diversity of public expression arising from deregulation 
and emerging patterns of media ownership and control urgently 
require policy responses. An argument could be made here that, tý 
whereas a commercial media company has to put profits first, a public 
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service broadcaster can pursue other objectives, including the objective 
of providing a neutral forum for the discussion of political, cultural 
and social issues. In this role it has clear advantages compared with a 
profit-seeking firm. Where it is entirely owned by the ý(_Y_overnment, it 
is immune to take-over; if some private shareholding is allowed, a 
blocking 'golden share' can be held by the government and therefore 
the immunity can be maintained. Its journalists need therefore not feel 
intimidated by proprietors or management, or required to adjust their 
political statements to meet the proprietors' wishes. Moreover, when it 
comes to reporting and analysing controversial issues which, for 
example, affect their own profits, privately-owned media companies 
are unlikely to be objective. But a public sector broadcaster with non- 
market funding can try to present all sides of the case. In addition, 
commercial broadcasters in an unregulated world would decide the 
balance between news coverage and the rest of their programming by 
the profit criterion-, a public service broadcaster can instead try to 
provide a news service that is both comprehensive and accurate. An 
appropriate mix of news and other programming can thus be achieved. 
A public service broadcaster which could be required, by statute, to 
encourage the honesty, transparency and diversity of the socio-cultural 
and political debate, could thus provide a valuable alternative. The 
main policy response to the digital revolution should be to maintain 
positive encouragement of universally available public service 
broadcasting, which would aim to fulfil the following criteria: reflect 
and promote national culture; provide independent news and current 
affairs programmes; expand the interests of audiences, especially in the 
arts and sciences; make available to the entire population important 
national and local events; provide educational programmes for all ages-, zn 
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provide worthwhile programmes for children; and aim at the highest 
standards of decency. The maintenance of a healthy public sector 
broadcaster, however important it is, is not of course the only solution 
to the problem of loss of diversity. The second purpose of regulation 
should be to prevent undue concentration of influence at any stage of 
the process of conveying material to viewers, listeners and readers. If 
the market place for ideas (ideas being broadly interpreted to include 
all types of content) is to succeed, we must ensure that a balanced 
content (including both mainstream and unpopular programming) has 
some way of entering the mass communication flow. This balance in 
Europe has historically been achieved not only through regulation but 
also through competition. 
As explained in Chapter three, competition policy in general is 
concerned firstly with preventing agreements between undertakings 
that reduce the effectiveness of the competitive process, secondly with 
controlling mergers that increase the probability of exercising undue 
market power, and thirdly with anti- competitive behaviour that enables 
companies either to acquire market power or to increase barriers to 
entry. Competition policy rules ensure (or should ensure) that the 
competitive process is not threatened by either market structure or the 
conduct of firms. Its application though to the media industry cannot 
always safeguard other values and objectives such as diversity and 
freedom of expression. Media policy has encompassed a much wider 
range of public values and objectives than the efficient functioning of 
private markets. The media play a central role as a disseminator of 
information, opinions and culture, and policies are often founded on 
broad principles governing the circulation of ideas and information 
that are fundamental values for pluralistic democratic societies. 
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Precisely because of the nature of the media industry, competition 
policy objectives are not enough for preserving other policy objecti\, es. 
This is not to say that competition policy does not have a role to play in 
the cultural field. Policies promoting efficient competition may limit 
concentration of media control and at the same time they may also 
promote the presentation of diverse points of view. However, the 
safeguarding of a competitive environment and the promotion of 
diversity are different (although sometimes overlapping) objectives. 
The latter can only be fostered by specific media rules on either 
content or ownership. 
The current position of the Commission of the European Communities 
for addressing this issue is to apply measures tackling the structure of 
the communications industries. The proposal, expressed in the 1992 
Green Paper on 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal 
Market', is to limit the number and size of the media operations that 
any one person or group can control. Diversified ownership and 
harmonisation of national restrictions in the area of media 
concentration, the argument runs, will both establish a 'level playing 
field' and eliminate the threat to diversity of information. The 
Commission's main objective though is not to maintain pluralism and 
diversity in the media, but to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market. The craving for the harmonisation of national media 
ownership rules has more to do with ensuring the smooth operation of 
the single market rather than safeguarding media diversity as such. The 
apparent favour on the part of the Commission for harmonising media 
ownership restrictions is not surprising, as it is fully in line with its 
position in other areas: indeed, the Commission is known to regard 
Final Conclusions 2 54 
competition in the market for corporate control as a natural expansion 
of competition in product, labour and capital markets. 
Although ownership restrictions are certainly needed for the pursuit of 
diversity, there are a number of problems with their suitability to 
deliver this desirable goal. There are doubts on the enforcement of 
ownership control rules, as these may be easily bypassed through, for 
example, inter-lockings, 'sleeping partners', etc. This leads us to the 
problem of identifying accurately the notion of the 'media controller', 
extensively analysed in Chapter four. It is imperative to extent the 
'media controller' concept so as to encompass influences exerted by 
companies upstream and downstream, advertisers, managers, and so 
forth. In addition, any examination of media diversity cannot confine 
itself to concentration at the delivery stage, as the 1992 Commission 
Green Paper stated. The creative stage should also be taken into 
consideration since some companies may exercise a monopoly in the 
supply of products to channels. Disney, for instance, has a monopoly in 
the supply of cartoons to almost all major European channels. ITN 
exercises a near monopoly in the supply of news to ITV network. 
Independent TV producers in recent years are supplying more and 
more material to broadcasters. Therefore, it is not always the owner of 
the distribution mechanism who decides what the viewer watches. In 
this sense, regulations that are tailored specifically to the 'controller' of 
the medium (the Green Paper's favoured term) may not capture 
entirely the true extent of media concentration. 
Apart from the problem of the enforcement of potential ownership 
rules, there is the whole question of whether European regulation can 
ever be a reality in this area. National restrictions on media ownership 
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(as the Commission recognises at pages 55 and 56 of its 1992 Green 
Paper) are diverse and inconsistent. As we have seen, several Member 
States are planning to amend or introduce new regulations to control 
concentration patterns in the media. There are proposals for new anti- 
concentration rules in Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy, 
whilst Greece has already amended the national rules on media 
ownership and the United Kingdom is about to do so. Individual 
national problems and local pressures are determining the pace of 
change and encouraging the creation of new national legislation on the 
already shaky framework of diverse and sometimes discriminatory 
national rules. In Germany, for instance, the impetus for change 
appears to derive from the dissatisfaction of both broadcasters and 
regulatory authorities with the current provisions on media ownership, 
as they are felt to be vague and unworkable as between the German 
States. The stimulus for change in Britain appears to be driven by the 
level of dissatisfaction with current rules, mostly expressed by the 
independent broadcasters who argue that the rules deny them the 
opportunity of achieving economies of scale and chances to compete in 
the global media market. Proposals for changes seem to be based on 
different objectives and perceptions in each Member State. It therefore 
appears highly unlikely, given the history of media regulation in 
Community countries and the different pressures for change, that 
individual Member States will voluntarily legislate to approximate or 
harmonise their laws. 
There are also serious doubts about Community competence to regulate 
in the area of media concentrations and pluralism, since the 
Commission has itself stated in its Green Paper that the objective of 
safeguarding media pluralism as such is neither a Community objective 
Final Conclusions 
nor a matter within Community Jurisdiction. This may prevent the 
Commission, contrary to the wishes of the European Parliament, from 
approaching the issue of media concentration from the cultural and 
human rights perspectives and from tackling it in an all-encompassing 
way. As indicated elsewhere, the European Parliament's view is that 
any legislative act on media concentration must take into account not 
only the economic dimension but also the cultural dimension, the social 
impact and the moral and political implications. Only in this way 
pluralism will be guaranteed. As far as possible however, the 
Commission will leave measures relating to media pluralism and 
diversity to the Member States. The subsidiarity principle of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union requires this. In choosing a 
harmonisation instrument, the Commission must also carefully 
motivate its competence on the basis of the EEC Treaty to prevent that 
the harmonisation measures will be held to be inoperative (particularly 
on the basis of Article 190 EEC). 
If, nevertheless, the Commission decides to regulate in this area, 
another important question concerns the interactive services. Should 
they be included in a potential action on behalf of the European Union? 
Harmonised rules on media ownership and control would not make 
sense if they did not cover multi-media concentration (cross-media 
ownership). The digital revolution and the convergence of information 
technology, telecommunications and broadcasting will bring the 
different media sectors closer together. In the information society, 
programme material will be increasingly designed/created for multi- 
media use and service providers will offer multi-media packages. 
Therefore pluralistic safeguards have to cover all media sectors, 
including radio, TV, free papers, periodicals, etc. Accordingly, new 
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interactive media, particularly those which are of relevance for public 
opinion forming, should not be exempted. It is true, however, that 
interactive services are not yet a reality and no one knows how fast 
they will develop. At least in the initial phase, they will have only a 
marginal impact on public opinion. Nevertheless, allowing this sector 
to come under the influence of one or a few media conglomerates 
could have far-reaching and almost irreversible effects for pluralism in 
the future media landscape. Applying media ownership limitations only 
to a part of the media would also distort competition between the 
different media sectors. Distortions within the Internal Market could 
arise from the fact that in some countries interactive services are 
covered by the same media ownership rules as broadcasting, while in 
others no limitations apply. 
A possible solution would be to specify that Member States have to 
ensure equivalent safeguards for pluralism with regard to interactive 
media (e. g. video on demand, electronic publishing), at least when such 
services have attained a considerable share of the overall media market. 
Harmonisation of the criteria applied to interactive services (e. g. 
audience measurement) could then be left to a future review of a 
Community instrument. Flexibility in forming any regulatory 
framework is indeed crucial. Regulators, whether at national or 
European Union level, will have to get used to shorter life-cycles of 
regulatory framework in rapidly changing environment, to avoid 
legislation becoming out-dated. An example of this is the 1990 British 
Broadcasting Act, widely acknowledged to have been designed with the 
old BBCATV duopoly in mind and clearly already out of date in the 
new multi-channel environment. All regulatory activity should be 
against an evolving technical backdrop, so as to allow an effective 
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mechanism to adapt to technical progress. The 'new media' must thus 
be included in a potential harmonisation instrument. Unless they are, 
not only will the new proposals become rapidly out of date, but the 
very same distortions set up by the 1990 Broadcasting Act (which 
excluded non-domestic satellite from the restriction of cross- 
ownership) will be created afresh. 
The most serious problem though concerning the establishment of a 
Europe-wide legislation is the measurement problem, which is 
discussed in great length in Chapter four. The definition of the relevant 
market in a multi-media context is not a straightforward task, and 
therefore the measurement of market shares is also problematic. The 
difficulty here is that the outcome is extremely sensitive to the specific 
way in which these restrictions are formulated. In particular, the 
choice between restrictions on total audience reached, share of 
ownership in a channel or title, share of industry revenues, etc., is 
crucial and leads to different results as the examples provided in 
Chapter four clearly show. In general, there are a number of issues 
that should be considered when measuring multi-media concentration. 
Firstly, relevant markets must be defined with great caution. The 
comparison between national and regional channels could lead to false 
results as the Arthur Andersen's study in particular allowed to be seen. 
Distinctions would have to be made with regard to different 
distribution areas. It would not be possible to apply the same audience 
or financial thresholds in different contexts. In smaller countries and 
restricted language areas, for example, there may be room for one or 
two generalist TV channels whereas in large markets an audience share 
of, say, 25% would appear high. The definition of relevant products 
and the search for close substitutes is the second task. Even within one 
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and the same media sector, crucial decisions have to be made. For 
example, should videos or pay-TV be included when considering the 
television market? 
Having considered these issues, the regulator must then choose the 
appropriate unit for measuring media concentration. As already said, 
possible measures suggested for establishing a method of assessing 
multi-media concentration levels include advertising revenue/ 
expenditure, time spent consuming media, circulation, etc. There are a 
number of reasons why none of these measures alone could be used to 
measure concentration levels and establish impact: a) they give 
radically different results. For example, radio generates relatively little 
revenue but it listened to for many hours. It would therefore appear 
small on one measure and large on another. The 'objective' result, as 
we proposed, would be for both measures to be taken into account, as 
each measure provides some important information about the influence 
of different companies; b) particular results are favoured by particular 
groups. For instance, News International (through the Arthur 
Andersen study) supports the measurement of 'influence' by using the 
criterion of time spent. In contrast, the British Media Industry Group, 
representing Associated Newspapers, Pearsons, the Guardian and the 
Telegraph group, favour what it calls 'share of voice', which is in fact 
share of audience/circulation. The results are sharply different. The 
first makes News International look relatively small, whereas the 
second does the same for the BMIG (see Tables 4.5 and 4.4 above 
respectively). Such results clearly coincide with the interests of each of 
the groups that have suggested them. Moreover, both News 
International and the BMIG include public service broadcasters in their 
measures. This has the effect of making both groups look much smaller 
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than would otherwise be the case and of making the BBC appear 
particularly large. As we have argued elsewhere however, public 
service broadcasters should be excluded from any potential initiative to 
regulate media ownership due both to their obligation to provide 
internal pluralism (i. e. a range and diversity of material and views 
within their output) and to the fact that public channels are not 
available for sale or take-over. 
The contribution of this study rests on the development of better 
measures capable of both assessing accurately the degree of 
concentration in a given market and protecting best desirable social 
objectives such as diversity of access and content. Its originality reposes 
on the fact that while accepting the urgent need for new standards to 
measure media concentration and pluralism in the media market, it 
concludes that the proposed units are not sufficient to capture 
'influence'. None of the above described measures alone can effectively 
assess pluralism. ) measure 'influence' and establish the 
impact of media 
controllers on the diversity of views in a society. The variety of 
possible measures combined with different results makes it highly 
unlikely that any search for a single 'objective' measure will succeed. 
Alternative proposals are thus put forward in an attempt to develop a 
better measure which takes into account a large number of public 
interest issues. In the absence of a direct measure of influence, the 
study concludes that it is necessary to develop an approach combining 
the various sets of methods and use it as an alternative technique to 
establish impact indirectly. 
The propositions include a combined test involving advertising and/or 
subscription revenues and audience shares, the setting of a percentage 
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of market share in terms of revenue/expenditure as a threshold for 
further examination of the position, and an approach combi ing more n 
measures such as numerical criteria, revenue share, audience share and 
audience time spent consuming a medium. What all these suggestions 
have in common is that they attempt to mix different measures and 
develop an approach which is applicable to all information services 
with different characteristics. This is because establishing a method of 
measuring multimedia concentration on the basis of a single unit is 
impossible. Combining different types of measurement is more likely 
to provide a valid method. The use of a combination of measures is 
essential since no single measure captures both the quantity and the 
quality of consumption which will tend to determine the degree of 
influence exerted and the extent of access and of content diversity 
offered. In the final analysis though, it is the duty of a regulator to use 
the measurement approaches he/she deems necessary to build up a 
complete picture of the market and the actions required to ensure the 
outcomes the regulation alms to achieve. But the more information 
about the market position of media firms a regulator has, the less 
disputed his/her judgement will be. Just as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer receives a wide range of information to decide whether 
inflationary pressures are sufficient to justify a rise in interest rates, so 
any media regulator will need a great deal of information extracted 
from a wide range of indicators to help him/her decide whether the 
influence of a particular company is a cause of concern. 
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APPENDIX I 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
COUNTRY Limitation of combined ownership in the same sector 
(press) 
Belgium Newspapers or newspaper publishing chains owned by one and the 
same natural or legal person holding more than 50% of the shares 
cannot make separate claims for direct press aid unless they can show 
that each paper or publishing chain is an independent editorial unit. 
France A natural or legal person or group of persons cannot own or control, 
directly or indirectly, or publish daily publications devoted to general or 
political news if the circulation exceeds 30% of the total national 
circulation of all the daily publications of the same nature. 
Germany Provisions of combined ownership in the press sector are laid down in 
the Act Against Restrictions of Competition. Special reduced reference 
thresholds apply to merger controls for newspapers and magazines 
(DM 25 million turnover per annum). 
Greece With Law 2328/1995, a natural or legal person cannot own or control, 
directly or indirectly, more than one national morning, evening and 
weekly daily publications. He can however own up to 2 local non- 
dailies, provided that he does not own more than 2 national dailies. 
These restrictions apply to all kin (up to forth degree of kinship) 
provided that they cannot prove financial independence. 
Italy The position of an undertaking or person is considered dominant if the 
undertaking or a person publishes or controls companies which publish 
daily newspapers whose circulation during the previous year exceeded 
a certain percentage (20% at national level, 50% in any one inter- 
regional area). This principle also applies in the case of publication (or 
control of companies which publish) of more than 50% of the 
newspapers published in the same region (if there is more than one 
newspaper), or where links are established with companies publishing 
daily newspapers whose circulation exceeded 30% of the total 
circulation of daily newspapers in Italy during the previous year. 
The There is no press concentration regulation at the time of writing. There 
Netherlands is though an on-going political debate on such regulation. Limits of 
25% or 33% of the market have been proposed during this debate. - United The prior consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry is 
Kingdom required for the transfer of ownership of newspapers (or their control 
following such a transfer) to a person or legal entity which already 
controls papers with an average circulation of 500,000 or more copies. 
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APPENDIX 11 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
(continued) 
COUNTRY Limitation of combined ownership in the same sector 
(radio) 
Belgium In the French Community of Belgium, a natural or legal person cannot hold, either directly or indirectly, more than 24% of the capital of more 
than 5 radio stations, nor hold more than one-third of the shares in the 
management bodies of more than 5 private radio stations, nor manage 
more than 5 private radio stations. In Belgium's German-speaking and Flemish Communities, where the operation of local radio stations is 
restricted to associations, no association may operate more than one 
such station. 
France A person (company, association or foundation) owning a national Hertzian network serving more than 30 million people may only obtain 
new Hertzian sound radio licences if the population served on the basis 
of these new licences does not exceed 15 million. In the field of cable 
radio broadcasting, combining services is lawful up to a population of 
8 million. 
Germany Regarding the private broadcasting sector, a broadcaster may only 
broadcast up to 2 nation-wide radio programmes (one of which must be 
a full programme and the other specifically concentrating on news). 
Account must be taken of the broadcaster's other German-language 
programmes which can be received nation-wide and of the natural or 
legal persons with whom the broadcaster is connected. The Land laws 
may lay down additional limitations for programmes covering the Land 
territory only. 
Greece With Law 2328/1995, a natural or legal person cannot hold more than 
one radio station. The same rules apply to all kin (up to forth degree of 
kinship) provided that they cannot prove financial independence. 
Italy Operating licences for national radio services granted to the same 
person or group may not exceed 25% of the total number of national 
networks and may in no case exceed 3. Operating licences for local 
radio services may not exceed I per broadcasting zone or 7 for all the 
broadcasting zones, on the condition that they do not cover a 
10 million. population of more than 
The There is a strict division between the public and private broadcasting , 
Netherlands domains. A public broadcasting organisation cannot obtain permission 
in a commercial to run a commercial station and cannot participate 
broadcasting organisation. 
United Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the maximum number of licences a 
Kingdom person can hold at any one time is: I for national radio services, 20 for 
local radio services and 6 for restricted radio services. However, the 
government plans to raise the limit on the joint holding of local radio 
licences from 20 to 35 in the short term and abolish the numerical limits 
on the number of radio licences held in the longer term. 
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APPENDIX III 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
(continnech 
COUNTRY Limitation of combined ownership in the same sector (national television) 
Belgium The French Community's public service broadcasting body (RTBF) 
may not hold more than 24% of the capital of private TV services. Further, a natural person holding more than 24% of the capital of one French Community private TV service, either directly or indirectly, 
may not hold more than 24%, either directly or indirectly, of another. Finally, a tele-distributor and his manager may not jointly hold more 
than 24% of the capital of a French Community private TV service, nor hold more than one-third of the shares in the management bodies, nor 
manage a French Community private TV service or a local or 
community television service. 
France -A natural or legal person cannot hold more than 49% of the capital of 
a nation-wide television station. The authorisation to operate a TV 
service with nation-wide coverage excludes any other authorisation for 
a national television service broadcast by terrestrial Hertzian waves; 
- The combining of 2 satellite television services is lawful. A service broadcast by terrestrial Hertzian waves and transmitted simultaneously 
by direct broadcasting satellite is regarded as a single service broadcast 
by Hertzian waves. 
Germany Regarding the private broadcasting sector, a broadcaster may only 
broadcast up to 2 nation-wide TV programmes (one of which must be a 
full programme and the other specifically concentrating on news). In 
one of them, he/she may own up to 50% of the capital of the medium. 
Account must be taken of the broadcaster's other German-language 
programmes which can be received nation-wide, and of the natural or 
legal persons with whom the broadcaster is connected. 
Greece With Law 2328/1995, a natural or legal person cannot hold more than 
25% of the capital of a nation-wide television station. The same rules 
apply to all kin (up to forth degree of kinship) provided that they cannot 
prove financial independence. 
Italy Operating licences for national television services granted to the same 
person or group may not exceed 25% of the total number of national 
networks and may in no case exceed three. The rules enable a media 
fin-n to own up to 100% of a television channel. 
The There is a strict division between the public and private broadcasting 
Netherlands domains. A public broadcasting organisation cannot obtain permission 
to run a commercial station and cannot participate in a commercial 
broadcasting organisation. 
United Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the maximum number of licences a 
Kingdom person can hold at any one time is 2 for the Channel 3 services and I 
for Channel 5. Under the new bill though, which is expected to become 
law in summer 1996, the rule that no company can own more than 2 
regional licences will be abolished. In future, broadcasters will be able 
to expand to up to 15% of total TV audience share. 
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APPENDIX IV 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
(continued) 
COUNTRY Limitation of c'ombined I ownershil? in the same sector 
(local and regional television) 
Belgium There are no restrictions concerning this area. 
France The combining of local and regional television services is authorised for a population of up to 6 million. However, a company may only 
have one television service in any geographical area. The combining of 
services is lawful up to 8 million inhabitants for cable television. 
Germany The Land laws may lay down specific conditions and limitations for 
regional and local television services. 
Greece There is no regulatory framework covering this area. 
Italy Local television service operating licences granted to the same person 
may not exceed 1 for any broadcasting zone or 3 for different 
broadcasting zones. These zones may be adjacent, provided that their 
joint populations do not exceed 10 million. 
The Only public broadcasting is allowed at the local and regional levels. 
Netherlands 
United Under the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the maximum number of licences a 
Kingdom person can hold at the same time is 2 for the Channel 3 regional 
services. Under the new bill though, which is expected to become law 
in summer 1996, the rule that no company can own more than 2 
regional licences will be abolished. In future, broadcasters will be able 
to expand to up to 15% of total TV audience share. 
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APPENDIX V 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES (cont. ) 
COUNTRY Limitation of combined ownership in different sectors 
(written press and broadcasting) 
Belgium There are no restrictions concerning this area. Publishers have thus 
unlimited access to television. 
France At a national level, no licence for operating a radio station, Hertzian 
television station, or radio and TV cable distribution neovork may be 
granted to a person publishing or controlling one or more dailý' 
publications which print general and political news and whose 
circulation is more than 20% of the national total, if that person also 
owns: one or more television services serving 4 million people, or a 
radio service serving more than 30 million, or one or more television or 
radio cable networks serving more than 6 million. Limitations of the 
same kind exist at the regional and local levels. 
Germany Regarding programmes covering only the territory of a Land, the Land 
broadcasting laws limit the shareholdings of press companies in the 
broadcasting sector. 
Greece With Law 2328/1995, the owner of one or more national or local 
publications may not be a shareholder with more than a 25% interest in 
a national or local TV company, but can own a national or local radio 
station. In general, a natural or legal person can participate to up to two 
media sectors. 
Italy It is forbidden to own: 
-a nationwide TV channel in the case of a company which publishes or 
controls daily newspapers whose circulation during the previous year 
exceeded 16% of the total circulation of daily newspapers in Italy; 
- more than one nation-wide TV channel in the case of the publication 
of daily newspapers whose circulation exceeds 8% of the total; 
- more than two nation-wide TV channels in the case of the publication 
of daily newspapers whose circulation is less than 8%. 
The Permission to operate a national commercial broadcasting station will 
Netherlands be refused when the applicant, or one or more of the corporate bodies 
or companies with which the applicant is connected, hold either alone 
or together, a 25% share of the market in national daily newspapers. 
United The 1990 Broadcasting Act sets out that: 
Kingdom - the owner of a national or local newspaper may only 
be a shareholder 
with more than a 20% interest in a company with a Channel 3 or 
Channel 5 licence or a national radio service (the provision also applies 
conversely); 
- the owner of a local newspaper may only 
be a shareholder with more 
than a 20% interest in a company holding a licence for a local radio or 
cable service (the provision also applies conversely); 
- the owner of a national newspaper with a 
holding of more than 5% 
but less than 20% in a company holding a Channel 3, Channel 5 or 
national radio service may not be a shareholder with more than a 
5% 
interest in another similar company (the provision also applies 
conversely). 
But the government proposes to establish a circulation threshold, 
below 
which newspaper groups will be free to own outright TV and radio 
broadcasters, and vice versa. Newspapers below the 20% national 
circulation threshold will be able to apply for approval to expand to 
control up to 15% of the total TV market (by audience share). 
They will 
also be able to apply for approval to control radio stations and vice 
versa. Only one national radio licence could be controlled, and 
given foi- newspapers approvals for local radio licences would not be * with more than 30% of the circulation in the particular local)tN .I 
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APPENDIX VI 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES IN SELECTED EU COUNTRIES 
(continued) 
COUNTRY Limitation of combined ownership in different sectors (radio and television) 
Belgium A natural or legal person holding more than 24% of the capital of a French Community private television service, either directly or indirectly, may not hold more than 24% of the capital of more than 5 
private radio services. 
France At a national level, no licence may be granted for the operation of a 
radio, Hertzian television or radio and TV cable distribution network to 
a person who is in more than two of the following situations: 
- holds one or more licences for a television service covering more than 4 million people; 
- holds a licence for a radio station serving more than 30 million; 
- holds one or more licences to operate radio and TV cable distribution 
networks serving a population of more than 6 million; 
- publishes or controls one or more daily papers printing political or 
general news, whose circulation is more than 20% of the national total. Limitations of the same kind exist at the local and regional levels. 
Germany Regarding the private broadcasting sector, a broadcaster may only broadcast up to 2 nation-wide TV or radio programmes. Regarding 
programmes covering only the territory of a Land, the Land 
broadcasting laws limit the shareholdings of radio companies in the 
television sector and vice versa. 
Greece With Law 2328/1995, a broadcaster may only own one national or 
local radio station, and may not be a shareholder with more than a 25% 
interest in a national or local TV company. In general, a natural or legal 
person can participate to up to two media sectors. 
Italy Anyone who has been granted a licence for a local television service 
may also be granted a local radio service licence, provided that the 
number of radio service licence applications for the same area does not 
exceed the number of frequencies to be allocated. However, no one 
may be a licensee or franchisee for a sound radio and television service 
both nationally and locally at the same time. 
The A public broadcasting organisation cannot obtain permission to run a 
Netherlands commercial station and cannot participate in a commercial broadcasting 
organisation. 
United The current restriction of television companies owning radio stations 
Kingdom has been explored above. The British government has however decided 
to allow TV companies to own radio broadcasters (and newspaper 
companies) subject to a maximum share of 15%. It should be noted 
though that it will continue to apply the present ban on common 
ownership of Channel 3 licences or cable companies and local radio 
stations in areas where there is significant overlap in population served. 
Source: Committee of Experts on Media Concentration and Pluralism (MM-CM (93) 
6, MM-CM (94) 6); Media Ownership: The Government's Proposals (Cm 2872, 
1995); The Guardian (16-12-1995); Financial Times (16-12-1995); The Greek 
Broadcasting Bill (232811995); To Vima (13-08-1995); Media View (April 1995); 
Kagan World Media (1995); Media Map (1995). 
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APPENDIX VII 
MULTIMEDIA ALLIANCES 
Software production/con tent ownership alliances 
Acclaim Entertainment/Lightstorm Entertainment 
Acclaim has exclusive option to produce video games based on Lightstorm movie properties 
Apple/Time Warner Interactive 
Joint development of multimedia software AT&T/Paramount Communications 
joint development of interactive TV programming AT&T/PF Magic 
joint development of networked video games IBM/Boss Films 
joint special effects development 
JVC Entertainment/Luc Besson 
joint movie production 
JVC Entertainment/Jim Jarmusch 
joint movie production 
JVC Entertainment/Tribeca 
joint movie production 
Largo Entertainment/Total Vision 
joint development of multimedia software 
New Line/Virtual World Entertainment 
NLC has first-look deal for movies based on VWE game properties Paramount Technology Group/Spectrum Holobyte 
joint development of multimedia software 
Philips POV/Propaganda Films 
joint development of multimedia software 
Polygram/Egg Pictures (Jodie Foster) 
joint movie production 
Polygram/MFP 
joint movie production 
Sega/Walt Disney Computer Software 
joint development of multimedia software 
Sega/Shochiku 
joint development of multimedia software based on Shochiku movie properties 
Working Title/Havoc (Tim Robbins) 
joint movie production 
Distribution/software delivery alliances 
Apple/Ameritech/BellSouth/US West 
collaboration on communications development of Apple Newton technology 
AT&T/PF Magic/Sega 
joint development of networking facility for Sega video games 
News Corp/BT 
exploring digital distribution opportunities 
Polygram/MGM 
MGM/UA to distribute major films releases for Polygram Filmed Entertainment 
TCI/Fox 
F/X US basic cable network 
Key technology alliances 
3DO/American Laser Games 
joint development of 3DO arcade games 
3DO/Atari Games 
joint development of 3DO arcade applications 
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3DO/Sanyo 
Sanyo a 3DO hardware licensee 
Apple/Matsushita (Kyushu) 
licensee of Apple Newton technology 
Apple/Sharp 
licensee of Apple Newton technology 
Apple/Siemens 
licensee of Apple Newton technology 
Apple/Toshiba 
joint development of 'Sweet Pea' CD-ROM reader AT&TNiacom Cable 
AT&T providing computer server for video-on-demand tests in Castro Valley, California 
BT/Olivetti 
partnership for development of video conferencing systems BT/Motorola 
joint development of video conferencing chip-set, in conjunction with VideoLogic Canal Plus/Bertelsmann 
joint approach to digital TV development 
AT&T/Pacific Bell 
AT&T supplying equipment for Pacific Bell's 'superhighway' 
Bell Atlantic/Stet 
BA helping Italian PTT with video-on-demand trials 
DirecTV/Compression Labs 
CLI supplying encoders and decoders for DirecTV digital DBS 
DirecTV/Thomson 
Thomson supplying receivers for DirecTV digital DBS 
DirecTV/News Datacom 
ND supplying digital encryption system for digital DBS 
EMC3/Goldstar/Hitachi/Daewoo/Samsung 
development of VCRs with EMC3 time-compressed video-on-demand feature 
General Ins tru ment/Intel/Mic rosoft 
joint development of 'smart' digital cable box and user interface 
General Instrument/MIT 
joint development of digital HDTV systems 
General Instrument/Samsung 
collaboration on manufacture of Digicipher equipment 
General Instrument/Toshiba 
joint development of digital HDTV VCR 
GO/EO/Matsushita 
Matsushita manufacturing EO personal communicators 
IBMIICTV 
joint development of video-on-demand cable system (with New Century Comm) 
IBM/R Greenberg Associates 
joint development of digital imaging techniques for Power Visualisation System 
IBMNideo Logic 
joint development of multimedia PC chips 
LucasFilm/Avid Technology 
jointly developing digital editing system 
News Corp/Comstream. /NTL 
Comstream and NTL contracted to develop digital TV system for BSkyB 
News Corp/BT/Cellnet 
exploring opportunities arising from digitisation 
News Corp/Kirch Group 
joint approach to digital TV development 
NYNEX/Liberty Cable 
video-on-demand trial in New York with Time Warner Cable 
Philips/Broadband Technologies/Compression Labs 
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developing technology for transmitting compressed video via telecoms nem, ork, " Philips/Kodak 
joint development of Photo CD standard 
Philips/Motorola 
joint development of CD-I chip-sets 
Philips/Xing Technology 
Philips Semiconductors working with Xing on chips for compressing, video with PCs Pioneer/NEC 
Pioneer LaserActive system incorporates NEC Turbo Graphics games system 
Pioneer/Sega 
Pioneer LaserActive system incorporates Sega game capability 
Scientific Atlanda/Motorola/Kaleida/Labs/Time Warner Cable 
joint development of 'smart' digital cable box and user interface 
Scientific Atlanda/NTL 
joint development of broadcast video compression systems 
Sega/Amstrad 
Amstrad making PCs incorporating Sega game drive 
Sega/Hitachi 
joint development of next generation video games machine 
Sega/Virtuality 
provides key virtual reality technology for development of Sega VR arcade systems 
Silicon Graphics/Avid Technology 
joint development of random access editing systems 
Silicon Graphics/Nintendo 
joint development of next generation video games machine 
Time Warner Cable/Silicon Graphics 
SG is providing computer video server for TWC video-on-demand tests 
Your Choice TV/TCI/Cablevision Systems/Continental Cable/TWC 
cable groups have committed to testing Discovery's YCTV user interface and menu- 
based software (other doings so include Cox Cable, Newhouse, Times Mirror Cable, 
Comcast) 
Zenith Electronics/LSI Logic 
joint development of integrated circuits for digital cable TV boxes 
Source: Screen Digest, January 1994 
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APPENDIX VIII 
COMPETITION LAW IN cjFl, FCTFTl PIT d""Ulcr'rD'vc 
COUNTRY Control of mergers, takeovers and integration operations 
(competition law) 
Belgium The law of 5 August 1991 on the protection of economic competition (which came into force on I April 1993), subjects integration operators above a certain level to 
the prior approval of the Competition Committee (i. e. operations relating to the 
integration of companies with a turnover exceeding I billion Belgian francs and 
which have joint control of more than 20% of the market concerned). Approval may 
be given on certain conditions and may impose certain obligations. 
France Media firms are subject to the supervision of the Competition Council. The Conseil 
Superieur de I'Audiovisuel (CSA) informs the Competition Council of such abuses 
of dominant positions and of such practices hindering, the free exercise of 
competition as may come to its notice in the audio-visual sector. It may advice the 
government for the development of competition in audio-visual communication. 
Germany Media sector companies are subject to the provisions of the Act Against Restraints 
of Competition. Because of the particular nature of the newspaper market, special 
reduced reference thresholds apply to merger controls for newspapers and magazines 
(DM 25 million rather than DM 50 million turnover per annum). 
Greece Media sector companies are subject to the provisions of law 703/1977 (as amended 
by law 2296/1995) safeguarding competition and the market which regulate 
concentrations and abuse of dominant positions. Concentrations must be notified to 
the Competition Committee if: 
- the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertakings exceeds 50 million 
ECUs, and the national turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings is more 
than 5 million ECUs; or 
- if a 25% share of the national market is created or increased. 
Italy Media sector firms are subject to provisions of legislation safeguarding competition 
and the market, which regulate concentrations and abuses of dominant positions. For 
firms in the media sector, these regulations are implemented by the Broadcasting and 
Publishing Guarantor. 
The Media sector companies are subject to the provisions of general legislation on 
Netherlands competition. Under the law on economic competition, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs may declare some agreements affecting competition to be wholly or partially 
c interest. He may also inoperative if he considers them to be against the pub 11 
. . impose obligations on firms occupying a dominant position which is contrary to 
the public interest. 
United Existing United Kingdom competition law provides for case by case investigation of 
Kingdom mergers, monopolies and anti- c ompetiti ve practices and restrictive agreements. 
Separate roles are given to the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT), the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) and the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry - A merger qualifies for investigation by the MMC if the value of the assets taken 
over exceeds E70 million or if a 25% share of the market is created or increased. The 
DGFI' advises the Secretary of State, who decides whether to refer a merger to the 
MMC. In practice, only a small proportion of qualifying mergers is referred to the 
MMC. If (and only if) the MMC finds that the merger would operate against the 
tate has powers to enforce remedial action public interest, the Secretary of S 
including banning the merger. Special rules apply to newspaper mergers, where a i 
reference to the MMC is usually necessary. 
1 ilar model. The monopoly and anti-competitive practices legislation follows as mi 
The DGFIF may make references to the MMC where a firm has a 25% share of a 
particular market. The MMC investigates and reaches a judgement on the public 
interest, and, if the MMC's finding is adverse, it is for the Secretary of State to 
decide what remedial action to take. The system thus gives the authorities wide 
I discretion. 
--, -1 ,. ff I ff 'ý 
I ff In '3 ý 
Source: Committee of Experts on Media Concentration and Pluralism (MIVI-(, ivi (5, -1) 
6, MM-CM (94) 6); Media Ownership: The Government's Proposals (Cm 2872, 
1995); The Greek Competition Law (703-1977 as amended by 229611995). 
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APPENDIX IX 
Pluralism and Media Concentration in the internal Market 
Questionnaire No I 
concerning a possible initiative on media ownership 
QUESTION 1: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties 
regarding the needs for action, and in particular on: 
- any cases where the Community dimension of media activity has meant that 
restrictions on media ownership imposed for the purpose of maintaining pluralism have become ineffective, for example because they are circumvented or because of 
transparency problems; 
- the existence of restrictions or restrictive effects other than those identified here; 
- practical instances where ownership restrictions have actually impeded the activity of 
economic operators in the sector; 
- the sectors and activities which are especially affected by restrictions on ownership (for example, is the press subject to restrictive effects not only in respect of multimedia 
aspects but also in respect of monomedia aspects? ). 
QUESTION 2: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on 
whether the needs identified are of sufficient importance, in the light of Community 
objectives, to require action in the media industry and, if so, when such action should 
be taken. 
QUESTION 3: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the 
effectiveness, in the light of Community objectives, of action which would be taken 
solely at Member State level. 
QUESTION 4: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the 
content of a possible harmonisation instrument as envisaged above, and in particular 
on the two variants for its scope, on the use of the real audience as a basis for setting 
thresholds, on the demarcation of distribution areas, on any other possible references, 
and on ways of defining the concept of controller. 
QUESTION 5: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the 
desirability of action to promote transparency which would be separate from a 
harmonisation instrument. 
QUESTION 6: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on the 
desirability of setting up a body with competence for media concentration. 
QUESTION 7: The Commission would welcome the views of interested parties on 
each these foreseeable options. 
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APPENDIX X 
List of non-confidential written comments on the Green Paper 
- Commentsfrom European federations or associations 
Association des Television Commerciales Europeennes (ACT) 
European Association of Advertising Agencies (EAAA) 
Association Europeenne des Radios (AER) 
European Advertising Tripartite (EAT) 
European Committee of Trade Unions in Arts, Mass Media and Entertainment (EGAKU) 
European Publishers Council (EPQ 
Federation Europeenne des Radios Libres (FERL) 
European Group of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) World Federation of Advertisers (YvTA) 
Comite des Industries Cinernatographiques et Audiovisuelles des Communautes 
Europeennes et de I'Europe extracommunautaire (CICCE) 
European Broadcasting Union/Union Europeenne de Radio-Television (EBU/UER) 
AMARC-EUROPE 
European Newspaper Publishers' Association (ENPA-CAEJ) 
Europaische Grafische Foderation 
- Comments from interested parties other than federations or associations 
Broadcasting Entertainment Cinernatograph & Theatre Union (BECTU) 
Channel Four Television 
Europaisches Medieninstitut 
Editoriale I'Espresso 
ITV 
Institute for Information Law JVIR) 
New International p1c. 
Pearson p1c. 
Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) / Arbeitsgemeinschaft der offentlichrechtlichen 
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) 
Independent Television Commission (ITC) 
Fininvest Comunicazioni 
British Sky Broadcasting Limited (BSkyB) 
Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telekommunikation e. V. (VPRT) 
Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali 
RTL plus Deutschland Fernsehen 
Federazione Radio Televisioni (FRT) 
Reuters 
RCS Editori "Rizzoli Corriere della Serza" 
Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e. V. 
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APPENDIX XI 
Complementgj: y Questionnaire 
relating to the Green Paper 'Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: 
an assessment of the need for Community action', of 23 December 1992 (CONI (92) 480 final) 
QUESTION A. New technologies 
A. 1 Identify the new technologies or those under expansion which will affect the 
market (distinguishing namely between those which, from the point of view of the 
consumer, will replace existing technology and those which will be of a more 
complementary nature, giving details of the expected time scale for implementation of 
these technologies). 
A. 2 What economic impacts will be foreseeable at the Community level, in particular 
on the market structure and on the strategy of operators within the internal market? 
This evaluation will not have to be all encompassing but should be carried out on a 
technology by technology basis. It is important to give precise information about the 
access costs to these technologies, in particular for the consumer and the operators. 
A. 3 What impacts will be foreseeable on the national statutory arena in regard to media 
ownership? Does current national legislation covering media ownership permit, or, on 
the contrary, limit, the development of these new technologies (explain the effect of 
any limitations)? 
A. 4 To what degree could the new technologies develop conditions for the granting of 
authorisations or licences applicable to television or radio operators'? In particular, 
which conditions, besides those relating to pluralism, could be envisaged? 
QUESTION B. Potential development of national legislations 
B 1. Are you aware of any proposals for new anti -c onc entratio n rules, in the Member States, specific to the media? What is their origin and objective? 
B. 2 Would you welcome a change in the applicable regulatory framework? 
B. 3 What factors could change the national regulatory framework in the future (new 
broadcaster authorisations, case law developments, political debates, ineffectiveness of 
national rules, over stringent rules, etc. )? 
BA How long did it take to draw up the current regulations and were you involved in 
this process? 
B. 5 Could these possible changes accentuate or attenuate the regulatory disparity 
between the Member States of the Community? 
QUESTION C. Possible use of the audience criterion 
C. I Given that a criterion of potential audience (like the population covered by a 
satellite footprint) would be too restrictive, what type of audience measurement might 
be utilised, in particular for multimedia and monomedia concentration of radio and 
television enterprises (for example, "audience share" for television, "daily share" for 
radio, number of dailies sold for newspapers)? 
C. 2 With reference to criteria used in national arenas, namely the number of channels, 
will the audience criterion offer more opportunities to access the market, namely for 
thematic channels (by reason of their weak audience)? 
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C. 3 What might the necessary conditions be to make a system using thresholds based Z: ý on audience levels workable (compatibility, comparability, equivalence, etc ...... )? Is it possible to have a single audience criteria applicable to multimedia or is it necessar-N, to 
have several distinct criteria applicable to each media or combinations of media" 
CA Might it be deemed necessary to have complementary criteria such as, for 
example, that of language of the media, that of the type of radio station or TV channel 
concerned, that of the number of licenses granted at the same time, etc ... ? 
C. 5 Should the fixing of thresholds leave a discretion to the member States to sct 
stricter limits for operators established on their territory? 
QUESTION 4. Possible use of the media control criterion 
D. I Is it necessary to go further than existing company law to define media control in 
specific rules? 
D. 2 What comments can be made on the definitions used for media controllers in 
current national regulations? 
D. 3 What elements should a definition contain bearing in mind the objectives of 
effectiveness, adaptability to the Community framework, and compatibility with 
existing systems as well as the economic and technological effects that could result? 
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APPENDIX XII 
Replies to the Co=lementaa Questionnaire 
- Comments from European federations or associations 
Association des Televisions Commerciales Europeenes (ACT) 
Association Europeenne des Radios (AER) 
European Broadcasting Union/union Europeenne de Radio-Television (EBU/UER) 
Federation Graphique Europeenne (EGF) 
European Group of Television Advertising (EGTA) 
Association Europeenne des Editeurs de Journaux (ENPA) 
European Publishers Council (EPQ 
Federation des Associations d'Editeurs de Periodiques de la CE (FAEP) 
Federations des Editeurs europeens/Federation of European Publishers (FEE/FEP) 
Groupernent europeen des Societes d'Auteurs et Compositeurs (GESAC) 
International Federation of Journalists JFJ) 
- Comments from interested parties other than European federations or associations 
Bertelsmann AG 
Channel Four Television 
Fininvest Comunicazioni 
Federazione Italiana Editori Giomali 
FUNK Fragen Unabhangiger Neutraler Kommunikation 
Global Media Italia SRL 
ITC Independent Television Corninission 
ITV Network 
L'Espresso 
News International 
OLON Organisatie van Lokale Omroepen in Nederland 
Pearson plc 
RCS Editori 
RTL Pluls Deutschland Fernsehen 
VDZ Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger e. V. 
Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) 
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APPENDIX XIII 
Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market 
Questionnaire No IH 
concerning a possible initiative on media ownership 
QUESTION A. The need for Communi! y action 
A. 1 Can you comment (giving practical examples, etc. ) on the analy sis of the need for 
a Community initiative set out in the communication? 
A. 2 Have you any specific comments to make on the analyses presented in Part III. A 
of the communication of the impact of establishing a set of Community ground rules" 
QUESTION B. Scope of a possible initiative 
B. I Are new interactive services already covered by the national rules on media 
ownership that concern you? (If so, please describe the relevant provisions). 
B. 2 If not, is any draft regulation under consideration or is the possibility of applying 
rules on media ownership to interactive services under discussion? 
B. 3 Should a possible COMMUnity initiative cover new interactive services? If so, 
why? 
BA Should a possible Community initiative cover concentration between press 
enterprises? (Please give reasons). 
B. 5 Would it not be sufficient to apply (national or Community) competition law, with 
specific notification thresholds where appropriate? 
B. 6 If concentration between press enterprises were to be covered, what type of 
publication should be included (e. g. all daily press, the daily newspapers, magazines)? 
B. 7 Should public channels be fully or partly subject to the same conditions governing 
access to media ownership as private channels? (Please give reasons). 
B. 8 Could certain channels be excluded on the basis of the programmes they broadcast 
(specialised, general-interest, news-only, etc. ) or other criteria such as the language in 
which they are broadcast? 
B. 9 Do the specific rules and regulations on media ownership which are designed to 
safeguard pluralism and which concern you cover operators (in the production, 
distribution, cable distribution, etc. sectors) outside the traditional media (television, 
radio and newspapers)? 
B- 10 Would it be necessary for rules on pluralism (not competition rules) to cover 
non-media enterprises or vertical integration itself? If so, why? 
QUESTION C. Principles unde1pinning the internal market 
C. I Could the place of establishment of a media enterprise be used to determine which 
State is responsible for supervising it and which law it is governed by Ourisdiction 
criterion)? 
C. 2 If it were decided to opt for Community harmonisation, which type of 
harmonisation should be chosen: complete or minimum? 
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QUESTION D. Conditions governing access to media ownership to be included in a possible initiative 
D. I Are there, in the Member State which concerns you, any new rules (dating from after the December 1992 Green Paper), planned measures or discussions on the conditions governing access to media ownership thought necessary in order to safeguard pluralism? If so, what is the approach taken: tighten the limits, relaxing or liberalising the regime to take account of new technologies, increasing effectiveness, etc. ? 
D. 2 What is your assessment (effectiveness, implementation, suitabilitý' for the information society, etc. ) of the criteria used in existing or planned rules and 
regulations on pluralism with a view to limiting media concentration (lirfUtation of the holding that can be acquired in the capital of any one television channel; limitation of the number of channels; limitation by reference to the public served; limitation by 
reference to market share; etc. )? 
D. 3 What type of conditions and what type of criteria should be used in a possible Community initiative on media ownership in order to safeguard pluralism? (Please 
give reasons). 
DA On what analysis (of the impact on pluralism and of the economic impact) do you base your appraisal of the conditions and criteria? (Please present the analytical 
method). 
QUESTION E. Criteria for defining the media controller 
E. I Please describe briefly the definition(s) of media controller used in the rules on 
access to media ownership that concern you. You are welcome to comment on the 
analysis made in the study. 
E. 2 Should a possible Community initiative define de facto control or it be confined to 
de jure control? Where appropriate, how could de facto control be defined in a possible 
Community initiative? 
E. 3 Please comment on the four criteria identified in the study: ownership links, links 
with employees, financial links and contractual links (supply, distribution, etc. ). 
EA How should these criteria be spelt out, in particular the criterion of contractual 
links which should make it possible to cover cases of vertical integration? 
E. 5 If several criteria were to be used for identifying the media controller(s), what 
should be the relationship between them: 
- criteria to be ranked by order of importance, or some criteria having 
subsidiary status; 
- criteria to be applied cumulatively without any order of precedence; 
- assessment on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the national 
authorities? 
E. 6 To what extent do you consider that the vertical integration of functions such as 
broadcasting and conditional access will affect pluralism as well as competition? 
E. 7 Should family links be taken into account in identifying the media controller? If tý' 
so, how: up to what degree? Should a link constitute merely an indication or a 
presumption? Under what circumstances should the presumption be dropped or be 
deemed irreputtable? 
E. 8 Should a change of media controller be subject to prior authorisation or merely to 
notification? 
Appendices 
QUESTION F. Criterion of actual audience 
F. I Could the audience criterion be used, for the purposes of safeguarding pluralism, 
to measure the level of media concentration? Please comment on the attached study on 
the feasibility of using audience measurement. 
F. 2 What conditions would have to be satisfied for it to be feasible to use the audience 
criterion? 
F. 3 Should the audience criterion be used in conjunction with other additional criteria 
(number of channels, revenue, restrictions on holdings, etc. )? If so, why? 
F. 4 Within the area in which the channel is broadcast, should it not be possible to 
waive application of the thresholds where they are exceeded only in asmall or sparsely 
populated area? If so, on what basis should such an area be defined: size or 
population? 
F. 5 What reference period should be taken for audience measurements (e. g. the most 
recent twelve-month period for which data are available)? 
F. 6 What type of audience measurement should be used'? What is your opinion on the 
types of measurement envisaged in the conclusions of the study: 
- monornedia television concentration: Audience share: share of total 7V vieiving time; 
- monomedia radio concentration: Listenership share: share of daily average reach-the 
average number of listeners listening to a station at least once a day; 
- monornedia newspaper concentration (if the case arises): Circulation share: share of daily average number of copies of each issue circulated to the public; 
- multimedia concentration: Daily average contact (radio = listenership share; TV daily average reach (the average number of viewers viewing a channel at least once a 
day); newspapers = daily average readership (the daily average number of readers per 
issue)) ? 
F. 7 Should there be a single overall multimedia limit or several cumulative limits 
according to the type of concentration (monomedia television/monomedia 
radio/multimedia)? 
F. 8 Should a distinction be drawn between the type of channel concerned (speciallsed, 
general -interest, news-only, etc. )? 
F. 9 To what extent could multi-channel television broadcasting be taken into account? 
F. 10 Should the types of measurement (mentioned in question F. 6) be defined and 
spelt out in the directive and, if so, to what extent? 
F. 11 What could be the thresholds above which a media concentration could be limited 
in the interests of pluralism? (Please specify the type of criteria and the reasoning on 
which you base these thresholds). 
F. 12 On what analysis (of the impact on pluralism and of the economic impact) 
do you 
base your view of these thresholds? (Please present the method of analysis). 
F. 13 What effect should exceeding these thresholds have (prohibition of the 
concentration, presumption against it, further examination of the case, 
flexibility in 
other respects, etc. )? 
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QUESTION G. Disqualified persons 
G. I What are the rules restricting or preventing the access of certain persons to media 
ownership in the Member State(s) which concern you? 
G. 2 What types or categories of person should be denied access to media ownership by a possible Conununity initiative, and why? 
QUESTION H. Transparency and exchange of information 
H. I For what types of information should disclosure to the competent authorities be 
made mandatory? 
H. 2 What types of information should be confidential? 
H. 3 How could the direct exchange of information between the national authorities be 
organised and facilitated? 
HA Should information on operators who have been granted an authorisation or 
licence be systematically published? 
QUESTION 1. European committee 
1.1 What advantages could a European committee offer compared with a situation 
where only the national authorities were involved and co-operated directly with each 
other? How could such a committee ensure that a possible initiative was applied more 
effectively? 
1.2 What could be the composition and terms of reference of a European committee? 
1.3 How could the independence of such a comrMttee be ensured? 
QUESTION J. Type of Community instrument 
J. I What type of legal instrument should be chosen for a possible Community 
initiative: a directive, a regulation, a recommendation or any other type of measure 
(please specify)? 
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APPENDIX XIV 
'MEDIA CONTROLLER' DEFINITIONS IN SELECTED COUN'TRIES 
France 
The legislation controlling ownership of the written press refers to control as defined in Article 355-1 of the French Company Law (and as modified on July 12 1985). Article 355-1 is translated as follows: 
... ]a company is considered as controlling another company where it: holds, directly or indirectly, a percentage of the capital giving it a majority of the voting rights at shareholders' meetings of the second company; 
- has, alone, a majority of the voting rights in that company pursuant to an acrreement entered into with other associates or shareholders which is not contrary to the interest of the company; 
- determines in fact, through the voting rights it holds, decisions made at shareholders' 
meetings of that company. 
A company is presumed to exercise this control where it holds, directly or indirectly, 
more than 40 per cent of the voting rights and where no other associate or shareholder directly or indirectly holds more voting rights. 
In addition, 'control' exists 'in any situation in which a physical person or a legal 
entity or a group of physical persons or legal entities would place a publication under its authority or its dependence'. 
In relation to the audio-visual media the 'control' criteria are not used. Instead, legislation provides that the same physical person or legal entity may not hold, directly 
or indirectly, more than a certain percentage of the capital or voting rights of a 
participant media undertaking. The level may vary according to the type of media. The 
percentages are as follows: 
- national broadcast television companies: 
(i) 25%; or 15% if that person already owns more than 15% of another national 
broadcast television company; or 
(ii) 5% if already owns more than 5% in two other national broadcast TV 
firms. 
- regional broadcast television companies: 50% 
- satellite television companies: 
(i) 50%; or one third if that person already owns more than one third of another 
cable television company; or 
(ii) 5% if already owns more than 5% in two other satellite TV firms. 
Germany 
The State's Treaty on Broadcasting distinguishes between full programmes and 
programmes with an emphasis on information (news channels) on the one hand and 
special interest programmes on the other hand. 
In the first case, the broadcaster must be a joint venture in which no shareholder holds 
more than 50% or more of the capital or voting rights or exerts any other form of 
dominant influence. If somebody holds an interest of 25% or more, but less than 50% 
of such a channel, this person or company may hold an interest in only two further 
broadcasters of corresponding programmes to an amount equal to or less than 25% of 
their capital or voting rights. In all cases, a 'de facto' dominant influence fulfils the 
same criteria even if the shareholder holds less than 25% (or such other mentioned 
threshold) of the capital or voting rights. 
Italy 
'Control' for the purposes of the Italian broadcasting legislation is as defined in Article 
2359 of the Italian Civil Code. The following are considered to be'controlled firms': 
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1. firms in which another firm holds the necessity majority to adopt resolutionýs at ordinary' shareholders' meetings; 
2. firms in which another firm holds enough voting rights to exercise a dominant influence at 'ordinary' shareholders' meetings; and 3. firms which are under the dominant influence of another firm by virtue of special contractual links with the latter. 
For the purposes of 1. and 2. above, votes held by controlled firms, trust firms and intermediaries are counted. Votes held on behalf of third parties are not counted. 
Pursuant to Article 37 of the Broadcasting Law, a 'dominant influence' (for the purposes of Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code) is presumed whenever there are financial or organisational relationships which allow any one of the following: 
- communication of profits and losses; 
- co-ordination of the broadcasting business with other businesses in order to achieve a common purpose or in order to limit competition; 
- the distribution of profits or losses in a manner which differs from that which would have otherwise prevailed in the absence of the relationship in question; 
- obtaining more power than would otherwise result from the number of shares held, 
and 
- granting to entities, other than those that would otherwise be entitled to them based 
on the ownership structure, powers in the selection of directors or managers of broadcasting firms, or editors in chief of the programmes. 
The same definitions are used in Article I of the Italian Newspaper Publishing Law. 
The United Kingdom 
Schedule 2 of the 1990 Broadcasting Act (now under review) asserts that a person 
controls a body corporate if: 
1. he holds, or is beneficially entitled to more than 50% of the equity share capital, or 
possesses more than 50% of the voting rights in that body corporate; or 
2. he is liable, by virtue of share ownership or voting rights, to ensure that the affairs 
of the business are conducted in accordance with his wishes; or 
3. he has the power, by virtue of the articles of association or any other corporate 
document, to ensure the affairs of the company are so conducted. 
The provisions of the 1973 Fair Trading Act relating to newspaper mergers provide 
that a newspaper proprietor 'includes (in addition to an actual proprietor of a 
newspaper) any person having a controlling interest in a body corporate which is a 
newspaper proprietor, and any body corporate in which a newspaper proprietor has a 
controlling interest'. A 'controlling interest' exists where a person can, directly or 
indirectly, determine the manner in which one quarter of the votes at general meetings 
may be cast. 
Under the merger reference provisions of the Fair Trading Act reference is made to the 
fact that 'a person or group of persons able, directly or indirectly, to control or 
materially to influence the policy of a body corporate, or the policy of any person in 
carrying on an enterprise, but without having a controlling interest in that body or 
enterprise, may ... be treated as having control of it'. These statutory provisions still leave room for debate over the meaning of 'control'. That is why the government has 
decided to clarify the definition of 'control' in the 1990 Broadcasting Act, to ensure 
that the intention of the legislation cannot be circumvented by institutional 
arrangements which, while they allow for control in practice, do not technically breach 
the statutory definition of control (Cm 2872). 
Source: Media Ownership (Cm 2872,1995); Pearson plc (1994); EIM (1994). 
